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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation examines the record of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA, 2004-14) government in India in its efforts to promote better equality of 
opportunity for religious minorities with special reference to Muslims. In order to 
address the concerns of religious minorities, especially disadvantaged Muslims, the 
UPA administration introduced new policies, administrative innovations and executive 
actions to deliver substantive equality of opportunity in a regime of ‘competing 
equalities’ for backward and disadvantaged castes. Conventional political science 
explanations of the UPA’s shortcomings on these policies, this thesis argues, offer only 
a limited understanding. A more comprehensive account needs to combine a historical 
reading of how minority rights have been framed within the Indian Constitution, how 
they have evolved in practice as a result of institutionalisation and path dependence, and 
a policy analysis of the UPA government’s performance. Taking this as its point of 
departure, the thesis develops an institutional policy analysis approach which combines 
historical institutionalism (and path dependence) and policy analysis with a particular 
emphasis on the policy process. It provides detailed case studies of the policy process in 
three areas: Muslims and public sector employment; the provision of service delivery 
for Muslim communities; and the efforts to create a new legislative framework against 
communal violence. By drawing on extensive official sources and in-depth interviews 
with key policymakers, the institutional policy analysis approach, it is suggested, offers 
a more rounded approach to why UPA’s policies were thwarted than hitherto. Although 
the UPA’s policies on religious minorities, especially Muslims, held the promise of 
delivering substantive equality of opportunity, institutionalised resistance to such 
change from backward and disadvantaged caste lobbies, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) and the allied forces of Hindutva, and the civil service and the judiciary re-
established the familiar pattern of path dependence and reinforced the limited 
understanding of minority rights during constitution-making.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the most remarkable features of states’ responses to 9/11 was the near uniformity 
of approach towards Muslim minority communities across the globe. The dramatic 
impact of the attack on the World Trade Centre and the ‘War on Terror’ were 
accompanied by policies that appeared to pathologise Muslim minority communities 
around the discourses of terror, identity politics and self-imposed isolation.1 Increasingly 
constructed in the language of Huntington’s self-fulfilling prophesy of Clash of 
Civilisations,2 these policies posited Muslim minorities as ‘the enemy within’. ‘Europe’, 
declared the distinguished French scholar Gilles Kepel, has ‘emerged as the primary 
battlefield’ 3  between the values of Enlightenment and Islam. Helmut Schmidt, the 
former social democratic chancellor of Germany, opined that ‘a peaceful 
accommodation between Islam and Christianity is possible only in authoritarian states’.4 
In many Western states this ‘clash of civilisations within’ was attributed to 
multiculturalism, a political creed that had allegedly undermined collective citizenship 
by fostering identity politics. Thus, in the aftermath of the 7th July 2005 (7/7) bombings 
in central London, British public opinion appeared to agree on one thing: that 
multiculturalism was dead, and that it was militant Islam that had killed it off.5  
 
Polemicists blamed this state of affairs on public policies and practices that 
encouraged the social and political isolation of minority immigrant communities. The 
events of Madrid on 11th March 2004 and London on 7th July 2005 gave further impetus 
to the critics of multiculturalism. However, serious political and administrative decision-
makers, including experts in security, were obliged to address the realities of diverse 
societies, to keep jihadis and Islamophobes at bay, while recognising the need to 
confront the segregationist aspects of multiculturalism. This response was matched by 
                                                      
1
 See Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 
2004); Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005).  
2
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996).  
3
 Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 241. 
4
 Quoted in Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. 
5
 Martin Wolff, ‘When Multiculturalism is a Nonsense’, The Financial Times, 31 August 2005 (electronic 
edition). 
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political strategies, almost universally across the West, designed to build ‘social 
cohesion’ and promote integrationist values. Whilst the securitisation of Muslim 
minority communities reflected the hard edge of this policy, state-led efforts to examine 
causes of Muslim under-achievement and disadvantage mirrored the ‘softer’ 
integrationist intent.6 Almost all states in Europe have adopted policies that include a 
mixture of these approaches, with the initial emphasis on securitisation being displaced 
by a renewed policy interest in disadvantage and discrimination suffered by Muslim 
minorities.7 
 
 In developing countries a similar process has also been taking place. In Africa, 
in countries with large Muslim communities such as Nigeria and Tanzania, state 
policies have been characterised by both securitisation and the need to tackle concerns 
of identity and under-development. In Asia, where Muslim minorities traditionally have 
been subject to violence, post-9/11 many states have recognised that securitisation can 
only be legitimised if accompanied by realistic efforts to confront under-development 
and long-standing issues of (mis)recognition. Thus, in India, the post-9/11 response to 
country’s Muslims was distinguished, on the one hand, by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) central government’s condoning of 
pogroms against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, which cost 2,000 lives and displaced a 
further 150,000 and, on the other, efforts of the NDA’s successor, the Congress-led 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA), to overcome the ‘development deficit’ suffered by 
the country’s largest minority community. 
 
 Against the backdrop of the Indo-Pakistan Kargil war (1999), the mobilisation 
of India’s forces against Pakistan following an attack on the Indian Parliament by 
Islamic militants (2001), and the pogroms in Gujarat (2002), the election of the UPA 
government in 2004 marked a turning point. Committed to ‘preserve, protect and 
promote social harmony’, its National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) 
promised ‘to provide full equality of opportunity, particularly in education and 
employment for Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), Other Backward 
                                                      
6
 See Liz Fekete, ‘Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State’, Race and Class 46 (July 2004), 
3-29; Yunas Samad, ‘Community Cohesion without Parallel Lives in Bradford’, Patterns of Prejudice 
47:3 (2013), 269-87.  
7
 See Klausen, The Islamic Challenge. 
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Classes (OBCs) and religious minorities’.8 These promises, moreover, were backed by 
Congress’ efforts to rebuild its relations with minorities, especially the Muslim 
community, through ‘affirmative action for all religious and linguistic minorities’. 
Drawing on the model of reservations in employment and education in Kerala and 
Karnataka, the party was determined ‘to adopt this policy for…Muslims and other 
religious minorities on a national scale’.9  For the first time since Independence, it 
appeared the concerns of India’s Muslims had found a receptive political audience.  
 
 
India’s Muslims 
 
India’s 138 million Muslims, with 13.4 per cent of the total population, are the largest 
religious minority followed by Christians (2.3 per cent) and Sikhs (1.8 per cent).10 India 
has the third largest Muslim population in the world (after Indonesia and Pakistan), and 
is home to some of the oldest communities since the birth of the faith. However, this 
legacy is bitter-sweet: Indian Muslims carry the burden of being stigmatised as 
‘outsiders’, and more importantly, in recent times, as the ‘children of India’s 
Partition’. 11  Since Independence this weight has been difficult to endure because 
Muslims have had to demonstrate their loyalty to the new nation and to bear the brunt of 
a resurgent Hindu Right, notably since the 1980s. As one recent high-powered 
committee concluded, Muslims in India ‘carry a double burden of being labelled as 
“anti-national” and as being “appeased” at the same time’.12 Negotiating these troubled 
waters has not been easy. And set against the background of domestic and global 
developments, the community has often felt, and has been viewed by many, as under 
siege. ‘The Muslims of India’, writes Glazer, ‘are thus a unique minority, unique in 
their size, unique in their relation to a foreign nation which is seen as the permanent and 
                                                      
8
 National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India. Available at: 
http://pmindia.nic.in/cmp.pdf [accessed on 11 April 2012]. 
9
 Indian National Congress, Manifesto 2004. Available at: http://www.indian-
elections.com/partymanifestoes/party-manifestoes04/congress.html [accessed on 12 April 2012]. 
10
 Ministry of Home Affairs, Census of India 2001 (New Delhi: Government of India (GoI), 2001). 
11
 Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Introduction: Muslims of the Indian City: From Centrality to 
Marginality’, in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds., Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of 
Marginalisation (London: Hurst, 2012), 2. 
12
 Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim 
Community of India: A Report (New Delhi: GoI, 2006). Hereafter Sachar Committee Report (SCR), after 
its chairman, 11. 
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unchanging enemy of India, unique in their history as a once dominant group that is 
now reduced to one that has lost power, property, and dominance.’13 
 
Central to understanding the dilemmas facing the community today are its social 
and political challenges. Although its leaders like to project the idea of a monolithic and 
historic community, India’s Muslims have lost their historic status as dominant, 
cohesive and privileged elite under the Mogul and British Raj. Today, they are 
increasingly differentiated by language, caste, region, and social stratification, and 
resemble the economically and socially disadvantaged groups within Hindu society. 
Large sections are among the most deprived groups in India. Decades of identity 
politics since Independence have given way to more prosaic concerns about 
development and jobs; and as SCs, STs, and OBCs have witnessed a general 
improvement in their social development, the continued social exclusion of Muslims 
casts a deep shadow over the ‘success’ of India’s democracy.14  
 
Geographically, India’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-west, north, east 
and west coasts, and the central region around Hyderabad (see Map, p. xiv). These 
geographical divisions are significant for a community which also tends to be divided 
by language and regional histories, with those in states in the south more integrated into 
the local economy and society. Apart from Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims are 
everywhere a minority in the states in which they live. Community concentration is 
strongest in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal; it is particularly 
pronounced in western districts of Uttar Pradesh. In 2001, more than 60 per cent of the 
Muslim population was located in the three states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West 
Bengal – states that are also among the least developed.15 Muslims also tend to be more 
urbanised than other Indians, with 35.7 per cent of the community living in cities, 
according to 2001 Census. But ‘urban Muslims are comparatively poorer than rural 
Muslims, in contrast to the situation prevailing for most of the other communities’.16 
The social and economic condition of Muslims in India today is most problematic in the 
                                                      
13
 Nathan Glazer, ‘Minorities and India’s Democracy’, in K. Shankar Bajpai, ed., Democracy and 
Diversity: India and the American Experience (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 184. 
14
 For ‘success’ of India’s democracy, see Atul Kohli, ed., The Success of India’s Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
15
 SCR, Ch. 4. 
16
 Gayer and Jaffrelot, ‘Introduction: Muslims of the Indian City’, 11.  
5 
 
‘cow belt’, the north and east of India where the legacy of Partition politics still looms 
large. 
 
In the early 2000s, when the popular media regularly associated Muslims with 
terrorism and jihadi attacks (Indian Parliament, Mumbai, New Delhi), a High Level 
Committee established by the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, to examine the socio-
economic and educational condition of India’s Muslims (subsequently known as the 
Sachar Committee after its Chairman and its report (Sachar Committee Report, SCR)), 
found strong evidence of a community mired in under-development. Nearly 70 years 
after independence, Muslims performed badly on almost all indicators of socio-
economic development. Overall, the status of the majority of the community was only 
marginally above SCs and STs and below the Hindu OBCs. Only 8 per cent of the 
community’s urban population was found to be working in the formal sector compared 
to a national average of 21 per cent; 68 per cent maintained a lowly existence in the 
informal sector, working in casual employment in industries that were declining, or 
were adversely affected by economic liberalisation. Almost a third of the community’s 
population was below the poverty line, with average expenditure of urban Muslims at 
Rs 800 per month (2004-5) – the same as Dalits (at the bottom of Hindu caste system) 
and Adivasis (aborigines), and half that of upper caste Hindus. This status was further 
confirmed by findings that the male Muslim literacy rate (67.6 per cent) was only one 
per cent above Dalit men (66.6 per cent) at time when literacy rates among Dalits were 
improving rapidly as a result of reservations in education and employment. 
Surprisingly, the popular perception that the community’s educational performance was 
being thwarted because of madrasa education was shattered by the revelation that only 4 
per cent of Muslims actually attended madrasa schools. But nothing was more striking 
than the overwhelming under-representation of Muslims in the state sector: at all levels 
in public sector employment, in institutions of public representation, and in non-official 
bodies, the community was significantly under-represented, if not, at times completely 
unrepresented. While the representation of excluded and minority groups in state and 
national legislatures was increasing, that of the Muslim community was declining.17  
 
The systematic under-development of the Muslim community since 1947 is 
further reflected in its social structure. Socially, it has been divided into three categories. 
                                                      
17
 Ibid., 1-6; SCR, especially see Chs. 3, 4, 5 and 8.  
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At the apex is the Ashraf (‘noble’) who claim descent from central Asia and represent 
the elites. Significant sections of the Ashraf migrated to Pakistan, leaving the 
community’s leadership severely depleted. They also include high-caste Hindus, such as 
Kshatriyas, who converted to Islam during Mogul rule. Below the Ashraf is Ajlaf 
(‘commoner’), converts from Hinduism of middle and lower castes, often identified 
with such occupations as weaving, tailoring and hair-dressing, who form the bulk of the 
community. The lowest social group is Arzal (‘degraded’) who shares the same 
occupations and life-patterns as the former untouchable castes (SCs). Caste is present in 
Muslim society but the status of ‘each non-Ashraf “caste” (zat, equivalent to jati among 
Hindus) varies according to its lineage, ethnicity, traditional occupation and physical 
proximity to higher “castes”’.18 Taken together, the Ajlafs and Arzals constitute nearly 
40.7 per cent of Indian Muslims, 19  and the social condition of these groups both 
approximates to the most disadvantaged groups in Indian society and is reinforced by 
disadvantage arising from religious discrimination, periodical communal violence and 
uncertain employment patterns. The social exclusion of these groups, and the absence of 
substantive equality of opportunity for Muslims, is one of the major challenges facing 
Indian democracy today.20 
 
It is important to recognise that India’s Muslims can no longer be constructed as 
a homogenous community defined primarily by religious identity.21 The levels of social 
and political differentiation within the community, as we shall see in subsequent 
chapters (Chapter One and Four), has proceeded at pace. Particularly noteworthy for 
this thesis is the increasing political mobilisation of Dalit Muslims, for example, the 
pasmanda movement in Bihar, which seeks to access the reservations accorded to SCs 
and STs. What is interesting about these mobilisations is that they are rooted among the 
Ajlafs and Arzals, the most disadvantaged and deprived sections of India’s Muslims, 
                                                      
18
 (Gayer and Jaffrelot) ibid., 7. Caste, or caste like formations, are almost universal across South Asia 
and cut across all faith communities, see Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its 
Implications (London: Paladin, 1972). The tensions between the sociological reality of caste and the 
egalitarian precepts of some of the faiths –Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Sikhism – are, as we shall 
see in subsequent chapters with reference to India’s Muslims, at the core of the politics of equality.  
19
 (Gayer and Jaffrelot) ibid. The reference here is to the proportion of Muslims falling into the OBC 
category and the data from National Sample Survey 61st round (2004-5). 
20
 As we shall see in Chapter One, the debate about the ‘development deficit’ within the Muslim 
community is increasingly framed within the discourse of social exclusion. 
21
 This point is made most forcefully by Hasan Suroor, India’s Muslim Spring: Why is Nobody Talking 
about it? (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2014). The work is reviewed in Ch. 1. 
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and aim to secure the public goods for development (reservations and equal proportion 
of state services) accorded to their Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh counterparts.  
 
 
Equality of opportunity, the Indian state, minorities and Muslims 
 
The UPA’s efforts to provide ‘full equality of opportunity’ for minorities, especially 
Muslims, need to be seen in its historical and contemporary dimensions. The Indian 
Constitution, like most liberal democracies, bars any discrimination on the grounds of 
religion, race, caste, descent and place of birth and recognises that equality of treatment 
is a precondition of effective citizenship. Procedural equality in the operation of state 
structures and their interface with citizens is firmly specified. Unlike other liberal 
democracies at the time, however, the Constitution recognised the principle that equality 
of opportunity is, for some groups, dependent on the recognition of their cultural rights 
(e.g. personal laws, dress code etc.). This was an important concession, presaging a later 
debate in western liberal democracies that equality of opportunity is subject-
dependent.22 
 
 However, for minorities23 (non-Hindu religious groups) the framing of equality 
of opportunity in the Constitution was qualified by two major considerations that 
created a structural imbalance. First, historic minority rights relating to reservations in 
legislative assemblies, employment and state services were dramatically curtailed, with 
the result that minorities could no longer make political claims based on religious 
identities. 24  Second, reservations in legislatures, employment and education were 
introduced for SCs and STs to address the concerns of socially and economically 
disadvantaged lower castes. The provision of protective equality for SCs was to be 
limited to Hindu caste groups only. Religious communities (Buddhist, Christian, 
Muslim, Sikh), which professed an egalitarian creed but had social groups with similar 
status to SCs, were excluded.25 Although subsequently the remit of reservations would 
                                                      
22
 See Gurpreet Mahajan, Identities and Rights: Aspects of Liberal Democracy in India (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); Paul Kelly, ed., Multiculturalism Reconsidered: ‘Culture and Equality’ 
and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
23
 The Constitution of India provides a vague definition of ‘minorities’. This will be discussed in Ch. 3. 
Here and subsequently it is taken to mean non-Hindu groups. 
24
 See Rochana Bajpai, Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). This work is discussed in Ch. 1.  
25
 However, Sikh SCs were brought under the reservations net in 1956 and Buddhist SCs in 1990. 
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be expanded through the category of OBCs, particularly at the state level, and thrown 
open to non-Hindu communities, the Constitution institutionalised a form of path 
dependence that minorities, notably Muslims, have found difficult to reverse.26 
  
Since Independence this framework of equality of opportunity has not matched 
the aspirations of some of the minorities. Muslims in particular have struggled to assert 
procedural equality in the face of discrimination, violence and regular stigmatisation as 
the Indian nation’s ‘other’.27 Simultaneously, they have witnessed the transformation in 
the social and developmental status of backward communities that now stands on the 
cusp of surpassing them in terms of socio-economic indicators. Naturally, therefore, 
Muslim groups have raised demands for a ‘full equality of opportunity’, a radical 
conception of the term which, in contrast to the procedural or liberal approach outlined 
above, privileges the ‘equality of outcome’. ‘The absence of fair distribution is’, for the 
radical approach, ‘ipso facto, evidence of unfair discrimination.’ 28  Typically, this 
approach aligns itself with reservations and quotas as the surest way of delivering 
outcomes – in contrast to positive, or affirmative action, that is often associated with the 
‘liberal’ conception of equal opportunities.29 The radical approach seeks to politicise 
‘decision-making’ and, like the framework of protective equality, is anchored in a 
                                                      
26
 ‘Distinctive and separate strategies’, notes Zoya Hasan, ‘were followed for different groups. The 
Constitution and state made a basic distinction between the cultural rights of minorities and group rights 
for communities that were discriminated on the basis of caste. While minorities were located in the 
framework of religion, disadvantaged castes were removed from this realm and located in the framework 
of social justice.’ Politics of Inclusion: Castes, Minorities, and Affirmative Action (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 5. For discussion of institutionalisation and path dependence, see Chs. 2, 3. 
27
 For the construction of Muslims as the ‘other’ of Indian nationalism, see Christophe Jaffrelot, The 
Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, 
Implantation and Mobilisation (with Special Reference to Central India) (London: Hurst, 1996). 
28
 David Mason, ‘Competing Conceptions of “Fairness” and the Formulation and Implementation of 
Equal Opportunities Policies’, in Wendy Ball and John Solomos, eds., Race and Local Politics 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 51. 
29
 The terms reservation, affirmative action and positive action are often, misleadingly, used inter-
changeably. Affirmative action was first used in the United States in 1961, under the Kennedy 
government, to refer to policies that recognised race, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation or 
national origin in order to benefit an under-represented group. Affirmative action may, but does not 
normally, include reservations and quotas. It is generally aimed at combating discrimination and using 
promotional policies to ensure a more representative presence of excluded minorities. Such measures can 
include advertising in minority press, targeting, codes of practice, monitoring, training against bias in 
recruitment and service delivery, and pro-active measures. Reservations are fixed quotas for preferential 
selection. Such quotas are mandatory and are often seen as compensation for past injustices inflicted on a 
particular social group. Positive action is the British variation of affirmative action but does not include 
the use of quotas. For our purposes, the radical approach is used interchangeably with substantive equality. 
See Jacob T. Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).   
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community ‘collectively as the object of policy’. 30  As we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, in India both for policymakers and campaign groups, radical or substantive 
equal opportunities offer the tantalising prospect of building new (and old) vote-banks.  
 
 
Defining the puzzle of UPA, equal opportunities and Muslims: a paradigm 
shift or political pragmatism? 
 
The election of the UPA government in May 2004 was followed by a raft of policy 
initiatives aimed generally at minorities but even more specifically at Muslims. These 
measures came on the heels of high-powered commissions or committees that 
investigated the conditions of the minorities, or were charged with examining new, 
alternative approaches to the existing framework of equality of opportunity with lessons 
drawn from comparative experience. The most notable of these committees was the SCR 
which single-handedly focused the discourse of Indian Muslims on ‘identity’, ‘security’ 
and ‘equity’. The SCR and other policy initiatives included the creation of new 
institutions such as the Ministry of Minority Affairs (MoMA), new draft legislation to 
tackle communal violence, the use of executive discretion to implement affirmative 
action to enhance Muslim employment in the public sector, and improve service 
delivery to Muslim communities. It also included the recommendations made by the 
National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, also known as Ranganath 
Misra Commission after its Chairman, that reservations in employment and education 
should be implemented for disadvantaged Christians and Muslims. At one level these 
policy measures sought to create an even playing field within the framework of 
‘competing equalities’.31 At another, it was also distinguished by an effort to transcend 
these ‘competing equalities’ to create a new overarching framework of equality of 
opportunity along western, especially British lines, as the United Kingdom merged its 
different regimes of discrimination and disadvantage (gender, disability, and ethnicity) 
                                                      
30
 Nick Jewson and David Mason, Equal Employment Opportunities in the 1990s: A Policy Principle 
Come of Age? (Discussion Paper in Sociology: University of Leicester, 1993), 12. Jewson and Mason 
offer a threefold typology of equal opportunities policies in employment: minimalist, liberal and radical. 
31
 See Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). The term ‘competing equalities’ is used by Galanter to refer to the 
policies of compensatory discrimination in India in the judicial tendency to resolve disputes among 
compensatory discrimination policies and the norms of equality with reference to SCs, STs, and OBCs. In 
this research we operationalise the term ‘competing equalities’ with reference to equal, but different, 
opportunity frameworks for religious minorities (procedural equality) and SCs/STs (protective equality) 
in the Indian political system. 
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into the Equality and Human Rights Commission under the Equality Act (2010). This 
new approach, adapted to Indian requirements and allied to the needs of minorities, 
according to some analysts, represented a ‘paradigm shift’ in policy thinking.32 Such a 
shift also held out the promise of a new deal for minorities, the possibility that they too 
would realise the full potential of Indian citizenship.  
 
 Yet, within three years after UPA’s election most of these policy initiatives were 
on the backburner. While publicly the Congress-led coalition still professed commitment 
to these policies, its allegiance was more tactical, symbolic and performative. What 
accounts for this about-turn? Why was the momentum lost? Was this simply another 
example of failed ‘vote-bank politics’, a poor effort to rebuild Congress’ traditional 
relationship with Muslims? Or was the government’s record more the outcome of 
enduring historically institutionalised resistance to a policy change that would place 
minorities, especially poor Christians and Muslims, on par with India’s other 
disadvantaged communities? 
 
 This thesis focuses on the institutionalised opposition to UPA policies that 
rendered them ineffective or sometimes non-implantable. Its central argument is that we 
cannot understand UPA’s reluctance to implement the new initiatives generated by its 
policy process mainly through the calculus of political incentives, the trade-off between 
action and votes. Political explanations are important in assessing how the Congress-led 
UPA acted, or did not act, but provide a partial account. Most importantly, we also need 
to recognise the structural factors that constrained the government’s actions. A more 
comprehensive account of the UPA’s policies on minorities, but particularly Muslims, 
therefore, would recognise the deeply embedded historical institutional opposition to a 
policy change that would accept India’s largest religious minority as an integral part of 
the system of reservations and affirmative action. This opposition emanated from three 
significant constituencies. First, it came from the institutionalised SCs, STs and OBCs 
regimes and lobbies that view themselves as the guardians of these caste groups’ 
interests, and as such, saw provisions for minorities as encroaching upon their rights 
because of the potential threat to dilute their existing institutional structures and legal 
provisions of reservations. Second, it was rooted in state structures (civil service and 
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 Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Transcending Reservation: A Paradigm Shift in the Debate on Equality’, Economic 
and Political Weekly (EPW) 43:38 (20-26 September 2008), 8-12. 
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judiciary), which since Independence have become accustomed to treating minority 
demands as religiously defined, and therefore, beyond the realms of public policy in a 
secular state. This institutional resistance, which intersects with the majoritarian view of 
minorities, as we shall see, acted as a powerful constraint on policy change at national 
and state levels. Finally, it was articulated most forcefully by the BJP and the allied 
forces of Hindutva, but not without significant representation within Congress as well. 
This constituency viewed itself as the custodians of the Constitution but the thrust of its 
resistance was to protect the ideological construction of caste as it applied to 
disadvantaged Hindu caste groups. Locating itself as the firm defender of the 
constitutional settlement, this opposition rejected the claims of religious identity as a 
marker of social and economic disadvantage. In short, the combined opposition of these 
three major institutional forces undermined the ground from which the UPA could 
implement its new initiatives. 
 
 This thesis substantiates the above argument by developing an institutional 
policy analysis approach. Our perspective combines two distinct approaches to the 
subject. First, it is located firmly within neo-institutionalism, the argument that 
institutions matter and shape patterns of behaviour of political actors and outcomes.33 
Neo-institutionalism, however, is a broad church with many competing and 
contradictory schools of thought. What is central to our analysis is the need to situate 
and understand the role of core institutions, how, for instance, the constitutional 
settlement after Independence created a framework of reservations in which the 
distinction between caste and religion became solidified. Drawing on the seminal works 
of Hasan, 34  Bajpai 35  and Verma, 36  who have highlighted the importance of this 
distinction for the subsequent development of Indian democracy, we examine how this 
division between caste and religion became institutionalised after 1950 with deleterious 
consequences for religious minorities, especially Muslims. Accordingly, we borrow 
from historical institutionalism, especially its emphasis on the enduring impact of 
institutions, to provide the broad perspective for situating the comparative experience of 
minorities, particularly Muslims. Within historical institutionalism we highlight 
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 See Jon Pierre, B. Guy Peters and Gerry Stoker, eds., Debating Institutionalism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2013). 
34
 Hasan, Politics of Inclusion. 
35
 Bajpai, Debating Difference. 
36
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recurring behaviour and outcomes through the use of the concept of path dependence: 
that is, a critical juncture, the creation of particular institutional structures at a given 
point in time (e.g. India’s constitution-making), which produce a chain of events (path 
dependence) that generates ‘increasing returns’ to actors who benefit from existing 
institutional arrangements that make policy change increasingly difficult. Policy changes 
that require a radical reassessment of existing arrangements often require another critical 
juncture. 37  Thus, it is our argument that the distinction between caste and religion 
established at Independence in the provision of reservations for socio-economically 
disadvantaged castes has ‘locked-in’ a form of path dependence that has witnessed the 
increasing expansion of reservations for SCs, STs and OBCs since 1950, while on the 
other hand, the claims of disadvantaged religious minorities have become relatively 
marginalised because they do not fully come within the framework of backward classes. 
 
  Historical institutionalism and path dependence provide the framework within 
which this thesis is located. However, it also concentrates on the UPA’s policy process 
on minorities. Thus, in examining critically how these policies were implemented, we 
have drawn from public policy analysis the concept of the policy process (how policy is 
evolved, formulated, decided, implemented and evaluated) and policy sectors (key 
actors and structures).38 We have used this framework to track the progress of particular 
policies aimed at increasing Muslim employment in the public sector, improving service 
delivery to Muslim communities, and creating model anti-communal violence 
legislation. The thesis recognises the constraints of policy analysis in the Indian context, 
where access to decision-making and data is severely restricted, and as a result, utilises 
in-depth interviews with key personnel who were integral to the policy-making process. 
These insights constitute the major new empirical findings of this research: indeed, for 
the first time, it sheds new light on why some policy options were pursued, others 
neglected, and others still left in abeyance.  
 
 To recapitulate: institutional policy analysis combines historical and policy 
analysis approaches. This hybrid approach has been developed because it enables us to 
undertake a detailed analysis of UPA’s policies on minorities from 2004 to 2014, and 
demonstrate the limits of policy change beyond those put forward by conventional 
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 Here we draw extensively on the work of Michael Howlett and R. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: 
Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). This is reviewed in Ch. 2. 
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political explanations. It does not, of course, preclude the possibilities of change, but our 
analysis suggests that the likelihood of transformative policy change is severely limited.  
 
 In developing the hybrid framework of institutional policy analysis it is 
necessary to acknowledge that historical institutionalism is the independent variable and 
the policy process is the dependent variable.39 Or in other words, the form of historical 
path dependence on caste and religious minorities established at Independence has 
heavily circumscribed the limits of policy change. The policy process for any 
government in this area, for example the UPA, suggests that policy change is certainly 
possible but it needs to overcome a very high threshold of resistance from institutions 
and actors that have become the main beneficiaries of the constitutional settlement in 
this important policy sector. Neither electoral incentives nor the nature of the policy 
process under the UPA were the major determinants of the outcome of UPA policies on 
minorities: rather it was the in-built opposition from the three major constituencies 
identified above which were pre-eminent in determining their fate. 
 
 Finally, it is important to emphasise that this thesis is not about policy 
evaluation per se. Whilst we review evaluation in the policy process with special 
reference to the two key areas – employment, service delivery (the communal violence 
bill was not legislated upon) – a systematic and comprehensive assessment of the 
impact of UPA policies in this area is beyond the remit of this work. Instead the primary 
objective of this work is to better understand the institutional resistance to UPA’s 
policies, how they were stymied, and why they were difficult to implement. This 
resistance is explored both with reference to the nature of the policy process during the 
UPA government and the enduring influences of historical institutionalism that 
ultimately defined the possibilities of change.  
 
 
Organisation of the thesis 
 
No work, let alone a PhD thesis, can adequately cover the vast range of policy initiatives 
on minorities by the UPA government from 2004 to 2014. The UPA government itself, 
                                                      
39
 This is further discussed in Ch. 2.  
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during its tenure, sedulously avoided a serious evaluation of these policies.40 Taking as 
our point of departure the SCR’s emphasis on the Muslim community’s need for 
recognition of its ‘identity’, to guarantee Muslims ‘security’, and provide ‘equity’ in 
public services, we examine detailed case studies of efforts to improve Muslim 
employment in the public sector, enhance the provision of public sector service delivery 
to Muslim communities across India, and enact a model anti-communal violence law. 
These case studies are thus inevitably limited and detailed, but nonetheless, provide 
crucial fresh insights into the shortcomings of the policy process and confirmatory 
evidence of the broader pattern of institutional path dependence. 
 
 Chapter One reviews the existing literature on the UPA and minorities with 
special reference to equal opportunities and Muslims. This literature, it is argued, is 
limited because it is heavily biased towards instrumentalism, specifically, electoral 
incentives in determining UPA’s policies, to the exclusion of institutional and structural 
constraints. The chapter also reviews the studies located in the fields of social justice, 
social exclusion and Indian Muslim community studies. Only the ‘grey literature’ 
produced by advocacy organisations, it is suggested, addresses some of the research 
questions central to this thesis. These works, however, are too narrowly focused on 
policy evaluation to provide meaningful insights into the policy process or a broader 
understanding of why these policies were thwarted. 
 
 In Chapter Two, in order to overcome the shortcomings of existing policy 
studies, and situate the UPA experience in a historical perspective, we develop a 
framework of institutional policy analysis which combines the policy process approach 
common to the discipline of policy studies with historical institutionalism and path 
dependence − hence institutional policy analysis. Institutional policy analysis, we argue, 
offers a more relevant analytical framework for the history of minorities or reservations 
in India because it brings into sharper relief the different regimes of equal opportunities, 
the structures that continue to reproduce them, and the institutional resistance to change. 
The chapter also outlines in detail the methodologies used to operationalise the research. 
 
                                                      
40
 In February 2013, the government announced the setting up of a high-powered committee to evaluate 
the implementations of SCR’s recommendations. The interim report was submitted to government in mid-
March 2014 and the final report was due by June 2014. The report was finally submitted on 29 September 
2014, after the submission of the thesis. This report was submitted too late to be fully integrated into the 
thesis but is discussed in the Conclusion. 
15 
 
 Chapter Three examines the historical development of the different regimes of 
equal opportunities since Independence. It reviews in depth how minority rights were 
framed during constitution-making with a special emphasis on the cleavage between 
caste and religion. Subsequently, this cleavage created different forms of 
institutionalisation for disadvantaged castes and minorities, and in the 1980s, a 
mobilisation by some of the minorities against a perceived sense of discrimination − a 
development which gave rise to the Hindu Right, and ultimately, to the emergence of the 
BJP as the party of government. The election of the UPA in 2004, however, marked a 
new phase, a contestational juncture,41 which promised a radical vision of equality of 
opportunity for India’s religious minorities. 
 
 Chapter Four offers a synoptic account of the UPA’s policy process on the 
subject. In setting the context before the three subsequent case studies, it gives an 
overview of policies on minorities viewed through the lens of the policy process – 
agenda-setting, policy formation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation – and 
highlights the key developments, including the UPA’s new paradigm of equal 
opportunities. These conceptual and institutional innovations in policy-making are 
contrasted with the ambivalence and ambiguity in implementation and evaluation. This 
dissonance, it is suggested, was not only the result of twin-tracking on the part of the 
Congress and the UPA, but also the product of institutionalised opposition. 
 
 Chapter Five undertakes an assessment of the UPA’s efforts to improve the 
representation of Muslims in government employment at the national level. It maintains 
that despite the high-profile commitment to increase the numbers of Muslims in national 
public sector employment, the use of affirmative action did not appreciably improve 
Muslim representation in this sector. The government, moreover, was unable to win the 
argument to implement the recommendations of the Ranganath Misra Commission 
Report (RMCR), thereby resorting to ‘symbolic implementation’. That this policy 
initiative was heavily compromised by institutional resistance is further demonstrated by 
the incomplete and inadequate monitoring data on Muslim employment in central 
government jobs. If policy design and implementation had been operationalised 
according to policy declarations, more relevant policy instruments would have been used 
to deliver these outcomes.  
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 Chapter Six reviews the UPA’s initiatives in three key areas of service delivery 
for Muslims. Some of the high profile programmes, including the Prime Minister’s 15-
Point Programme (PM’s 15PP) for minorities, have been criticised for being ineffective. 
Our detailed analysis of some of the policy process in three areas of service delivery 
demonstrates that poor outcomes were the product of weak design and implementation 
in the policy process as well as institutional resistance, notably at the state level, against 
policies specifically targeted at Muslim communities. Although recently some 
modifications have been made to modes of implementation, such changes are unlikely to 
overcome high levels of institutional opposition to service delivery provisions aimed at 
Muslims. 
 
Chapter Seven assesses the failure of the two anti-communal violence bills (2005 
and 2011). These bills were the core of UPA’s post-Gujarat anti-communal violence 
strategy for better security for India’s minorities by increasing the likelihood of 
punishments for perpetrators of violence and negligent state officials. The UPA’s 
inability to steer the passage of these bills through Parliament was compounded by not 
only institutional opposition – from opponents and supporters of the bill – but also the 
culpability of India’s two major parties, the Congress and the BJP, in communal 
violence in the past (e.g. anti-Sikh riots in Delhi (1984), the demolition of Babri Masjid 
in Ayodhya (1992), and anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat (2002)). Security, the essential 
requirement of citizenship, remains an elusive dream for some of India’s minorities.  
 
Finally, the Conclusion reassesses the core arguments of the thesis to reflect on 
the UPA’s experience in light of the Sixteenth Lok Sabha elections in May 2014 which 
witnessed the emergence of the BJP as the party of government and marked the end of 
the contestational juncture signified by the UPA victory in 2004. It also addresses the 
utility of the institutional policy analysis approach in the study of other areas of Indian 
public policy and Indian studies.  
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Chapter One 
UPA, equality of opportunity and Muslims:       
a review of literature 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The formation of the UPA government in 2004 is generally seen as a major change in 
Indian politics: the election of a Congress-led coalition surprised most analysts, and the 
appointment of Manmohan Singh, a Sikh, as Prime Minister was symbolic of the new 
approach towards India’s religious minorities. Arguably, the new policies, institutional 
innovations, and executive decisions taken by the UPA administration in its first term 
represented a ‘paradigm shift’ in how equality of opportunity is understood in India.42 
This departure, it is suggested, marked a radical break, especially for religious 
minorities, who had become victims of social exclusion and discrimination. The SCR, 
for example, by recognising the social and economic marginalisation of India’s 
Muslims drew attention to the ‘development deficit’ suffered by the community since 
Independence. The RMCR, probably the most radical official document on India’s 
minorities since 1947, drew a pointed reference to ‘inequalities’ which excluded 
disadvantaged religious minorities, such as Christians and Muslims, from accessing the 
right to reservation in employment and education. In brief, these and other initiatives 
appeared to mark a critical turning point. 
 
  The substance of these new policies is discussed in Chapter Four. This chapter 
reviews the literature on the UPA, equality of opportunity and Muslims with the aim of 
introducing in the next chapter an alternative framework for understanding the 
administration’s policies. The shortcomings of existing studies, it will be argued, 
require a new institutional policy analysis approach that is historically grounded. 
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Review of literature 
 
In reviewing the literature on UPA policies on religious minorities, especially Muslims, 
it is possible to identify seven genres which are neither exclusive nor exhaustive.43 
These include: popular and journalistic accounts, electoral incentive studies, political 
ideology, social justice, social exclusion, Muslim community studies, and the grey 
literature produced by public policy institutes and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).44 
 
Popular and journalistic accounts 
 
Surprisingly little serious academic effort has been expended on a review of the 
performance and policies of either the UPA I (2004-9) or UPA II governments (2009-
14). Popular or journalistic accounts still dominate the field. While we cannot expect 
academically rigorous analysis from such accounts, they are influential in establishing 
the terms in which the UPA governments are discussed, and therefore merit 
consideration. Thus, Bhambri’s Sonia in Power: UPA Government, 2004-2006 45 
explores the UPA’s rise to power and the Left parties’ role in coalition formation. 
Essentially a compilation of press articles, the author examines domestic and foreign 
issues such as bureaucracy, elections and democracy, federalism, governance, relations 
with Pakistan and the Kashmir problem. This volume is useful in highlighting the role 
of Sonia Gandhi in coalition-building, but as the title indicates, it covers a brief period 
in the tenure of the UPA, and the journalistic nature of this volume, moreover, detracts 
from its analytical quality. 
 
 Gaur’s The UPA Government: Achievements, Failures and Challenges46 covers 
a longer time span and offers a more detailed narrative of coalition politics. Although 
reasonable coverage is provided of key milestones, such as the vote over energy policy, 
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the overall assessment is cursory, with little detailed analysis of policies. Minorities, for 
instance, are hardly mentioned. For a work aimed at a general audience, the general tone 
is set by its sensational, racy style. 
 
Similarly, The Other Side of UPA-II: An Analysis of the Second Innings of the 
Government of World’s Largest Democracy 47  also falls into the same genre. Its 
concentrates on how the UPA came to power in 2009 and a review of its policies. This 
assessment, however, is far from comprehensive: it is merely a compilation of 
government announcements, without critical understanding or analysis. Unsurprisingly, 
minorities’ issues rarely feature in this volume. 
 
In contrast, Baru’s The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking 
of Manmohan Singh48 achieved notoriety during the Sixteenth Lok Sabha elections. An 
insider account, written by Manmohan Singh’s former media advisor, this volume 
covers the period up to 2009. Its main objective, as the author acknowledged, was to 
demonstrate how Manmohan Singh was both ‘made’ and ‘unmade’ as Prime Minister 
by the machinations of the Gandhi family.49 As an informed, journalistic account it 
provides invaluable insights into the working of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the 
major challenges which faced the UPA (I) administration , and the complex process of 
managing the coalition (see Chapter Four). It also offers a welcome revisionist 
perspective on Manmohan Singh as a reforming, radical Prime Minister who was 
frustrated by the Congress hierarchy and its coalition partners. 
 
 The Accidental Prime Minister is a major advance on previous journalistic 
accounts, but it also suffers from notable shortcomings. First, notwithstanding its focus 
on policy, an assessment of UPA’s approach to religious minorities is entirely absent.50 
Second, the work’s objectivity has been questioned because it was inspired by the 
refusal of the UPA (I) to extend Baru’s tenure as a media advisor, allegedly at the 
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behest of the Congress hierarchy.51 Finally, Manmohan Singh himself has distanced 
himself from the work’s revelations, thereby casting doubt on some of the major claims, 
especially those relating to the Gandhi family.52 Overall, as we shall see below, The 
Accidental Prime Minister sheds new light on the tenure of the UPA (I) but it is far from 
a comprehensive − or unbiased − account of the government’s policy formation process. 
 
Electoral incentives 
 
Wilkinson in Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots 53  has 
advanced a compelling argument that communal riots in Indian politics are determined 
by the nature of electoral competition in the states. Political leaders in states, according 
to Wilkinson, are more inclined to protect religious minorities when they are dependent 
on them for electoral support, or when party politics is so competitive that there is a 
high probability that they will need to rely on minority votes or minority-supported 
parties in the future.54 Hence, when minority groups are swing voters, or when their 
backing is needed to support the ruling government or coalition, political leaders have a 
greater incentive to protect minorities. These outcomes result from a high degree of 
party fractionalisation, leading Wilkinson to emphasise a correlation between the level 
of party competition in a state and the state government’s prevention of riots. 55 
Wilkinson’s argument has been influenced by Brass’ contention that ‘the fomenting of 
violence both to win votes and to ward off defeat by arousing communal sympathies 
and animosities is part of the standard repertoire of contemporary political practices in 
north Indian politics’.56 
 
 Further developing this approach in his analysis of UPA policies on minorities, 
Wilkinson suggests that these were determined primarily by the electoral support given 
by the minorities to Congress and its allies. This support proved pivotal in some states 
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and gave the UPA ‘a powerful incentive to attend to minority concerns’.57 However, 
this support from, and for minorities, could not be allowed to alienate the mainstream 
Hindu electorate. UPA policies on minorities, therefore, did not mark a radical 
departure but continuity – with the familiar commissions on the conditions of 
minorities, especially Muslims – and selective measures designed to garner maximum 
electoral advantage. Criticising the implementation of the SCR for not mainstreaming 
Muslims in ‘anti-poverty and education programmes’,58 Wilkinson argues that result 
was a ‘large number of relatively under-funded and uncoordinated’ schemes that were 
unlikely to have a major impact.59 
 
 Wilkinson’s instrumentalist interpretation of electoral incentives has some major 
shortcomings. First, he fails to explain why ‘mainstreaming’ Muslims in ‘anti-poverty 
and education’ in the past has failed to deliver better results, unless it is the outcome of 
religious discrimination, or ‘religious blindness’. 60  Second, he acknowledges the 
success of reservations as most effective way of delivering jobs for the community but 
dismisses this policy option as a part of community-centred politics. Reservations for 
SCs and STs, and subsequently OBCs, as we shall see below, have had the most 
transformative impact on the life chances of these groups. The UPA’s approach to 
policy implementation might well have been selective, but what is lacking from 
Wilkinson’s analysis is a rounded understanding of the historical context in which 
caste-centred equality of opportunity policies in India have evolved, and the role of 
institutions – the legislature, executive and judiciary – in framing the context in which 
policy formation and evaluation take place. Above all, he fails to explain how these 
institutional structures and political agents have resisted the extension of reservations to 
poor Christians and Muslims. 
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Political ideology 
 
Sáez and Singh’s New Dimensions of Politics in India: The United Progressive Alliance 
in Power61 assesses the UPA (I)’s performance on a wide range of fronts – poverty 
eradication, federalism, education, state secularism, minorities, foreign policy, energy 
security and anti-terrorism – and reflects on policy formation and implementation, and 
the continuities and discontinuities with previous administrations. However, despite this 
broad coverage, the central thesis of the work is that the ‘UPA experience suggests that 
ideology matters’.62 Before the 2004 general elections, Congress and its allies attempted 
to create clear blue water between themselves and the NDA, with the party’s manifesto 
emphasising that ‘it was not a moment for a narrow pursuit of partisan power. This is 
the moment to consolidate all forces subscribing to the fundamental values of our 
Constitution’.63 At the heart of this difference was the concept of nationhood – at direct 
variance from the NDA’s – which valued diversity and respected the ‘time-honoured 
sensitivity to the cultural [and] linguistic identity of the people of India, and its pluralist 
conception of nationhood’.64 With an eye to NDA’s performance, and especially the 
Gujarat pogroms, the UPA’s NCMP committed the alliance to: 
…to preserve, protect and promote social harmony and to enforce the law 
without fear or favour to deal with all obscurantist and fundamentalist 
elements who seek to disturb social amity and peace, [and] to provide full 
equality of opportunity, particularly in education and employment for 
SCs, STs, OBCs and religious minorities.65 
 
Although these commitments, as we shall see in Chapter Four, were designed to rebuild 
the relationship between religious minorities and the Congress party, they were founded 
on the experience of states in the south, notably Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu that 
had established reservations in employment for disadvantaged Muslim groups.66 
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 Ideological considerations played a leading role in shaping the UPA’s policies 
on minorities by creating an overarching context within which these policies were 
framed. But ideology per se is an inadequate tool to explain why certain policies were 
selected for implementation and others not. Congress’ ideological outlook needed both 
to accommodate minorities while preserving support from the majority; as such, it is 
difficult to determine the correspondence between ideological positions at any one time 
and the policies followed. Ideological explanations, moreover, overlook how the 
opposition, particularly the BJP, and its associated Hindutva forces, has influenced the 
national discourse on minorities, making it difficult both for Congress and other secular 
parties to promote pro-minorities policies, even when the BJP has been electorally 
weak. The strength of any party’s ideology, therefore, is relational; in coalition politics 
driving through an ideological agenda becomes difficult, if not impractical. 67 
Ideological accounts, therefore, provide an overarching explanation for the 
government’s policies on religious minorities, but missing from them is a causal 
mechanism that explains the selection of policies, decision-making, implementation and 
evaluation. Perhaps more pertinently, they ignore the importance of institutional factors 
– the legislature, executive and the judiciary – in defining the context in which policy 
outcomes are determined. 
 
Social justice 
 
The UPA’s policies on religious minorities and SCs and STs have also received the 
attention of political and social theorists alike. Operating within the framework of 
normative political theory, Heredia’s Taking Sides: Reservation Quotas and Minority 
Rights in India, 68  Verma’s Non-discrimination and Equality in India: Contesting 
Boundaries of Social Justice69 and Bajpai’s Debating Difference: Group Rights and 
Liberal Democracy in India70 are three works that claim to offer fresh insights into 
understanding recent policy shifts. 
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Heredia’s Taking Sides is a general, discursive overview of the relationship 
between claims for social justice of religious minorities and the nation-building process. 
The author argues that though the Constitution sought to create an egalitarian and caste-
free society through affirmative action and reservations for the backward and weaker 
sections of society, for religious minorities the impact of these policies has been 
unfair. 71  In assessing the conditions of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, 
Heredia draws extensively on findings of SCR, RMCR, and National Commission for 
Minorities (NCM) reports, to highlight the degree of disadvantage suffered by these 
groups. For Heredia, the provision of equality of opportunity for religious minorities has 
proved challenging. Indeed, the author contends that ‘a constitutional democracy must 
work within an understanding of justice, through constitutional rights and procedures, 
for equity and equality for all its citizens, reconciling freedom and equality, human 
rights and egalitarian policies’.72 Importantly, Heredia’s work offers an entry point for 
understanding the development deficit of some religious minorities (Christians and 
Muslims) by acknowledging that ‘for historical reasons, the sticking point of minority 
rights has been religion, not language’.73 
 
Whilst Heredia’s conclusion that – ‘reserved quotas have resulted in a positional 
change for some groups, but they have not brought any real structural transformation in 
the broader society’74 – underscores the observations of both critics and supporters of 
reservations alike, his methodological eclecticism and highly discursive style diminish 
the analytical quality of the work. In brief, the volume offers only fragmentary insights 
into the role of institutions in the process of policy formation and implementation, and 
is at best, a poor synthesis of the literature on religious minorities in post-1947 India; at 
worst, it is a highly derivative discourse which singularly fails to develop a clear and 
sustained line of argument. 
 
 Non-discrimination and Equality in India, on the other hand, is a general inquiry 
into the evolution of concept of social justice and its relationship to equality of 
opportunity and anti-discrimination within Indian politics since Independence, with 
special reference to reservations. Described by the author as an essentially ‘descriptive’ 
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and ‘philosophical’75 account, Non-discrimination and Equality in India maps out how 
the concept of social justice was historically constructed in terms of anti-discrimination 
legislation and affirmative action provisions for SCs and STs. The Indian Constitution, 
posits Verma, not only allowed for group rights in the form of reservations for SCs and 
STs, thereby creating a framework of ‘competing equalities’, but in so doing, 
recognised the claims of these groups for substantive equality of opportunity. These 
provisions, furthermore, were embedded in a form of ‘governmentality’ that recognised 
‘constitutional provisions, special legislations and judicial announcements’ for these 
groups and ‘endorsed a set of bureaucratic categories’ that were tied to the ‘state as both 
a political bounty and a mover of economic activity’.76 In short, the distinction between 
socio-economically disadvantaged castes and religious communities was predicated on 
a historical concept of social justice that was firmly institutionalised during constitution-
making.  
 
However, over time the extension of the state in areas of social justice, 
according to Verma, has politicised the post-Independence settlement; and the 
‘Mandalisation’ and ‘marketisation’ of Indian politics after 1991 has created a growing 
disenchantment with the idea ‘that the state can be the vehicle for social justice’ because 
it has now become ‘the object of competing and irreconcilable claims’.77 As neo-liberal 
economic policies have reinforced upper castes’ privileged social status, suggests 
Verma, the conventional idea of social justice is being challenged by new 
understandings of anti-discrimination and equal opportunity that emphasise group 
inequalities, resulting in ‘demands for various measures of affirmative action – mostly 
through quotas – that [would] improve the bargaining positions of sexual minorities, 
disabled, religious minorities and disadvantaged women’.78 Inevitably, some minorities 
have questioned the secular credentials of the Constitution which concede reservations 
for Hindu SCs, STs, while rejecting the claims of similar caste groups among Christians 
and Muslims. Simultaneously, to further complicate matters, multiple axes of 
disadvantage and discrimination have also emerged among protected groups and the 
new groups mobilising for social justice. 
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Non-discrimination and Equality in India offers a synoptic review of the 
complex and shifting terrain of equal opportunities and anti-discrimination in 
contemporary Indian politics, and how ideas of social justice are being redefined. It 
presents, as we shall see in Chapter Four, a thoughtful engagement with the new 
framework of equal opportunities developed under the UPA administration. Yet, it 
succeeds only as a general interpretation of the normative principles underpinning the 
change without offering an account of ‘why’ this change came about, or more precisely, 
‘why’ a particular set of policies were followed by the UPA. This still remains an 
important lacuna in the study of the subject. 
 
Bajpai’s Debating Difference also explores the theme of social justice and how 
it has evolved with the development of group-differentiated rights in India, though from 
an ideological perspective.79 As a wide-raging account of what the author calls ‘public 
reasoning’,80 the work unpacks how liberal principles have defined group-differentiated 
rights and also, paradoxically, permeated the discourses of subalterns and nationalists. 
Methodologically rooted in liberal theory, postcolonial theory and ideological analysis, 
this study compellingly deconstructs the ideological frames created at the time of 
constitution-making, which have ultimately set the parameters of public discourse on 
the subject. It does so by focusing on the political rhetoric of the Constituent Assembly 
Debates and parliamentary debates in post-Independence history with reference to three 
critical junctures in Indian history: constitution-making (1946-49), the Shah Bano case 
(1986), and the Mandal debate (1990).  
 
Bajpai develops a model of Indian liberalism predicated on the inter-related 
concepts of ‘secularism’, ‘democracy’, ‘social justice’, ‘national unity’ and 
‘development’ that, according to her, generated a hegemonic ‘legitimising vocabulary’ 
of group rights.81 Bajpai rejects the argument that Partition undermined the rights of 
religious minorities during constitution-making: rather they were limited because of the 
long-term ideological outlook of Indian nationalism which privileged national unity. 
The dominant interpretation of the nationalist vocabulary in the Constituent Assembly, 
insists Bajpai, was against the special treatment of minorities, particularly religious 
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minorities, for it was perceived as a threat to national unity. 82  Nationalist public 
reasoning imbued with an ideal of secular, united India with a strong centre was unable 
to countenance legislative and employment quotas for religious minorities. On the other 
hand, quotas were deemed necessary for socio-economically disadvantaged Hindu caste 
groups as a compensatory measure. A meticulous reading of constitutional debates leads 
Bajpai to conclude that considerations of ‘legitimising vocabulary’ was uppermost for 
lawmakers in narrowly framing the rights of religious minorities at Independence.83 
 
Whereas constitution-making in the late 1940s occurred against the background 
of centralisation of power, and the ‘containment of group rights’84 based on religion, the 
1980s and 1990s witnessed the decentralisation of power accompanied by expansion of 
reservation-based group rights and the rise of lower caste parties, culminating in ‘a shift 
to more multicultural and egalitarian conceptions of secularism, democracy and social 
justice, as witnessed in the legislative debates on Shah Bano and Mandal’.85 Bajpai’s 
detailed analysis of the Shah Bano case suggests that change in the Congress’ 
multicultural policy did not to amount to a ‘fundamental break in the normative 
vocabulary.’86 Similarly, the Mandal debate, which led to an extensive expansion of 
quotas for OBCs, was framed in a ‘legitimising vocabulary, by linking equality closely 
to democracy, and distancing it from national unity’.87 In both cases, the conceptual 
sleight of hand ensured that the key principles of the constitutional settlement remained 
in place.88 
  
Bajpai extends this analysis to the UPA government in her contribution to New 
Dimensions of Politics in India. 89  In an empirically rich paper bristling with new 
insights, she draws attention to the shortcoming of instrumentalist accounts of UPA 
policy-making on minorities and group-differentiated rights, with a plea to understand 
the ‘ideological distinctiveness of the UPA’.90 This uniqueness is to be found in the 
Congress’ accommodation ‘of identity-based quotas, a change of position that has 
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involved an important shift in the meaning and significance of social justice in Congress 
discourse, and a reorientation of its relationship to national unity and development’.91 
The core of Bajpai’s argument, again drawing on her previous analysis, is that while the 
UPA embraced a major expansion in quotas – for OBCs in higher education and private 
educational institutions, and was committed to reservations for religious minorities, 
which was pursued largely through ‘stealth’, that is, through ‘executive action’ instead 
of primary legislation – this commitment was shot through by pro-poor redistributionist 
policies and a need to align the new policies with a more egalitarian conception of 
social justice. ‘It is in light of this normative-discursive shift in conceptions of social 
justice’, concludes Bajpai, ‘that the policies enacted by the UPA for the expansion of 
affirmative action can be adequately grasped.’ 92  For Bajpai, the Congress’ actions 
mirrored a ‘polity-wide shift that can be traced back at the national level to at least the 
Janata Dal in the 1990 Mandal debate’. 93  But a justification of reservations for 
minorities in terms of a ‘development deficit’, contends Bajpai, is unsustainable because 
unless the UPA can generate legitimacy for ‘policies of special treatment for minorities 
in terms of the common good…[they are] vulnerable to criticism from the Hindu 
Right’.94 
  
Bajpai’s incisive analysis is a major contribution to understanding the 
‘legitimising vocabularies’ of the UPA policies on religious minorities. She correctly 
draws attention to the continuities with previous debates, as well as the Congress’ 
position in seeking to balance its traditional, pro-redistributionist outlook with the need 
to accommodate new group claims. Above all, she highlights the ideological boundaries 
within which the debates about minority rights in India can be framed, the overarching 
need to locate them within the conception of national unity, social justice, development 
and the common good if policy change is to be effected.95 However, although this 
conceptual analysis of ideological rhetoric is certainly a major advance on 
instrumentalist explanations, it still provides us with only partial insights into the policy 
‘black box’ of the UPA government in which the formation, selection and 
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implementation of public policy in this area still remains shrouded in mystery. 
‘Legitimising vocabularies’ are crucial for understanding the justification of policies, 
but no less significant is the role of institutions – and embedded oppositional forces – in 
shaping the policies and their outcomes. 
 
Social exclusion 
 
Another body of literature that has addressed the subject situates itself within the debate 
on social exclusion. Identified with the ‘politics of presence’,96 it ‘responds to a broad 
sense of ethnic, racial, gender, and minority exclusions by questioning the separation 
between ideas and identity’.97  Social exclusion perspectives require the presence of 
excluded groups in decision-making as a necessary condition of articulating their 
interests, and are often linked to social marginalisation and structural factors that deny 
some groups and communities political, economic and social opportunities. 98 Especially 
relevant here is the experience of the British Muslim community and the work of Tariq 
Modood who has demonstrated how Islamophobia has interacted with structural factors 
in Britain to produce a marginalised Muslim community that has become the subject of 
a public policy discourse on ‘parallel lives’. 99 The need to develop socially inclusive 
policies, as we have seen in the Introduction, was highlighted by 9/11 which focused 
global attention on Muslim communities. 
 
Following the publication of the SCR, a large body of literature has emerged 
which interrogated the Muslim community’s ‘development deficit’.100 These works lack 
the historical dimension to be found in the works on normative political theory 
discussed above. Two works that are an exception to this rule are Hasan’s Politics of 
Inclusion: Castes, Minorities, and Affirmative Action and Gayer and Jaffrelot’s Muslims 
in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation.101 
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 Politics of Inclusion is the most engaged account of the position of minorities, 
especially Muslims, within the framework of substantive equality of opportunity 
defined by social justice for disadvantaged castes. For Hasan, the distinction between 
caste and religion as the foundational principle of reservations by Indian constitution- 
makers created a permanent cleavage by excluding disadvantaged religious minorities, 
even though they suffered similar discrimination and disadvantage, and had sizeable 
untouchable castes. This distinction, Hasan insists, has resulted in the privileging of 
caste-based social categories, which reflects their position in Indian society and politics, 
and ‘underlines the limitations of the paradigm of social justice’.102 Hence, observes 
Hasan, ‘even with constitutional safeguards for minorities, large sections of them have 
been feeling a sense of marginalisation and alienation from the nation-state’. This 
alienation, according to Hasan, arises because for minorities ‘social and economic rights 
were missing from this framework’. 103  Dissimilar state responses to similar social 
inequalities, contends Hasan, illustrate a narrow concept of social justice, and mask 
discrimination and disadvantage among minorities today. 
 
 Politics of Inclusion draws attention to the different trajectories of disadvantaged 
castes and minorities since Independence. While reservations in employment, quotas in 
political representation and education have enabled SCs, STs, and latterly OBCs104 to 
make substantial strides, and ensure recognition and security, religious minorities of 
equivalent social status, particularly Muslims, have suffered a terminal marginalisation. 
‘The evidence’, Hasan concludes, ‘suggests that there are unjustifiable disparities 
prevailing among different groups as a result of discrimination, lack of equal 
opportunities, and lack of affirmative action for some groups.’105 Indeed, Politics of 
Inclusion is a powerful indictment of the caste-based approach to social justice and 
discrimination. What is required today, according to Hasan, is a re-evaluation of ‘the 
political frameworks constructed at the time of Independence in the background of 
Partition [and] whether they are appropriate’.106 
 
 By linking social exclusion to a substantive, egalitarian conception of equal 
opportunities, Hasan offers a powerful critique of the narrow social justice approach 
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centred on caste discrimination and disadvantage. This reading places the claims of 
groups among religious minorities, such as Christians and Muslims, on par with their 
social peers by drawing on contemporary discourse of disadvantage, discrimination and 
under-development. Not unnaturally, such claims threaten to undermine the 
exclusiveness of existing provision based on caste.  
 
Hasan further develops her argument in her contribution to Congress after 
Indira: Policy, Power, Political Change (1984-2009). 107 The unprecedented degree of 
mobilisation of Muslim community electoral support for the Congress, and its 
contribution to the formation of the UPA government in 2004, argues Hasan, enabled 
Muslims to be ‘seen as possible subject of development in India’.108 By recognising 
religion as a category of development policy, the UPA set up new committees and 
commissions (e.g. SCR, RMCR) to investigate the community’s condition, established 
new schemes targeted at minorities (e.g. PM’s 15PP), and created a new institution 
(MoMA). Hasan asserts that ‘the creation of the [MoMA] in 2006 was a political step to 
demonstrate an acceptance of the category of minority for the purpose of policymaking 
for development’.109  
 
Yet these initiatives, according to Hasan, quickly became ensnared in 
institutional and political opposition. MoMA, in Salman Khurshid’s words, soon 
became ‘powerless and redundant’,110 a ministry wholly unsuitable to being a ‘nodal 
ministry to monitor implementation [of SCR]’,111  and instead championed ‘flagship 
schemes’ 112  rather than need-based policies for the Muslim community. The strict 
adherence to an area-based approach, moreover, for identifying Minority Concentration 
Districts (MCDs) and Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MSDP) limited the 
targeted recipients because the fear of judicial review prevented the UPA government 
from going ‘beyond the area development approach’.113 Of the development initiatives 
that were undertaken, they were characterised by low budgetary allocations, poor 
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utilisation of funds, and weak monitoring of impact.114 But perhaps most disconcerting 
for Hasan was the finding that the ‘Congress did not really push the government to 
seriously implement the Sachar Committee recommendations’.115 Its reluctance to fully 
lead on the SCR recommendations together with Muslim community leaders’ inability 
to mobilise their own poor sections meant that the Congress was willing to ‘take the 
issue only up to a point’ and pursue ‘the broader agenda of inclusive growth’.116  
 
 The argument advanced by Politics of Inclusion is further developed by Gayer 
and Jaffrelot’s Muslims in Indian Cities. An account of Muslims in 11 major cities, it 
uses an ethnographic approach with quantitative data to provide an overview of 
‘trajectories of marginalisation’. Drawing on the findings of the SCR and other surveys, 
Gayer and Jaffrelot emphasise the increasing residential ghettoisation and socio-
economic marginalisation of India’s Muslims brought on by decades of insecurity and 
discrimination. These processes, they argue, are more pronounced in the ‘cow belt’ 
states of the north because the ‘Hindu traditionalists who ruled over north India – the 
Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh especially – never implemented 
the policies that had been designed by the government, such as the promotion of 
Urdu’.117 As a result, Muslim representation in administrative or security services is 
negligible. The case for the community’s claim to reservations, suggests Gayer and 
Jaffrelot, is even ‘more compelling’ than ‘the Hindu OBCs’.118 
 
 Both Politics of Inclusion and Muslims in Indian Cities illustrate the alternative 
conceptual and historical reading of post-Independence India viewed through the 
experience of minorities and the framework of ‘politics of presence’. Both highlight the 
radical egalitarian conception of equality of opportunity linked to distributive justice 
and proportionality. Methodologically, Politics of Inclusion is especially insightful 
because of the need to link policy and political processes to explain the ‘paradoxes of 
inclusion and exclusion’. Fully developed, such an approach has the potential to draw 
out the ‘inbuilt biases of the policies and institutions that maintain and create power 
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inequalities in India today’.119 This, as we shall see below, is the point of departure for 
our work which combines a policy-based approach with an institutional analysis of 
UPA’s policies on religious minorities, especially Muslims. 
 
Muslim community studies 
 
Muslim community studies in India represent another body of literature that needs to be 
acknowledged. 120  Sikand’s Muslims in India: Contemporary Social and Political 
Discourses121 explores some of the challenges facing Indian Muslims today − madrasa 
education, inter-religious and intra-Muslim relations, conflict in Kashmir, Muslim 
women and Islamic law, and Hindu-Muslim relations. His Muslims in India since 1947: 
Islamic Perspective on Inter-Faith Relations122 also covers some of the same ground but 
extends the examination to Dalit Muslims. The emergence of Dalit Muslims, Sikand 
insists, is in response to the Dalitisation of Indian politics and aims to build a non-
Ashraf and Ajlaf political identity which can access political and economic benefits by 
transcending inter-caste and inter-religious divisions. It is also an attempt to construct a 
separate identity. Although recognising the existence of ‘jati’ identities, Dalit Muslims 
seek to ‘subsume them within the wider collective Dalit identity, based on a common 
history of suffering as well as common racial origins as indigenous people.’ 123 
However, though Sikand’s work is rich in details of the community’s recent 
development, including the emergence of the history of the All India Backward Muslim 
Morcha, these works offer incomplete insights into how the state has responded to the 
community’s demands and avoid a comprehensive coverage of the experience of the 
UPA governments. 
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Abdul Shaban’s Lives of Muslims in India: Politics, Exclusion and Violence124 
highlights some key issues that face Indian Muslims today. As the title indicates, it 
deals with politics, exclusion, and violence but is mainly centred on the community’s 
experience of communal violence. Interestingly, the author notes that despite 
government policies ‘a lower caste Muslim is more likely to be identified as Muslim 
than as Dalit by the majority and state administration’, resulting in ‘the failure of the 
desired representation of Muslim OBCs in government services…and non-recognition 
of extremely lower-caste Muslims (as SCs) for reservation’.125 This aspect, however, is 
insufficiently developed. Neither is there any substantive assessment of the UPA’s 
policies: of the twelve chapters in the volume, only one covers public policies on 
Muslims, and briefly mentions SCR and Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC), with 
the author preferring to locate the debate within the framework of multiculturalism and 
social exclusion.126 
 
Omar Khalidi’s Khaki and the Ethnic Violence in India: Army, Police and 
Paramilitary Forces during Communal Riots127 raises critical and challenging questions 
concerning the religious and ethnic composition of army forces, the paramilitary units 
and the police – key institutions in the control of communal violence – by examining 
the significant under-representation of Muslims in the security forces.128 According to 
Khalidi, this under-representation is to some extent a legacy of the colonial era, but also 
the consequence of Partition129 which inspired a general distrust among Indian elites of 
Muslims in security forces. Muslim representation in the colonial Indian army was not 
insignificant, but within some Indian states, such as Kashmir, there was institutionalised 
discrimination against the community. 130 Khalidi notes continuities in these practices in 
the post-Independence period: ‘martial races’ (Sikhs and Gurkhas) are still over-
represented while merit-based recruitment has done little to improve the presence of 
Muslims in the Indian army. Anti-Muslim bias, according to Khalidi, is also found in 
the inculcation of ‘national values’ in army training or professional military education, 
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the selection of non-Muslims in promotion, and the role of the army during outbreaks of 
communal conflict.131 As recently as 2001, for example, the Army issued an advert 
specifying ‘no vacancy for Muslims and tradesmen.’ 132  Overall, Muslims remain 
heavily under-represented in all sectors of the security services in India and it leads 
Khalidi to conclude that if the country values legitimacy in the exercise of order, 
especially over minorities, there is a need for better representation of ethnic and 
religious minorities in these services.133  
 
Similarly, Khalidi’s Muslims in Indian Economy 134 provides a general overview 
of the community at the national and state levels, and the historical changes in 
livelihoods since the colonial period. Based on detailed case studies − Delhi, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Deccan, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra − Khalidi 
demonstrates the different trajectories of regional development of Muslims in post-
Independence India. The most dramatic transformation, according to Khalidi, has been 
in education and employment. Before Independence, Muslims, especially in Bombay, 
Hyderabad and Mysore states, Delhi, Bihar, and the central provinces, had embraced 
modern education, and also exceeded their proportion in government posts (30-36 per 
cent Muslims in the army compared to a national population share of 23 per cent).135 
However, Partition and the elimination of reservation in government jobs and separate 
electorates led to a secular decline in these trends, while reservation for SCs and STs 
enabled these groups to create a powerful middle class to represent their interests.136 
Khalidi explains the absence of Muslim civil servants in government in terms of 
‘migration to Pakistan, discrimination and educational lag’137 but also draws attention to 
Muslim politicians who are allocated to less significant and less powerful portfolios, 
and thus ‘unable to patronise the community’s poor members in the manner done by 
others.’138 The poor utilisation of the community’s own assets (e.g. Wakf boards), the 
misuse of the Evacuees Property Act, the Enemy Property Act, that handicapped 
Muslim businessmen from selling their properties, and most importantly, government 
discrimination against Muslims, asserts Khalidi, have resulted in an economically 
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insecure community. 139  These findings together with the lack of a decisive policy 
intervention on behalf of the government lead Khalidi to conclude that ‘the pattern of 
economic stratification among Muslims – a community of miniscule numbers in trade, 
slightly larger numbers in military and bureaucracy, larger numbers of artisans, and the 
largest number as landless peasants – continue into our own times.’140  
 
Khaki and the Ethnic Violence in India: Army, Police and Paramilitary Forces 
during Communal Riots and Muslims in Indian Economy fill an important gap in 
Muslim community studies. Both draw attention to the claims for the substantive 
equality of opportunity for Muslims. Both also illustrate that despite the different 
trajectories of Muslim development in some of the regions, the absence of a clear policy 
targeted at the community has resulted in its present under-development. 
 
A more nuanced approach to Muslims and development is offered by Fazal 
whose work provides sophisticated insights into the construction of Muslim political 
identity in colonial and post-colonial India as well as state responses to Muslim 
demands for reservations. 141  Fazal argues for the need to deconstruct the Muslim 
demand for reservations for the whole community, a demand that is opposed by 
‘Muslim backwards who resist any attempt at the “bundling of unequals” together’.142 
Although the Constitution allows the state to make reservations for Socially and 
Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs), or OBCs, the uncertainty of these categories, 
and their close identification with caste, most notably at the national level after 1950, 
maintains Fazal, has led to a large variation in state practices, particularly in the 
south.143 The OBCs category among Muslims, insists Fazal, has overlapping similarities 
with socio-economically disadvantaged castes among Hindus, particularly among the 
Ajlafs and Arzals who share common occupations and often are Muslims by conversion.  
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 In the absence of a constitutional consensus on OBCs, historically states in the 
south (Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka) soon established their own category of 
OBCs while those in the north (such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Jharkhand, West Bengal and Assam) resisted the OBCs status for Muslims 
until relatively recently.144 By examining the historical context in which states have 
been able to provide ‘protective discrimination’ for Muslims, Fazal offers three 
contrasting examples: ‘reservation for all Muslims’ (except the ‘creamy layer’) as 
witnessed in Kerala and Karnataka; reservations for Muslims as backward classes as in 
Tamil Nadu; and the Bihar model which bifurcates OBCs further into Most Backward 
Classes. While Kerala and Karnataka as examples have been favoured by Muslim 
leaders, Fazal supports the other two models for they ‘stand the scrutiny of logical 
consistency and the principles of social justice’.145  
 
Fazal’s argument is refreshingly non-polemical, emphasising the possibilities of 
change within the existing constitutional framework. The Tamil Nadu and Bihar models 
which Fazal favours remain firmly within ‘the ambit of a caste-based reservation policy 
for the backward classes’.146 However, as he also acknowledges, in the debate between 
identity and equity the case for ‘protective policies’ for poor Muslims has to contend 
with the opposition of the Hindu Right and there is no logical reason why in a caste-
based reservation system ‘Arzals or Muslims of Dalit origins’ should be excluded from 
‘entitlements earmarked for the scheduled castes’.147 As we shall see, these are not easy 
hurdles to overcome.  
 
The plea for a more grounded approach to the Muslim question is further 
explored by Alam148 who interrogates the case of reservations for, and the idea of, 
Muslims as a marginalised community by calling for a more ‘careful understanding’ to 
‘develop effective affirmative action policies’. 149  For Alam the argument for 
reservations for the whole Muslim community, which is favoured by its leadership, is 
predicated on backwardness, discrimination and social exclusion. However, this rhetoric 
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overlooks the fact that other religious communities also have significant backward 
sections, that reservations for all would not benefit the poor Muslims, are against the 
secular constitution and might intensify communal discord. According to Alam: 
 
…the various strands of debates on socio-economic disadvantages of 
Muslims and affirmative actions for them largely rest on simplification of 
the problem and are guided by rhetoric rather than engaging and 
exploring the idea of the multi-dimensional nature of socio-economic 
deprivation in the country.150 
 
A close examination of national family and health survey data leads Alam to asserts that 
contrary to the assumption of the Muslim community as a whole facing social exclusion, 
the degree of disadvantage of Muslims vis-à-vis other communities is somewhat limited. 
Rather, the deprivation of Muslim community is determined by its special distribution 
and ‘trajectories of their history and the political economy.’151 Alam also maintains that 
there is no correlation between ‘being Muslim’ and their socio-economic backwardness, 
although discrimination against Muslims in some sectors undoubtedly exists. Muslim 
deprivation, insists Alam, has more to do with the geographical concentration of 
Muslims in states in the north and east, the least developed states in India.152 The most 
important factor that affects ‘the national average of their socio-economic well-being’, 
concludes Alam, is ‘regionally biased demography of Muslim communities’.153 As such, 
instead of blanket communal reservations a ‘geographical approach’ to affirmative 
action is required.154  
 
Alam’s work is an important corrective to community studies that emphasises 
victimhood and discrimination. He, moreover, throws into sharp relief the multi-
dimensional nature of Muslim deprivation that requires specific, targeted programmes 
within the framework of affirmative action, not reservations. However, his analysis also 
draws attention to the innate resistance within the Indian political system to policies – 
reservations or affirmative actions – aimed at Muslims. 155  It is these biases and 
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institutional resistance to change in the policy process that we shall examine in detail in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
In contrast, Hasan Suroor’s India’s Muslim Spring: Why is Nobody Talking 
about it? 156  is a more optimistic re-evaluation of the ‘Muslim Question’ which, 
according to the author, has been too narrowly focused on the community’s failings. 
Instead, he turns his gaze on the emergence of new perspectives and strategies within 
the community. Suroor explores these new voices among India’s Muslims by drawing 
on interviews with young professional and educated groups on what it means to be a 
Muslim in India today, and how they see their future. The author argues convincingly 
that a quiet but historic shift is taking place among Muslims, driven by a new 
generation.157 Although discrimination is still pervasive, the young generation, Suroor 
contends, has a more ‘grown-up approach’ to today’s India.158 
 
Suroor insists that the Muslim community in India is in transition from 
‘accommodation’ and ‘compromise’. This ‘new mood of pragmatism’159 was reflected 
in the 2013 municipal elections in Gujarat in which Muslims voted in large numbers for 
the BJP, contributing to the party’s success in key Muslim-majority towns. Such a 
dramatic turnaround since the 2002 riots, according to Suroor, is the result of an 
increasing shift from the traditional preoccupation with identity issues to education, jobs 
and security. For the first time in post-Independence India, he argues, ‘the balance of 
power is rapidly shifting from fundamentalists to the moderates’.160 This change has 
been possible because for the younger generations ‘partition has no resonance’ and they 
have no special affinity with Pakistan, enabling them to be less conflicted about their 
identity.161 The real challenge before Indian politics, insists Suroor, is how political 
parties will respond to the changed terms of the ‘Muslim Question’. 
 
Suroor’s understanding of the new mood of changes among younger Muslim 
generations is a valuable contribution to community studies. However, the evidence on 
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which the author constructs his argument is too light to carry the weight he places upon 
it. The differences between the older and younger generations, for instance, are posited 
in binary terms as a clash between ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘liberals’. 162  Most of the 
interviewees were well-educated young, professional Muslims − businessmen, bankers, 
and journalists − who represent only a small section of the community. One of the 
interviewees claims that ‘India is the safest and best place for Muslims to live’163 but 
this statement overlooks the systemic impact of communal violence, not to mention 
more recent outbreaks in Muzaffarnagar. In brief, as the title suggests, Suroor’s volume 
captures the new mood within the community, but as the voting pattern of the 
community in the Sixteenth Lok Sabha elections has demonstrated, younger − and 
indeed, older Muslims − have yet to demonstrate large scale endorsement of the BJP’s 
vision of India.164 
 
Community studies cover an ever expanding field of study − declining political 
representation; 165  anthropological exploration of Islam among different sectarian 
traditions;166 Muslims in Indian cities;167 communal conflict;168 social inclusion169 and 
changes in India’s Muslim youth170 − but their main shortcoming for our perspective is 
the over-emphasis on community particularism or ethnographic analysis. In short, 
methodologically they provide weak foundations for policy analysis. 
 
Public policy studies 
 
Public policy approaches to the UPA’s policies on religious minorities have almost, 
invariably, focused on a critical evaluation of policy implementation.171 As the range of 
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these outputs is too diverse to cover adequately, we will review four examples:172 
Shariff’s Inclusive Development Paradigm in India: A Post-Sachar Perspective,173 the 
Centre for Equity Studies’ Promises to Keep: Investigating Government’s Response to 
Sachar Committee Recommendations,174 the Centre for Budget and Accountability’s 
Policy Priorities for Development of Muslims in the 11th Plan: An Assessment,175 and 
the Council for Social Development’s India Social Development Report 2012: 
Minorities at the Margins edited by Zoya Hasan and Mushirul Hasan.176 
 
Inclusive Development Paradigm in India aims to take ‘a stock of public policy 
initiatives and performance of the national government’ 177  since the SCR. In the 
absence of a credible and methodologically sound official study, it aims to ‘fill this gap’ 
by comparing SCR’s recommendations with the achievements. Although the report 
borrows from other studies, especially the Centre for Equity Studies (see below), it 
concentrates on the performance of Muslims in education and publicly funded anti-
poverty programmes. Drawing on the National Sample Survey Results for 2004-5 and 
2009-10, the report argues that improvement in educational performance among Muslim 
pupils up to grade 10 in these years was ‘lower than improvements amongst the SCs and 
STs’,178 despite Muslims having a higher rate of urbanisation. Equally disappointing, 
according to the author, was Muslim participation in the anti-poverty programmes. One 
major national survey in 2009-10 indicated that in the flagship programme, the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), Muslims were ‘hardly present’, with only 
‘3 per cent of all job card holders’. Their actual participation should have been in the 
range of 15-16 per cent.179 The root cause of these poor outcomes, the report concludes, 
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is ineffective policy formation, inherent religious bias in the state institutions and the 
failure to fully implement the SCR’s recommendations.180 
 
A more detailed and systematic evaluation on the implementation of the SCR’s 
recommendations was undertaken by the Centre for Equity Studies. Promises to Keep, a 
series of case studies of programme implementation in three Muslim majority districts 
in Bihar, West Bengal and Haryana, reveals obvious, and not so apparent, 
shortcomings: poor implementation, institutional bias, poor design and execution, low 
and ineffective budgetary allocation, weak Muslim civil society engagement, and 
chaotic and overlapping structures without effective ownership or monitoring of 
flagship programmes. The report provides a damning indictment: 
 
a) the scale of government interventions is too small to make a major dent 
into the large numbers and the depth of their economic and educational 
deprivations, and denials of public services; b) the design of programmes 
are ‘blunt’ because they do not often target effectively Muslim 
settlements and people directly; and c) institutional structures designed to 
implement these initiatives – right from the Union Ministry of Minority 
Affairs to implementing officials in districts and below – require 
strengthening, of personnel, mandate, orientation, training, support and 
supervision. They also need to plan and monitor programmes for 
development of Muslims in more participatory ways, consulting with and 
planning with women, youth and men from poor Muslim communities.181 
 
Despite this negative assessment, Promises to Keep recognises that the above initiatives 
need to be improved and deepened, rather than replaced by new policies that may, or 
may not, deliver on the ground. 
 
The Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability also drew similar 
conclusions. By examining the resources made available to minorities during the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan, it questioned the ‘adequacy of the government’s policy 
initiatives and budgetary provisions for the minority community, more specifically the 
Muslims’.182  Policy Priorities for Development of Muslims in the 11th Plan reveals 
major failings in policy design, programme implementation and actual access to 
programmes directed at Muslims. The MSDP, despite being a flagship measure, for 
example, was regarded as a ‘gap-filling programme’: it lacked a ‘proper institutional 
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mechanisms in terms of clarity of planning, implementation channels and coordination 
among various agencies involved in many States and districts’.183 During the Eleventh 
Plan only 6.66 per cent of the total plan allocation was earmarked for minorities;184 and 
the fund allocation for scholarship scheme was ‘woefully inadequate’.185 If Muslims 
were to be brought up to ‘par with other communities in terms of socio-economic 
development’, the report concluded, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan should address these 
shortcomings to ensure effective implementation.186 
 
India Social Development Report 2012: Minorities at the Margins by Zoya 
Hasan and Mushirul Hasan is the most recent account of policy analysis on the socio-
economic conditions of minorities. In a bid to explore the impact of policy intervention 
on social development the report covers both theoretical and empirical studies of 
policies for minorities. Beginning with the clarification on the concept of ‘social 
development’ which is defined as a function of economic growth, social policy, and 
poverty reduction measures,187 contributors to this report conduct theoretical as well as 
empirical policy analysis in a wide range of fields − poverty reduction, health, 
employment, gender, food security, social security, and education. Particularly 
noteworthy are detailed case studies of the UPA’s policies at the state level on 
education, madrasas and development programmes. While the report’s assessment of 
the post-Sachar evaluation of policies acknowledges the discriminatory practice of state 
officials in policy implementation at the state level,188 it fails to develop a more nuanced 
and fine-grained understanding of the institutional resistance in the UPA’s policy 
process which has produced these outcomes. 
 
Inclusive Development Paradigm in India, Promises to Keep, Policy Priorities 
for Development of Muslims in the 11th Plan, and India Social Development Report 
2012 have all filled an important void. But there are major shortcomings with these 
reports. Inclusive Development Paradigm in India can be challenged for its presentation 
of data, its overtly polemical tone, and the failure to adequately grasp the geographical 
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variations in the Muslim communities’ experience throughout India, especially between 
the states in the north and the south. Similarly, Promises to Keep is open to the criticism 
of selection bias for its focus on the weakest examples, where cumulative failures of 
public policy are already present. While the Policy Priorities for Development of 
Muslims in the 11th Plan provides a critical assessment on the UPA’s budget allocation 
for minorities, there is still much to be understood about the policy process. In a similar 
vein, India Social Development Report 2012 overlooks the complex policy process that 
both shaped and determined the outcome of UPA policies on the minorities, especially 
Muslims. Thus, recognising these shortcomings is a necessary prerequisite for more 
comprehensive assessment of the UPA experience. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the literature on the UPA, equal opportunities 
and Muslims. Although the coverage is extensive and complex, in key areas it is wholly 
inadequate. Thus, the conventional political science approaches emphasise 
instrumentalism, the electoral incentives for Indian governments to pursue particular 
policies in terms of payoffs. This perspective has been supplemented by political and 
social theory in the writings of Bajpai, Verma and Hasan working within the 
frameworks of social justice and social exclusion. The seminal works of these authors, 
in varying degrees, have drawn attention to the caste/religion distinction in both the 
framing of minority rights at Independence and its subsequent institutionalisation in the 
regime of caste-based reservations that created an unequal playing field between 
‘competing equalities’. The emerging field of Muslim community studies also offers 
new insights into the contemporary ‘Muslim Question’ in India, though it is dominated 
by ethnographic accounts that make generalisations either difficult or impractical. 
Nonetheless, authors like Fazal and Alam direct us toward a more fine-grained analysis 
of both state responses to Muslim demands and the specificities of Muslim deprivation 
which suggest that neither are state responses uniform and nor are India’s Muslims a 
monolithic community as their leaders sometimes claim. Instead their fortunes have 
been very much shaped by regional histories and socio-economic conditions that 
continue to leave an enduring imprint on the community’s political and social profile. 
Finally, the current ‘grey’ policy studies literature focuses primarily on evaluation – 
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what the target groups have not gained − but it too suffers from either extreme 
generality or excessive narrowness.  
 
The literature review demonstrates that there are major shortcomings in 
understanding of the policy process in UPA policies towards religious minorities. 
Foremost among these is the need to explain how public policy was formulated, the 
actors and institutions that influenced the selection of policies, and how policies were 
implemented, or remained unimplemented. Central to this policy process, as we 
outlined in the Introduction, is the pervasive institutional resistance that ultimately 
frustrated UPA policies. It is to an understanding of the policy process in India, and the 
role of history and institutions in shaping policies on religious minorities, that we turn in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Towards an institutional policy analysis:       
analytical approach and methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As noted in the previous chapter there is a major lacuna in the study of public policy on 
religious minorities in India. The existing literature, as we have seen, is biased towards 
either macro or micro explanations that fail to illuminate the ‘black box of public 
policy’. In order to bridge this gap, and to further advance the understanding of the 
subject, this chapter outlines the elements of an institutional policy analysis approach by 
drawing on studies of public policy and institutionalism with special reference to 
historical institutionalism and path dependence. The first section provides a definition 
of the discipline of public policy and the stages of the policy process – how it is 
conceptualised. We then identify the key policy actors and institutions around which our 
study is located within the Indian political system at the national and states levels. 
Following this delineation, we then situate our approach to public policy within the 
framework of historical institutionalism and path dependence in particular, outlining the 
rationale for this framework. We then, briefly, review some of the publications in the 
study of public policy in India that address these concerns. Finally, the chapter outlines 
the research questions which underpinned the study and the methodologies used to 
collect and analyse the data. 
 
 
Policy studies 
 
The discipline of policy studies emerged after 1945 with a ‘multi-disciplinary’, 
‘problem-solving’ and ‘explicitly normative’ approach in areas traditionally neglected 
by political science. 189 The father of policy science, Harold Lasswell, hoped that it 
would adhere ‘strictly to the canon of relevance, orientating itself towards the solution 
of real-world problems and not engaging in purely academic debates that, for example, 
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characterised interpretation of classical and sometimes obscure political texts’.190 While 
some of the key elements of this definition have changed, it remains the starting point 
for the subject. Perhaps the most concise definition is offered by Dye, for whom public 
policy is ‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’. 191  This definition 
recognises that the principal ‘agent of public policy-making is a government’.192 It also 
draws attention to the fact that governments need to act, or maintain, the status quo and 
take negative or ‘non-decisions’.193 Indeed, decision-making, or non-decisions, involves 
a range of actors and institutions that need to be engaged at various levels of the 
political system. In this respect the policy process is a ‘relatively stable, purposive 
course of action followed by government in dealing with some problem or matter of 
concern’. 194  Clearly, public policy-making thus involves many governmental and 
societal actors and institutions but this descriptive approach fails to account for why 
governments take particular decisions. 
  
 But before we outline our methodological approach to public policy analysis, it 
is useful to draw attention to two other dimensions: the ‘policy process’ and the ‘policy 
sector’.195 
 
The policy process 
 
As we have seen in the literature review, the UPA policies on Muslims correspond to 
what analysts have termed the ‘policy process’; that is, the various stages from which 
the policy evolves from inception to execution. In this literature there is an implicit 
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understanding of a ‘policy cycle’ or ‘process’ that unfolds in a set of sequential stages. 
Figure 2.1 below outlines the core stages of this process. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Stages of the policy process 
 
 
Source: Howlett and Ramesh, Studying Public Policy, Chs. 5-9.  
 
The initial stage is identified as ‘agenda-setting’ when a policy issue or a problem is 
recognised by the government. Agenda-setting for public policy, of course, is highly 
contentious, driven by, among other things, the politics of pre-election manifestos, the 
nature of the regime, historical institutional legacies, economic management, 
ideological differences, and patterns of social mobilisation.196 Hence, prior to the 2004 
elections, the 2002 Gujarat pogroms against Muslims were to have a profound impact 
on UPA’s policy-making. 
  
 Agenda-setting is followed by ‘policy formulation’, a stage in which policy 
options are produced within government and ‘involves assessing possible solutions to 
policy problems or…exploring the various options available for addressing a policy 
problem’.197 Inevitably the choice of policies determines their outcome. These can be 
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heavily influenced by substantive constraints (specific to the problem itself) or 
procedural constraints (institutional, constitutional, budgetary and organisational). 
Crucial to policy formation is the role of the state and policy-making actors. Subsystems 
– ‘federal units’, ‘policy networks’, ‘iron-triangles’ and ‘advocacy coalitions’198 – are 
also critical variables in this process. In a developing society such as India, however, 
although these elements exist, and are increasingly important, the state continues to be 
the main actor. Well-established mechanisms of ‘top-down’ expert commissions, as we 
shall see in Chapter Four, were the core of policy formulation. Muslim policy networks 
as an advocacy coalition became more fully engaged after the agenda-setting stage. 
Significantly, how the policies were formulated would eventually influence their 
outcome. 
 
 Closely associated with policy formulation is ‘decision-making’. 199  This 
involves ‘authoritative’ and ‘non-authoritative’ actors operating within the framework 
of governance in a political system. Typically, ‘only those politicians, judges, and 
government officials actually empowered to make authoritative decisions in the area in 
question can participate with both “voice” and “vote” at this stage of the policy 
cycle’.200 Decisions can be ‘negative’ (opposed to the policy), ‘positive’ (supportive of 
the policy), or ‘non-decisions’ (deliberate inaction). 201  Whereas negative decisions 
move through agenda-setting, policy formulation and to decision-making, and terminate 
at that stage, non-decisions can filter out policy options throughout the policy cycle – 
agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making and implementation. Students of 
power have drawn our attention to the importance of non-decisions both as indicators of 
non-action but also, importantly, as examples of agenda-setting power.202 Non-decisions 
can be pervasive in different models of decision-making (‘rationalist’, ‘incrementalist’ 
and ‘the garbage can’ model)203 and different styles but, nonetheless, are determined by 
the constraints under which key policy actors operate. As Forester argues, public policy 
operates under a range of institutional (subsystems) and constitutional constrains. What 
politicians and administrators do: 
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depends on the situations in which they work. Pressed for quick 
recommendations, they cannot begin long studies. Faced with 
organisational rivalries, competition and turf struggles, they may 
justifiably be less than wholly candid about their own plans. What is 
sensible to do depends on the context one is in, in ordinary life no less 
than public administration.204 
 
The literature review drew attention to the decision-making process in UPA policies on 
Muslims. Critical to understanding these decisions as ‘positive’, ‘negative’, and ‘non-
decisions’, are the institutional parameters outlined above, and the political constraints 
of operating within a coalition government. Coalition politics, especially the need for 
support of national and regional parties, notably caste-based parties like the Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP), the Samajwadi Party (SP), and class-based parties, the Communist 
Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)), as we shall 
see, influenced the decision-making process. And equally significant, if not more 
important, class, caste and regional groupings within Congress were influential in 
determining ‘what’ decisions were taken. When policies were targeted specifically at 
Muslim OBCs and SCs, the decision-making processes in such policies included 
potential national and state level trade-offs.205 
 
 The penultimate stage in the ‘policy’ cycle is ‘implementation’ when decisions 
are translated into action. 206  Here the emphasis is on the effectiveness of 
implementation, the methods used and the policy instruments drawn upon. 
Implementation is contingent on administrative structures or, sometimes, quasi-
government organisations, and can be ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’. Whatever the 
approach used, it faces the principal-agent problem; that is, the discretion given to 
‘agents’ by decision-makers whom they indirectly control. The relationship is normally 
defined legally. However, as Howlett and Ramesh observe, ‘the administrators have 
their own understanding, ambitions, and fiscal and knowledge resources that may come 
in the way of policies being implemented as originally conceived by decision-
makers’.207  And ‘agent’ autonomy might be increased if, as in the case of service 
delivery of the UPA’s policies, complex inter-organisational coordination is required, or 
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if the problem needs innovative solutions, or even more so, if the target group is diverse 
and complex. As a consequence, a great deal of discretion can be placed in the hands of 
civil servants. In a federal system like India, where the execution of policy takes place 
mostly at the state level, with political formations opposed to those at the centre, 
political and administrative discretion between the ‘principal’ and the ‘agents’ can be 
very wide. It is precisely because of this discretion that the appropriate ‘policy 
instruments’ (the tools government uses to put policy into effect) need to be employed. 
These instruments can be substantive (where there is state involvement in the 
production of goods and service delivery) or procedural/regulatory (where there is an 
effort to manipulate subsystem behaviour). In reality, most public policy problems 
utilise a combination of these approaches.208 As Howlett and Ramesh conclude, ‘the 
choice of policy instruments is shaped by the characteristics of the instruments, the 
nature of the problem at hand, governments’ past experience in dealing with the same or 
similar problems, the subjective preference of the decision-makers, and the likely 
reaction to the choice by affected social groups’.209  
 
  The literature review highlighted the problems of ‘implementation’. As Sáez and 
Singh observe, the gap ‘between policy and implementation, between passing 
legislation nationally and seeing it executed at the local level, is a little understood black 
box in Indian public policy’.210 However, in some areas of social policy, especially vis-
à-vis SCs and STs, policy instruments have had a higher degree of effectiveness than 
policies directed towards religious minorities.211 Surprisingly, the UPA was reluctant to 
draw on the rich ‘tool-box’ of public policy instruments used for disadvantaged castes, 
and in contrast, its policies on Muslims tended to be highly ‘top-down’, ‘overlapping’, 
‘confusing’, ‘poorly funded’, and with a great deal of ‘agent discretion’; that is, leeway 
to local officials to interpret policy implementation according their priorities. Lacking 
adequate feedback and monitoring mechanisms, moreover, these policies and initiatives 
had limited accountability both to the target groups (members of the poor Muslim 
community) and within the administrative structure themselves. The emphasis on 
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voluntarism and ‘general initiatives’ rather than targeted redistributionist policies, 
which are generally acknowledged to have much more impact in improving the 
‘development deficit’, according to critics, compounded policy ineffectiveness.212 As 
Promises to Keep concludes, the poor operationalisation of development schemes has: 
 
resulted in very dispiriting results on the ground. The picture, on the set 
up of these flagship interventions for Muslims, and especially on the 
institutional arrangements, is not pretty. There are serious structural and 
capacity issues that prevent implementing agencies from effectively 
delivering on programme and project objectives. But a more serious 
concern is the lack of any real engagement with intended beneficiaries 
and civil society groups around planning, implementation and monitoring 
of the projects.213 
 
Critics view these policies as essentially ‘tokenistic’, ‘symbolic’ measure designed to 
placate the Muslim vote. For others, for example the Muslim policy networks, these 
shortcomings can be overcome by borrowing from comparative public policy 
experience in different social sectors in India and the states. 
 
 The final stage of the policy process is ‘evaluation’, an assessment of how a 
policy has fared.214  Often this is posed in terms of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ but such 
evaluations are not readily possible. Modes of evaluation can be administrative, to 
check for ‘value of money’, technical monitoring of processes, and efficiency-centred. 
Judicial evaluation often arises as a result of review by courts. In India, for instance, in 
the last decade the rise of Public Interest Litigation has led to the reassessment of a 
number of flagship anti-poverty programme. 215  Policy evaluation, therefore, is a 
‘struggle over scarce resources or ideologies’ as much as a ‘part of a process of learning 
in which policies develop and change on the basis of assessments of past successes and 
failures and conscious efforts to emulate successes and avoid failures’.216 
 
 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, one of the striking features of UPA 
policies on Muslims in the area of employment and service delivery was the absence of 
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effective monitoring and evaluation. This shortcoming was apparent in the reluctance to 
develop effective monitoring mechanisms within the programmes themselves and the 
unwillingness to establish legislative scrutiny through Parliament. The MoMA, which 
had general oversight of these programmes, was found wanting in being able to 
undertake such regular evaluation and to provide feedback into the policy process. In 
short, effective evaluation of policies was sorely missing. Such was the criticism from 
NGOs and advocacy coalitions about these shortcomings that in February 2013 the 
Minister of Minority Affairs, K. Rahman Khan, was compelled to announce that UPA 
government would appoint a ‘high-power committee to review and assess the 
implementation of Justice Rajinder Sachar Committee’s recommendations and Prime 
Minister’s Fifteen-Point Programme’.217 
 
 To sum up: the policy process, or cycle, is a useful heuristic device for 
understanding UPA policies on religious minorities and Muslims in particular because 
almost a decade after the process began, with the election of the first UPA government 
in 2004, the cycle reached its final stage. This stage is an appropriate point of departure 
to critically examine the policies that made the agenda, why and how they are 
formulated, the critical decision taken to implement and not implement some of the 
policies, and the process of implementation itself. As we have noted above, a 
comprehensive evaluation of these policies is outside the remit of this thesis which is 
focused primarily on understanding the institutional resistance to these initiatives. 
However, to demonstrate the coherence of the policy process in the field of employment 
and service delivery a limited assessment of evaluation is undertaken using available 
data. But before we proceed to examine these dimensions, it is necessary to outline the 
institutions and actors involved in this process, and our methodology for understanding 
the policy process. 
 
 
Policy actors and institutions 
 
The policy process outlined above operates within the context of key policy actors and 
institutions. Although there are major debates within public policy studies on whether 
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actors and institutions are independent variables, or mutually dependent on each other, 
here we want to outline the key actors and institutions within the Indian political 
system. Key actors operate within an institutional context in which there are ‘formal or 
informal rules, and conventions, as well as ethical, ideological, and epistemic concerns 
[that] help to shape actors’ behaviour by conditioning their perception of their interests 
and the probability of these interests being realised’.218 The actors’ ‘assumptive worlds’, 
the ‘mental models’ that ‘provide both an interpretation of the environment and a 
prescription as to how that environment should be structured’,219 are critical in shaping 
appropriate solutions and are influenced by the normative views about ‘the nature of 
society and the proper role of government’.220 If institutions are heavily biased towards 
a particular policy path, key actors are likely to adopt a conservative, gradual and 
instrumentalist approach, or seek to operate within the ‘rules of the game’.221 As we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, UPA policy implementation, especially by the national 
and state administrations, was heavily compromised by the institutional actors’ beliefs 
about policies and attitudes towards Muslims. 
 
 Whilst this thesis adopts a historically informed institutionalist approach, for a 
detailed focus on institutional policy analysis during the UPA’s tenure the interaction 
between institutions and actors considered here are limited to the key political actors, 
pressure groups and ‘the constitutional arrangements within which governments 
operate, the rules of the game, and the bureaucratic machinery at their disposal’.222 
Thus, in India these key actors are the elected officials of the executive (government), 
the Opposition (legislature), appointed officials (bureaucrats), the judiciary, interested 
groups, NGOs, and the media. These actors operate, moreover, within an institutional 
context, or a subsystem that is vertically divided between the structure of governance at 
levels of the Union and the states. While the quality of governance and policy 
implementation – at the national and state level – varies enormously across the Indian 
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states, 223  the national and state level institutions are remarkably uniform in their 
structure and operational practices. This uniformity, furthermore, is reinforced by the 
existence of all Indian services (such as the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian 
Police Service (IPS), and Indian Foreign Service (IFS)) that provide the country with its 
‘steel-frame’. Figure 2.2 below illustrates this policy context: 
 
Figure 2.2 
 UPA and Muslims: actors and institutions 
 
 
Non-official actors   Institutions  Official actors 
     Union level 
 
Executive                [UPA, other parties]                   
         NGOs                                         Legislature              [UPA, BJP, other parties] 
         Media    Supreme Court        [Supreme Court Judges]   
                                                                
     States level 
     Executive        [Ruling parties] 
        NGOs               Legislature        [Congress, BJP, other parties] 
        Media    High Court             [High Court Judges] 
 
Source: produced by author.  
     
 The interaction between institutions and actors took place within the formal 
system of governance, but the media and some NGOs were to play a key role in shaping 
policy. Also important was the role of two other institutions. The judiciary, for instance, 
both at the national and regional levels, played a critical role because some of the policy 
initiatives of the UPA on religious minorities were challenged in the courts. Finally, the 
UPA as a coalition government had to engage in a ‘complex process of bargaining, 
negotiation, and political calculations’ before investing ‘administrative capacity and 
political capital’ 224  in some of the policies. This bargaining included important 
calculations at the national and state levels about the potential loss of support from other 
disadvantaged groups such as the SCs, STs and OBCs. The ever-present threat, and 
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capacity of the BJP, to mobilise against pro-Muslim policies, was to prove a powerful 
constraint on UPA’s capacity for action. 
 
 
Public policy: methodology 
 
Thus far we have provided largely a descriptive account of the policy process but it is 
necessary to outline our analytical approach. Our concern is to develop a historical 
sense of how policy on religious minorities, especially Muslims, became 
institutionalised after 1947, and has proven difficult to change, and how it aligns with 
the formal policy process during the UPA administration. Consequently, our emphasis 
is on institutional policy analysis, in which ‘institutions’ are, in a narrow sense as 
defined above, structures around which actors (agents) act, but also the embodiments of 
historical institutionalism − a methodological orientation that privileges institutions over 
individuals in shaping behaviour and outcomes. 
 
 Approaches to public policy divide along familiar methodological lines: 225 
deductive (e.g. rational choice theories, class analysis and actor-centred neo-
Institutionalism) that ‘developed largely on the basis of the application of general 
presuppositions, concepts, or principles to specific phenomena’;226 and inductive (e.g. 
sociological individualism, group theories and socio-historical neo-Institutionalism) that 
developed ‘generalisations only on the basis of careful observation of empirical 
phenomena and subsequent testing of these generalisations against other cases’.227 In 
the review of literature we have highlighted the limitations of these methodological 
approaches, but given our focus on UPA’s performance against historically embedded 
constraints framed during constitution-making, historical institutionalism provides an 
appropriate point of departure. 
 
 Peters has characterised the institutionalist approach as one in which: 
 
Institutions are the variable that explain political life in the most direct 
and parsimonious manner, and they are also the factors that themselves 
require explanation. The basic argument is that institutions do matter, and 
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that they matter more than anything else that could be used to explain 
political decisions.228 
 
By ‘institutions’, Peters refers to both structural features such as formal institutions, for 
example the bureaucracy, executive, legislature and legal framework, and informally 
shared norms that ensure stability over time.229 Krasner, on the other hand, offers a 
much broader definition. ‘An institutionalist perspective’, according to him, ‘regards 
enduring institutional structures as the building blocks of social and political life. The 
preferences, capabilities, and basic self-identities of individuals are conditioned by these 
institutional structures.’ 230  Despite these differences most institutionalists view 
institutions as an independent variable with public policy as the dependent variable. Or 
in other words, public policy and the policy process are determined by institutions 
rather than vice versa. 231  Although Peters acknowledges that some schools of 
institutionalism consider institutions as a dependent variable, or both dependent and 
independent variables, nonetheless most species of institutionalism ‘have at their centre 
a more or less clear conception of institutions acting rather autonomously in making 
policy’.232  In this thesis we concur with Peters that institutions are an independent 
variable and the policy process a dependent variable. However, our understanding of 
institutionalism is historically located and tied to the policy process to develop a new 
framework of institutional policy analysis.  
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Historical institutionalism: path dependence 
 
Historically, institutions can have an enduring impact on political behaviour. Recently, 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail233 has provided a seminal account of how 
decisions taken over time by almost identical polities have led to very contrasting 
patterns of institutional evolution and path dependence; that is, the self-reinforcing 
reproduction of institutions and institutional behaviour. In seeking to address the 
question why nations fail, Acemoglu and Robinson claim it is the quality of the 
institutions which ‘influence behaviour and incentives in real life’. 234  Political 
institutions, according to the authors, ‘are a key determinant of the outcome of this 
game’.235 By political institutions Acemoglu and Robinson mean both the constitutional 
framework of governance, and the ‘power and capacity of the state to regulate and 
govern society’. 236  They also include in this definition how ‘political power is 
distributed in society, particularly the ability of different groups to act collectively to 
pursue their objectives or to stop other people from pursuing theirs’.237 
 
 For Acemoglu and Robinson, there are two ideal types of political and economic 
institutions: those that are inclusive, plural and based on a degree of political 
centralisation, and those that are exclusive, extractive and limited. The former, they 
maintain, have led to the emergence of democratic and pluralist nation and state-
building in the West. The latter, on the other hand, have created extractive and exclusive 
political and economic polities in Asia and Africa. These outcomes were determined by 
different decisions and choices made by political leaders at a critical juncture when the 
existing relations between political and economic institutions were realigned. A critical 
juncture is a major historical turning point that accentuates ‘institutional drift’ between 
polities because the small difference that sometimes exists between them can lead to 
path dependence that can become self-reinforcing through a feedback loop, or 
‘increasing returns’. 
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 Why Nations Fail neatly encapsulates the essence of historical institutionalism 
and path dependence which holds that particular policies and choices made at a critical 
juncture can have a persistent and enduring impact over time. The idea of path 
dependence has been expounded at length by Pierson: 
 
The notion of path dependence is generally used to support a few key 
claims: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from 
similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; 
large consequences may result from relatively ‘small’ or contingent 
events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually 
impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is often 
punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours 
of social life.238 
 
Path dependence theorists, thus, emphasise the long-term impact of decision-making 
and institution building. The creation of institutions at India’s independence dedicated 
to tackling caste disadvantage, for example, maintains a form of path dependence 
dedicated to reservations for these groups into which institutions and actors have 
become ‘locked-in’, producing a positive ‘feedback loop’ of ‘increasing returns’ that 
have subsequently been reinforced by the initial direction of change and are increasingly 
difficult for any government to reverse. Path dependence, in other words, is reproduced 
by increasing returns to actors and institutions established during the critical juncture 
and the high costs of switching to alternative paths. As Pierson notes, ‘the probability of 
further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path…[because] 
the costs of exit − of switching to some previously plausible alternative − rise’.239 
 
 Path dependence has been criticised for being over-deterministic. The idea of 
‘increasing returns’ over time also begs the question of ‘diminishing’ or ‘constant 
returns’. In response, Mahoney and Schensul have drawn attention to reactive sequences 
in which the emergence of particular institutions can influence actions by triggering 
responses, sometimes unintended.240 Reactive sequences are characterised by ‘backlash 
processes that transform and perhaps reverse early events…[in] a chain of tightly linked 
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reactions and counter-reactions’.241 Similarly, Thelen242 suggests that if institutions are 
locked into a particular trajectory, this often overlooks the degree to which they are 
contested, notwithstanding the costs involved in such contestation. 
 
 Path dependence theorists have sought to address some of these concerns related 
to agency, structure and choice.243 First, they identify a critical juncture as ‘a major 
event or confluence of factors [disrupting] the existing balance of political or economic 
power in a nation’. Often these distinct legacies affect ‘a whole set of societies’.244 
Critical junctures arise as a result of pre-existing cleavages, but mark a radical 
transformation to new institutional arrangements. This transition is not pre-determined 
but is characterised by a range of possible options, the choice of which is impossible to 
predict; whilst the duration of critical junctures can vary, their end point is marked by 
the creation of new stable institutional arrangements. 
 
 The constitution-making process in India (1946-49) is, thus, an ideal exemplar 
of a critical juncture. At the time of the formation of the Constituent Assembly in 1946, 
few would have anticipated the final draft of the Constitution. Even allowing for the 
official policies of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League, in 1946 
it would have been difficult to anticipate the Partition, let alone the permanent removal 
of the long-established rights of religious minorities that were seen as the cornerstone of 
the constitution-making process. Nor would it have been possible to anticipate in 1946 
that social justice would be defined primarily within the framework of reservations for 
socially disadvantaged castes. In this sense, Partition was a game changer, and the 
constitution-making process was not only a critical juncture, but a foundational juncture 
for the Indian state that set the template for post-Independence India. 
 
  Second, in addition to critical or foundational junctures, path dependence 
scholars recognise contestational junctures. Whereas the former ‘give rise to particular 
paths of institutional development’, the latter represent major challenges to the 
                                                      
241
 James Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society 29:4 (August 2000), 
526-7. Emphasis original.  
242
 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political 
Science 2 (1999), 369-404. 
243
 See James Mahony and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
244
 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 106. 
61 
 
system.245 Whereas the former are exceptional events, contestational junctures arise as a 
result of mobilisation by new actors and institutions, and have the potential to be 
transformed into critical junctures, but more often than not, in the short-term result in 
reinforcing the existing institutional arrangements. 
 
 As we shall see in Chapter Three, India’s constitutional settlement around caste 
has been contested at number of junctures, principally by the Mandal debate (1990), and 
the gradual mobilisation of religious minorities, initially in the south, but increasingly in 
the north. This mobilisation culminated in UPA’s promise in the 2004 general elections 
to provide better equality of opportunity to religious minorities, including affirmative 
action.  
 
 
Studying public policy in India 
 
The discipline of public policy in India is still in its infancy. Despite the impressive 
array of institutions dedicated to the study of public administration, public policy has 
only recently emerged as a distinctive area of study. Three works which exemplify these 
developments are Mathur’s Public Policy and Politics in India: How Institutions 
Matter, 246  Mathur and Björkman’s Policy-Making in India: Who Speaks? Who 
Listens?, 247  and Kapur and Mehta’s Public Institutions in India: Performance and 
Design.248 
 
Understanding the policy process and how institutions function in post-
Independence India is a seriously under-researched area. In Public Policy and Politics 
in India, Mathur attributes this failing to centralised planning in which policies framed 
by the state institutions were rarely challenged. 249  Planned economic development 
designed by technocrats precluded policy as an arena of contestation – of bargaining 
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and compromises – of politics. Rooted in the cult of experts, the Nehruvian consensus 
on the developmental paradigm privileged technical and bureaucratic rationality. More 
often than not, policy failure and non-implementation were ascribed to irrational 
impediments than shortcomings in policy itself.250  In such circumstances, the ‘top-
down’ approach to policy-making generated a lack of understanding that policy is a 
complex process of bargaining. 
 
However, the economic downturn in the 1970s and the Emergency (1975-77) 
created a groundswell for reassessing policies. This trend was further strengthened by 
economic liberalisation and loosening of economic control under the second Indira 
Gandhi administration in the 1980s. The economic reforms of 1991 finally prompted the 
emergence of new research institutions on public policy, thereby creating an enabling 
environment for open debate over state policy. As interaction between the state and the 
civil organisations increased, the objectives of policy began to be interrogated much 
more widely.251 The growth of independent research institutions and NGOs redefined 
‘public problems’, with special attention paid to policy impact, and the appropriateness 
of state action.252 Increasingly government institutions and technocrats began to address 
policy failure through external reviews and civil society networks. As a result, what was 
considered to be in the traditional domain of the state was extended to policy 
researchers ‘both within and outside the bound of state institutions’.253 
 
While Public Policy and Politics in India covers the historical background of 
public policy-making in post-Independence India, Mathur and Björkman’s Policy-
Making in India explores the roles and interactions of policy actors – Cabinet, Prime 
Minister, political parties, civil servants, and Planning Commission – in the policy 
process. Located in the understanding that ‘the policy process in India is shaped by the 
way in which a web of institutions created by the Constitution functions’,254 the volume 
provides a concise account on the role of policy actors within the institutional 
framework and organisation of Indian government in reference to policy-making. The 
analysis is based on the understanding that the ‘characteristic feature of policy-making 
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in India is the predominance of political over administrative inputs’.255 Individuals (i.e. 
cabinet ministers and civil servants) within the institutional framework matter. The 
authors argue that the structure and method of working of the Congress party has 
greatly influenced the way in which cabinet and party functions in India. Particularly 
under Indira Gandhi’s governments decision-making became centralised. After 1971, 
Mrs. Gandhi chose only loyalists and those who posed a potential threat to her 
supremacy were excluded or marginalised from the policy process. The 1972 state 
elections further emboldened her to shuffle portfolios to demonstrate her power, and 
produced ‘a pyramidal decision-making structure in party and government’256 in which 
government officials and politicians were interested in controlling resource allocation, 
not policy-making. 
 
However, the Congress minority government in 1991, and the subsequent 
coalition governments (BJP-led NDA and Congress-led UPA), which needed support 
from its coalition partners, have transformed this system of decision-making.257 In a 
multi-party system, individual ministers have been given more autonomy to pursue 
party interests and coalition agreements have become formalised in common 
programmes for governments. 258  Therefore, unlike single-party (or personal) 
government, the policy process in coalition government has become complex and multi-
layered, further diffusing executive authority to new innovations such as the Group of 
Ministers or Empowered Group of Ministers.259 With the power of the Prime Minister 
to appoint ministers in coalition governments becoming increasingly circumscribed,260 
the policy-making process has become more complex and increasingly fragmented, 
resulting in civil servants having to exercise ‘tremendous understanding of 
administrative and political nuances in policy-making’.261 
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Public Institutions in India examines the role of India’s public institutions, such 
as Parliament, the judiciary, the police, civil service, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and 
the new regulatory institutions. Set against the backdrop of institutional reform 
introduced by economic liberalisation, the collection offers a rounded assessment of the 
capacity for institutional reform. Theoretically the work is anchored in historical 
institutionalism which emphasises the central role of institutions and how and why they 
matter.262 Going against the grain, the authors refute the mainstream explanations of the 
Indian state’s poor development record – that it is ideologically driven, state institutions 
are captured by social forces, or still, social mobilisation is to blame263 – in favour of 
institutional design. For Kapur and Mehta the main factor explaining India’s modest 
record in governance and development is the limited effectiveness of its public 
institutions. Paradoxically, according to the authors, the ‘Indian state is not only 
excessively procedural and rule bound, but that these procedures and rules place 
tangible limits on the capacity of social forces to manipulate the state in their 
discretion’.264 The labyrinthine character of the Indian state, they contend, operates to 
frustrate agendas for change. The enduring stability of Indian public institutions, it is 
suggested, prevents sudden change and reversals and makes innovation difficult.265 In 
discussing policy formulation and implementation, the authors explain that while 
citizens and social scientists judge the state by its outcomes, the Indian state does not 
take outcomes seriously, leading the authors to argue that the only reasonable measure 
of assessment is ‘whether it has developed any criteria to assess its own 
performance’.266  
 
Interest in public policy reform in India has also been stimulated by the good 
governance agenda and the need to improve service delivery. Although this literature 
does not directly address the shortcomings in service delivery for religious groups, its 
focus on improving the quality of service delivery has much broader implications for 
public policy in India. Hence, Vikram K. Chand’s two volumes, Reinventing Public 
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Service Delivery in India: Selected Case Studies267 and Public Service Delivery in India: 
Understanding the Reform Process,268 raise questions about improving the quality and 
effectiveness of public sector service provision. Both works examine in detail selected 
case studies in states and sectors where new innovations are taking place such as the 
creation of new executive agencies to implement policy. The key concern which defines 
these works is to explain why in these case studies such innovations have ‘worked’. 
Both volumes are important in demonstrating the range of new initiatives, particularly 
the use of new agencies to deliver services. They also draw attention to how the 
‘reforms depend critically on contextual factors, such as the history of reform ideas, the 
capacity of the state to execute reform, and the nature of the state itself including its 
relationships with key actors, such as the private sector and unions’.269 This context, as 
we shall see in subsequent chapters, is important in providing ‘a set of opportunities and 
constraints that policymakers cannot ignore in formulating policy options’, and in 
determining the success of policies themselves.270 
 
 
Analytical approach: a summary 
 
This thesis addresses the puzzle of the UPA which came to power on an agenda of 
promoting better equality of opportunity for religious minorities, particularly Muslims, 
but was frustrated in its objective. It seeks to examine why given the level of political 
support for these policies they still generated such opposition and resistance. Why, in 
other words, notwithstanding the UPA’s manifesto commitments, did the UPA struggle 
to deliver on some of the key promises? 
 
 This thesis does not seek to evaluate UPA policies in the field per se through 
assessing their impact. Such an undertaking, as we have noted above, is beyond the 
scope of this work. Rather its core objective is limited: to uncover the underlying modes 
of institutional resistance that ultimately determined the fate of UPA policies on 
religious minorities.  
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Indeed, empirically, there is still an urgent need to ‘pry open the black box of 
policy change’271 by actually examining the policy process on the subject – of how the 
issue came on the agenda, policy formulations, decision-making, (non) implementation 
and evaluation. This essentially descriptive approach needs to be tethered to a 
theoretical approach that elucidates the role of actors and institutions in order to account 
for recurring patterns of behaviour and outcomes. Thus, institutionalism, which 
privileges the role of institutions in explaining these outcomes, provides a necessary 
bridge in our research because the relevant policy process on the subject appears to be 
heavily shaped by bureaucratic design, incremental change and historical legacies. 
Institutional structures in India, both at the national and state levels, appear to have 
played an independent role in determining the fortunes of UPA policies on religious 
minorities. 
  
Our institutional-based policy analysis approach focuses primarily on the 
performance of the UPA governments from 2004-14. Yet, in order to understand this 
experience historically, it is also necessary to draw on historical institutionalism and 
path dependence. These perspectives, we argue, enable us to make better sense of 
recurring patterns of government performance, and explain why the framework for 
minority rights established at Independence remains firmly in place. 
 
 Finally, our historically informed institutional-based policy analysis approach 
recognises that in understanding UPA policies on religious minorities that history casts 
a permanent shadow over the present. Consequently, historical institutionalism and path 
dependence have defined the parameters within which the policy process can operate, 
shape, influence and ultimately determine policy outcomes. In concurrence with 
writings of institutionalists, therefore, we acknowledge that historical institutionalism is 
the independent variable and the policy process the dependent variable. 
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Research questions 
 
The analysis so far has outlined the research context within which this thesis is framed: 
the difficult area of public policy on religious minorities. While locating this debate in a 
historical context, our focus is primarily on UPA (2004-14) policies on the Muslim 
minority. The policy process under UPA identified a range of policy areas on which 
action was needed to address the ‘development deficit’. In particular, we focus on three 
areas that were identified by the SCR as requiring special attention: public sector 
employment, service delivery and security. 
 
Public sector employment has been selected because experience of quotas and 
affirmative action policies, both in India and elsewhere, demonstrates that under-
representation of minorities in the public sector is often associated with direct and 
indirect institutional discrimination. 272  Overcoming this under-representation is a 
necessary condition of creating effective equality of opportunity. Surveys have regularly 
highlighted the under-representation of Muslims in public sector posts and undertakings 
at all levels. 273  This status has remained unchanged since independence, a finding 
confirmed further by the SCR and the RMCR.274 Comparative and Indian experiences 
indicate that these policies, if appropriately designed, implemented and monitored, can 
have a transformative impact. 
 
Similarly, in service delivery the issue is whether all citizens are treated equally 
or suffer unequal outcomes in the provision of public sector goods, such as housing, 
education, social services, and basic infrastructure facilities. Studies in the West and 
India have demonstrated that excluded cultural, ethnic, racial and religious minorities 
often suffer from unequal outcomes.275 The need for public services to cater for all, 
including minorities and excluded public groups, has led to a re-design of public policy, 
for instance, in special provisions for SCs and STs. The UPA, as we shall see, was 
committed to a raft of new initiatives to improve service delivery for India’s Muslims.  
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For minorities subject to discrimination and victimisation, the provision of 
effective anti-violence and discrimination legislation is a necessary pre-requisite of civil 
engagement. 276  Most states have generic legislation against such violence and 
discrimination, but since the multicultural turn in public policy this has been 
accompanied by legislation that both outlaws particular types of discrimination – based 
on religion, caste, race, and ethnicity – and prohibits hate crimes against such ‘protected 
categories’. In India, specific legislation exists for acts of violence against SCs and STs 
(Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989)). But 
despite the high levels of communal violence against religious minorities, notably 
Muslims, the state has been reluctant to create a specific legislative framework that 
tackles communal violence, or inaction and non-compliance during such violence by 
official functionaries. The UPA’s commitment to introduce such model legislation, 
therefore, marked a distinctive break.  
 
The evaluation of UPA’s performance on these three fronts is undertaken within 
a set of seven inter-linked research questions: 
 
(i) What were the political considerations that led the UPA to adopt policies 
to promote substantive equality of opportunity for religious minorities, 
especially Muslims?  
(ii) How were these policies formulated? Did they mark a radical break with 
previous experience of the Indian state? To what extent, if at all, did they 
represent a ‘paradigm shift’? 
(iii) What were the institutional innovations introduced to facilitate the new 
policies?  
(iv) Why was the second half of the UPA’s first administration (2004-09) 
characterised by the increasing marginalisation of these policies in the 
government’s priorities? 
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(v) What factors frustrated UPA administrations’ efforts to improve the 
representation of Muslims in public sector employment in national 
administration and public sector undertakings?  
(vi) What factors thwarted the UPA administrations’ efforts to improve 
service delivery for Muslim communities identified as suffering a significant 
‘development deficit’? 
(vii) Why did the UPA struggle to provide a new model legislative framework 
against communal violence? 
Although these research questions are very broad, they are addressed more specifically 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven which focus on employment, service delivery and the 
anti-communal violence bills. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Comparatively, the use of systematic interdisciplinary methodologies and new forms of 
data that have previously been unavailable to study religious communities have 
advanced noticeably in the last decade.277 Hence, some of the major recommendations 
of the UPA committees and commissions in the process of policy required new forms of 
data collection, monitoring and evaluation to ensure that sound analysis of the status of 
religious minorities could be undertaken. Establishing base-line data is a necessary pre-
requisite for a systematic evaluation of communities which are under-represented or 
discriminated against in public policy.  
 
However, accessing data on Muslims in employment or service delivery remains 
problematic. Traditionally, there has been hyper-sensitivity about such information. In 
2006, for instance, efforts to ascertain Muslim representation in the armed services led 
to a major controversy.278 Indeed, the ‘control’ of this data, and at times its deliberate 
misrepresentation on grounds of confidentiality, or breach of state secularism, has 
created major difficulties for a comparative assessment of public policy. In the absence 
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of readily available data on religious minorities in the policy-making process, we have 
drawn on interviews with informed policymakers, grey literature and the data currently 
available in the public domain. 
 
Given the subject matter, therefore, this thesis uses the mixed methods approach. 
It draws heavily on the qualitative methodologies (documentary analysis of a broad 
range of official publications such as government and judicial records, secondary 
studies, and interviews and historical analysis that are central to policy studies), but 
where relevant, also borrows judiciously from available quantitative data. 
 
Qualitatively, it draws primarily on official documents produced by committees 
and commissions. 279  This output has also generated a large volume of specialist 
commissioned studies which have been drawn upon, and have sometimes been 
published separately. Another rich source of information was the annual reports of 
India’s national commissions (e.g. National Commission for Minorities, National 
Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), National Commission for Scheduled Tribes 
(NCST), and National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC)), judicial cases, and 
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha debates. The latter have provided invaluable insights into 
how the policy proposals were discussed and managed in terms of parliamentary 
procedures. As we shall see in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, how parliamentary 
procedures were managed was central to determining the fortunes of some of the 
policies. 
 
To overcome the gaps in publicly available data, and to obtain informed insights 
into policy formation and implementation, in-depth interviews were conducted in Delhi 
with 39 ‘key’ informants. These were individuals identified for having played a major 
role in the conception, formulation and implementation (and non-implementation) of the 
core policies under consideration. They comprised politicians, civil servants, academics, 
journalists and public intellectuals. Interviewees were identified from a preliminary 
analysis of official documentation and reputational analysis for engagement with this 
subject area. Further interviewees were identified through snowballing during 
fieldwork. Efforts were made to ensure the interviewees were representative and did not 
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constitute a skewed sample. The definition of ‘key’ policy informants includes 
individuals from a cross-section of the Indian political spectrum (Congress, BJP, CPI 
and SP) as well as all religious groups. All interviewees are listed in the Bibliography.  
 
Interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s place of work or residence 
during the initial fieldwork in New Delhi between January and April 2013. Prior to the 
interview, based on the interviewee’s biographical material, a semi-structured 
questionnaire was prepared. In the main, interviews were in-depth, and on several 
occasions, the respondents agreed to follow-up interviews. Owing to the unexpected, 
premature termination of the first fieldwork trip, some of the planned interviews could 
not take place.280 Outstanding interviews were then completed via Skype, telephone, 
email exchanges, and during the second fieldwork in New Delhi in April 2014. Prior to 
the beginning of the interview, all interviewees were asked whether they consented to 
both the interview and to being quoted. Where possible, it was decided to tape-record 
the interview, but notes were also taken. Some of the interviewees requested that certain 
sections of the interview be excluded; hence those parts have been omitted. Following 
interviews, where possible, the transcriptions were cross-checked with the respondents. 
 
A number of measures were taken to control for bias both in the respondents’ 
accounts and data collected. Triangulation, a ‘vehicle for cross-validation when two or 
more distinct methods are found to be congruent and yield comparable data’, was 
particularly useful.281 Where possible, triangulation was used to cross-check with other 
sources. Also, the combination of multiple methods (documentary analysis, interview, 
historical institutionalism, policy analysis) enabled multiple triangulations to be 
conducted where necessary. Similarly, to control against bias in the interviewee’s 
account, where relevant, the data have been triangulated with other sources, including 
other interviewees who could corroborate the claims.282 
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For analysis of qualitative data, content analysis of ‘written documents or 
transcriptions of recorded verbal communications’ can help to reveal ‘artefacts of social 
communication’. 283  This method is particularly useful when examining in-depth 
interview data for ‘objectively and systematically identifying special characteristics of 
the message’.284 Content analysis also enables the researcher to better understand the 
perspectives of the producer of the words, and it is possible to identify themes and 
categories that emerge from the data. Any material such as videotapes or photographs 
that can be textualised is amenable to content analysis. Hence the interview notes and 
reports of commissions and committees were potential subjects for content analysis. 
 
Although the author is experienced in computer-assisted data analysis with 
NVivo and ATLAS.ti,285 and aware of the strengths of using content analysis, it was 
decided to forgo such an exercise for two reasons. First, in order to use content analysis 
the recorded messages must be reproduced in the same manner, reorganised and 
categorised into coded and uncoded words for analysis. Because of the emphasis on 
semi-structured interviews (and incomplete recording of all interviews), this mode of 
analysis was deemed inappropriate. Second, content analysis was also considered 
unsuitable because, though the analysis is useful in identifying patterns, it was too 
restrictive to explore sensitive dimensions of decisions about policy-making which still 
remain shrouded in controversy. This, however, is not to suggest that content analysis 
lacks utility in Indian public policy analysis: the technique is clearly in its formative 
stage, and as more consistent data and interview protocols are established, such analysis 
is likely to become a more regular feature of research on Indian politics. At this 
juncture, therefore, this thesis attempts to provide a bridge between existing modes of 
public policy analysis and, new and more methodologically sophisticated approaches, 
which are likely to dominate the field in the future. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the analytical approaches and methodologies used in this 
thesis. The review of literature in Chapter One suggests that conventional explanations 
of UPA policies on religious minorities offer only a partial account of the policy process 
during the administration. In contrast, institutional-based policy analysis, with a 
historically informed understanding of path dependence, offers a more analytically 
relevant approach. Thus, institutional policy analysis provides new insights into policy-
making during the UPA’s tenure, but its performance becomes meaningful if it is 
situated within the historical pattern of the Indian state’s policies on religious 
minorities, especially Muslims. For this reason we need to extend the temporal scope of 
the work to include the institutional framing of religious minorities since 1947. In sum, 
the core argument of the thesis is that historical institutionalism and path dependence 
defined, shaped and outlined the parameters of the UPA’s policy process from which 
the UPA found it difficult to escape. Accordingly, in line with institutional analysis 
within our framework the former is the independent variable and the latter the 
dependent variable in understanding policy outcomes.  
 
Viewed in this broad perspective, the UPA administrations thus marked a major 
contestational juncture in the pursuit of better equality of opportunity for religious 
minorities. Ostensibly, this juncture had the potential to establish a new pattern of path 
dependence for religious minority rights in India. However, as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, institutional resistance to such change frustrated such a 
development. To understand this result, we have adopted research methodologies that 
focus both on documentary analysis but also include extensive in-depth interviews with 
the principal dramatis personae, the ‘key’ policy-informants at the heart of the policy 
process; and in the absence of readily available and verifiable data, we have primarily 
used qualitative research methods. 
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Chapter Three 
Equality of opportunity, the Indian state and 
religious minorities: an overview 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Before examining UPA’s policies it is necessary to understand how the rights of 
religious minorities have been historically framed. Constitution-making between 1946 
and 1949 marked a fundamental rupture with the rights of religious minorities under the 
colonial state: it was a critical juncture which created a template for how these rights 
were to be defined within a new framework of equality of opportunity. Unsurprisingly, 
India’s minorities have struggled to operate within a secular framework that has denied 
political claims to religious identities, with the result that some minorities, especially 
Christians, Muslims and Sikhs have, arguably, suffered systematic disadvantage and 
discrimination clustered around issues of security, identity and under-development. In 
this chapter, working within the framework of historical institutionalism and path 
dependence, we provide an overview of how this settlement has evolved since 1947. It, 
first, outlines the framework of equality of opportunity established at Independence and 
reviews the institutional framework that has emerged to support ‘competing equalities’ 
among caste and non-caste groups. We then, briefly, review some of the contestational 
junctures – the early 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s – when some of the minorities mobilised 
and challenged this settlement. Finally, with reference to the findings of the SCR that 
some religious minorities, particularly poor Muslims, suffer systematic discrimination 
and disadvantage, we discuss the official recognition by the UPA that a new approach 
was required to redefine equality of opportunity in twenty-first century India.  
 
 
Constitution-making as a critical juncture: redefining minority rights 
 
India is a religiously and ethnically diverse society and home to major world traditions: 
Hindus (80.5 per cent), Muslims (13.4 per cent), Christians (2.3 per cent), Sikhs (1.8 per 
cent), Buddhists (0.8 per cent), Jains (0.4 per cent) and Zoroastrians. 286  Hindus 
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constitute the overwhelming majority, with 138 million Muslims the second largest 
faith tradition. This religious diversity is coupled with enormous linguistic and cultural 
diversity. Politically, accommodating such diversity was a major challenge that faced 
the framers of the Constitution.  
 
 The dominant view articulated by the Congress during the nationalist struggle 
was that separate political representation of religious communities under British 
colonial rule had resulted in the partition of the country and the creation of Pakistan. 287 
Although many more Muslims chose to remain in India than join the new state of 
Pakistan, anxieties persisted about their future in a Hindu dominated society. Uppermost 
among these were guarantees of religious liberty and protection against the fear of 
cultural homogenisation. If equality was to be realised, then minority communities 
needed assurances about their cultural practices, and though the principle of equality 
before the law was extremely important, by itself it was insufficient to ensure access to 
social and public goods.  
 
  ‘From the late nineteenth century onwards’, notes Bajpai, ‘a range of special 
provisions were introduced by the British colonial state as well as native Princely states, 
chiefly for groups designated as minorities or “backward”.’ 288  These included 
provisions for special representation in the legislatures and quotas in the public services. 
Over time, these provisions were extended to include Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, SCs, 
and STs. In the constitution-making process, events and, as Bajpai notes, 289  the 
hegemonic nationalist discourse were to play a major role in shaping minority rights. 
Indeed, the provincial legislative elections (1945) and the Partition resulted in an 
overwhelming majority of Congress members in the Constituent Assembly;290 many 
were upper caste, accounting for a quarter of the assembly while constituting only five 
per cent of the population.291 As Austin argues, ‘the Constituent Assembly was a one-
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party body in an essentially one-party country. The Assembly was the Congress and the 
Congress was India.’292  
 
The discourse on minorities in the Constituent Assembly changed dramatically 
after Partition. The Minority Rights Sub-Committee Report tabled by Sardar Patel in 
August 1947 proposed legislative reservations for Christians, Muslims, and SCs, for an 
initial period of ten years. But against the backdrop of communal violence, mass 
migration and unparalleled human suffering, the dominant mood in the Constituent 
Assembly rejected political safeguards for minorities on the basis of religion because 
these were seen as a potential threat to the political unity and integrity of the country.293 
Nationalists claimed that group identities, such as caste, creed, and religion, would 
continue to divide society. As such, they were determined to privilege individual 
citizenship over these identities because religion-based representation was considered 
both antithetical to the ideal of a secular state and the separation between state and 
religion. It would, moreover, ultimately lead to the isolation of minorities and sharpen 
communal differences in which citizens would remain permanently alienated from one 
another. 294  Accordingly, efforts were made to persuade minority representatives to 
forego the claim for separate representation; 295 and as Chiriyankandath notes, ‘Sardar 
Patel and K.M. Munshi were instrumental in getting rid of separate electorates and 
reserved seats for religious minorities.’296 Austin is also adamant that the Assembly’s 
Hindu majoritarian outlook dissuaded the minorities from their position: ‘there can be 
little doubt’, concludes Austin, ‘that Patel, despite his belief that the minorities must 
make their own decisions on such issues and not be simply out-voted by caste Hindus, 
quietly and privately put a great deal of pressure on the minorities to relinquish special 
privilege’.297 
 
For the political leadership of the minority communities a combination of factors 
persuaded them to accept the fait accompli. Demoralised by the leadership of Jinnah and 
partition violence, Muslim leaders had little choice but to accept the new reality in 
                                                      
292
 Austin, The Indian Constitution, 8-9. 
293
 Bajpai, Debating Difference, 76-80. 
294
 Rajeev Bhargava, ‘India’s Secular Constitution’, in Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan, and R. Sudarshan, eds., 
India’s Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices and Controversies (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), 
105-33. 
295
 Chiriyankandath, ‘Creating a Secular State in a Religious Country’, 13.  
296
 Ibid., 10. 
297
 Austin, The Indian Constitution, 151. 
77 
 
which the ‘secular democratic state’ promised the best chance of security. 298  The 
pressure to ‘disavow reservation’ was also imposed on Christian leaders ‘from Patel, 
[and] exercised by K. M. Munshi’.299 Equally, Sikh political representatives came under 
similar pressure but ultimately refused to sign the Constitution.300 Indeed, in the final 
report of the Advisory Committee on Minorities (1949), the abolition of reservation on 
religious lines was justified in terms of ‘the foundations of a true secular democratic 
State’.301 Nehru welcomed the report as ‘a historic turn in our destiny’.302 The only 
exception was reservations for SCs and STs which were considered necessary to 
compensate for past discrimination and included quota of seats for SCs and STs in 
education, government jobs and legislatures. 303 
  
Despite this agreement, the Hindu majoritarian sentiment in the Constituent 
Assembly was not a negligible force. Early drafts of the Minority Rights Report wanted 
to ‘explicitly [refer] to the SCs, as a “section of the Hindu community”’.304 Leading 
figures, such as Sardar Patel and K. M. Munshi, furthermore, who ‘were instrumental in 
getting rid of separate electorates and reserved seats for religious minorities’, were 
deeply concerned about the ‘lack of reference in the Constitution to a distinctly Hindu 
identity or to central tenets of Brahminical Hinduism such as the notion of dharma, 
[which] left the majoritarians dissatisfied’. 305  Although Hindu majoritarians were a 
powerful lobby, ultimately they had to compromise with secularists led by Nehru. These 
innate but enduring tensions within the Constituent Assembly, argues Chiriyankandath, 
led to the ambiguous accommodation of secular and majoritarian sentiments as well as 
special group rights for SCs and STs306 − tensions that would subsequently be exploited 
by the Hindu Right and the BJP.  
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Religious minorities, equality of opportunity and the Constitution 
 
The starting point for an understanding of the framing of equality of opportunity is the 
making of the Constitution of India. In essence the Constitution embraces a dual 
conception of equality: one based on the generic principle of non-discrimination, and 
another rooted in protective equality for seriously disadvantaged groups. These two 
approaches represent ‘competing equalities’, ones that are historically rooted in the 
Indian social formation and are products of historical evolution.307 
 
  As a secular, modern text, the Indian Constitution recognises individual rights 
associated with liberal democracy. As a corollary, it established a strong principle of 
non-discrimination: Articles 15 and 16 prohibit the state from discriminating on the 
grounds of religion, race, caste, descent, place of birth, or any of them generally in the 
state’s actions. More specifically, they prohibit discrimination ‘relating to employment 
or appointment to any office under the State’.308 The principle of non-discrimination is 
further enshrined in procedural equality embedded in Articles 14-16 that commit the 
state to combat discrimination. Non-discrimination was thus one of the ‘core principles 
guiding the development of a democratic nation state in India’.309 Articles 15 and 16 
extend the equality guarantee by providing for redress against discrimination. The slight 
difference between the two is that the former prohibits discrimination by the state 
against citizens, while the latter is restricted to public employment. Article 15 
concentrates on the process through which a burden is imposed on an individual; it 
assumes a finite list of disfavoured criteria − race, religion, sex − and prohibits making 
allocations to or decisions about individuals based on those criteria.310 As an extension 
of the non-discrimination clause, Article 16 311  guarantees equal opportunity for all 
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citizens in employment under the state: it implies that all public offices and resources 
are available to all on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination.  
 
 Alongside the principle of non-discrimination, which is an essential requirement 
of liberal democracy, the Constitution also recognises the need for positive 
discrimination for disadvantaged groups. Articles 15 permits the state to make ‘any 
special provisions for women, children [and] any socially, educationally backward class 
of citizens’ and SCs and STs. Article 16 further enables the state to make provisions for 
reservations in appointments of posts in favour of ‘any backward class of citizens 
which, in the opinion of the state, is not adequately represented in the services under the 
State’.312 Whereas the former provision has become the bedrock of affirmative action in 
employment and education (and reservation of seats in the legislatures) for SCs and 
STs, since 1950 the latter article, especially at the level of states, has justified the 
extension of reservations (employment and education) to OBCs. Proportional 
representation in legislatures and public employment for the SCs and STs were intended 
to protect them from the practices of exclusion and discrimination. In addition to 
providing social, educational, economic and political safeguards for the amelioration of 
their conditions, the state also undertook development initiatives to bridge the gulf 
between the SCs and STs and the rest of society. Over the years, the scope of these 
policies has been expanded to cover an ever wide range of governmental schemes and 
programmes, for example, the Special Component Plan (of the regular five-year 
plans).313  
 
 Despite these articles, the concept of equality of opportunity for minorities has 
been a controversial one. In the Constitution the term ‘minority’, or its plural form, is 
not defined.314 As can be seen from some of its provisions, such as in Articles 29315 and 
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30, 316  minorities are recognised as groups who are culturally, linguistically and 
scripturally different from the ‘majority’. The scope of Articles 29 and 30 has been 
interpreted as absolute by the Supreme Court of India.317 Their provisions further the 
ideals of the Constitution as envisaged by the Preamble, which guarantees all citizens 
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Furthermore, Part III of the 
Constitution cements these ideals through the Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 
15, 16, 25, 26, 27, and 28. The Directive Principles of State Policy also enumerate 
certain rights of minorities, but these are not enforceable in the courts of law. Other 
articles, such as 330, 332, 334, 335 and 338 on SCs and STs also refer to the minority 
groups and bring under their purview issues such as admission into educational 
institutions maintained by the state, and access to state funds on the grounds of race, 
religion, caste or language. The minority groups are also permitted under law to set up 
their own educational institutions.  
 
 To sum up: Indian constitution-making was a new critical juncture that redefined 
the template of minority rights, and established a pattern of institutional path 
dependence which ‘locked in’ minority rights into a secular, universalistic, and 
nationalist discourses in which communitarian representation was considered anathema 
in a modern liberal democracy. The presence of diverse and historically distinct 
religious, linguistic and cultural communities within the polity was fulsomely 
recognised with assurances that minority cultures and identities would be protected and 
treated equally. Yet, while the dominant nationalist discourse was opposed to political 
rights for religious minorities, it accepted that reservations were necessary to address 
the ‘backwardness’ of lower castes and tribes.318It is also important to acknowledge that 
provision for affirmative action was constructed largely in response to the political 
claims of former untouchable castes.  
 
                                                      
316
 Article 30 states: (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice; (1A) In making any law providing for the 
compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a 
minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under 
such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed 
under that clause; (2) The state shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against 
any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on 
religion or language. 
317
 Jagdev Singh Sidhanti vs Pratap Singh Daulta on 12 February 1964 (1965 AIR 183, 1964 SCR (6) 
750). 
318
 Bajpai, Debating Difference, 168. 
81 
 
Partition and the creation of Pakistan severely circumscribed the claims of 
minority rights which were limited to the cultural and linguistic sphere.319 The project 
of democratising Hindu society resulted in the re-designation of SCs and STs, who 
before the Government of India Act (1935) were loosely defined as ‘Depressed 
Classes’, as a part of the majority (Hindu) community. Affirmative action provisions for 
these groups, as outlined above, were justified on the grounds that they were necessary 
to rectify their historic exclusion and victimisation within Hindu society. Poor religious 
minorities, on the other hand, were excluded from these provisions as the criteria for 
reservations were defined primarily with reference to caste, tribe and backwardness. 
Poor Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Sikhs were deemed to be outside the remit of 
these provisions because of the egalitarian precepts of these faiths. The Constitution in 
taking an ideological construction of caste that identified it with Hinduism – as opposed 
to a sociological one – created a sharp new boundary between Hindus and non-Hindus 
while excluding equally disadvantaged groups (socio-economically disadvantaged 
sections of Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs) because such claims were seen 
to reinforce religious group rights. In short, the Constitution in rejecting the political 
claims of religious minorities, recognising the cultural and linguistic rights of all 
minorities, and in introducing affirmative action provisions for SCs and STs, set up the 
project of democratising Hindu society. The last measure did not just create a structural 
imbalance in the equality of opportunity for disadvantaged minorities. As Weiner has 
noted, the Government of India would consistently refuse ‘to extend reservations to 
religious groups on the grounds that it would be divisive’. Such opposition, however, 
would strike religious minorities as discriminatory, given the government’s ‘willingness 
to grant benefits to caste, tribal, and linguistic groups’.320 
 
 
Institutionalisation of caste and ‘competing’ equalities of opportunity after 
constitution-making 
 
The constitution-making process thus signalled a fundamental rupture with colonial 
governance: as Bajpai observes, it ‘marked a moment of containment of group 
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rights’.321 At the same time, however, a new cleavage, defined by caste, was created 
between the ‘majority’ and the ‘minorities’. Henceforth group rights and affirmative 
action provisions attached to them would be defined primarily with reference to 
victimised socio-economically disadvantaged Hindu caste groups. This difference 
would subsequently become further institutionalised as the scope of reservations was 
extended to include OBCs, and national and state level institutions emerged to oversee 
the executive administration of these policies. 
  
 In the period after Independence, this structural imbalance would manifest itself, 
on the one hand, in the demands from SCs, STs and OBCs to increase the scope of 
reservations, and demands from the socio-economically disadvantaged religious 
minorities, on the other, that their exclusions from these provisions on grounds of 
religion was a form of discrimination. The criteria for SCs and OBCs were clearly 
defined by the overarching emphasis on caste within the Hindu tradition; and when this 
was challenged, the courts continued to err in favour of the hegemonic understanding of 
these categories.322 One notable variation from this norm was the practice of reservation 
for OBCs at national and state levels. At the national level the criteria for OBCs were 
only established by the Mandal Commission (1978), which conceded that religious 
communities like Muslims had ‘backward classes’ that should be given reservation. But 
in the pre-Mandal period, states’ interpretation of the OBCs criteria was largely 
influenced by history, tradition and regional peculiarities, so that some states like 
Karnataka and Kerala included Muslims under this category (See Chapter One). 
However, even these breakthroughs were unable to make significant progress in 
changing the hegemonic discourse: the rise of the Hindu Right in the 1980s and 1990s, 
together with mobilisation of Dalit communities after the implementation of the Mandal 
Commission recommendations (1990),323  further weakened the case for considering 
socio-economically disadvantaged religious minorities. 324  In fact, as Dalitisation of 
Indian politics in the 1990s and 2000s occurred at an increasing pace, the need to 
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address the framework of equality of opportunity for religious minorities, especially 
India’s Muslims, was dramatically illustrated by 9/11 and the riots in Gujarat. 
 
 
Institutionalised regimes of ‘competing equalities’ 
 
Before reviewing the religious minorities’ mobilisations against the foundational 
settlement, it is necessary to outline the institutional framework that has evolved to 
administer these policies and which reinforces patterns of path dependence. Table 3.1 
below compares the relative position of SCs, STs, OBCs and religious minorities. It 
contrasts the national provision for these groups of reservations in legislatures (and 
local bodies after 1993), employment, education, specific provisions for service 
delivery, group-specific anti-discrimination legislation, parliamentary oversight (e.g. 
committees), and executive oversight (Ministries/National Commissions). To appreciate 
this process of institutionalisation of different regimes, we need to keep four 
developments in mind. 
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Table 3.1 
‘Competing equalities’: SCs, STs, OBCs and religious minorities 
 
Nature of provision at 
the national level 
Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Classes Religious Minorities 
Reservations in 
employment, 
education, legislatures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SCs and STs get 15% 
and 7.5% reservation in 
case of direct 
recruitment 
 
 Reservations in 
national and state 
legislatures and local 
bodies 
 
 Reservation in 
promotion 
 
 In government-funded 
higher educational 
institutes, reservation 
available at the same 
rate 
 27% reservation in 
case of direct 
recruitment on all 
India basis 
 
 27% reservation in 
central government-
funded higher 
education 
institutions 
 
 No reservations in 
promotion 
 
 No reservations on 
the legislatures or 
local bodies 
Sikh Dalits (1956), 
Buddhist Dalits (1990) 
included within scope of 
SC reservations for 
employment 
 
 
Specific provisions for 
service delivery 
Planning Commission: from 
the 1st Five-Year Plan 
(1951-56) to 12th Five-Year 
Plan (2012-17); National 
Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes Finance 
and Development 
Corporation (1989)  
Planning Commission 
(Backward Classes 
Division); National 
Backward Classes 
Finance and 
Development 
Corporation (1992) 
Planning Commission 
(Minorities Division);  
Maulana Azad Education 
Foundation (1989); 
National Minorities 
Development & Finance 
Corporation (1994); 
National Commission for 
Minority Educational 
Institutions (2004); 
Prime Minister’s 15-
Point Programme (2006) 
Group specific anti-
discrimination 
measures 
Protection of Civil Rights 
Act (1955), Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(Prevention of Atrocities 
Act) (1989) 
No equivalent legislation No equivalent legislation 
(except for protection for 
Buddhist and Sikh SCs)  
Legislative Oversight 
 
Committee on Social Justice 
and Empowerment; 
Committee on Welfare of 
SC/ST; Consultative 
Committee on Social Justice 
and Empowerment 
Committee on Social 
Justice and 
Empowerment; 
Consultative Committee 
on Social Justice and 
Empowerment 
Committee on Social 
Justice and 
Empowerment; 
Consultative Committee 
on Minority Affairs* 
Executive Oversight Ministry of Social Justice 
and Empowerment; 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs; 
National Commission for 
Scheduled Castes (1978); 
National Commission for 
Scheduled Tribes (2003) 
Ministry of Social Justice 
and Empowerment ; 
National Commission for 
Backward Classes (1993) 
Ministry of Minority 
Affairs (2006); National 
Commission for 
Minorities (1992)  
* Not a permanent, standing parliamentary oversight committee. 
Source: Derived from Hasan, Politics of Inclusion, 41-74; MoMA website; National Common 
Minimum Programme; RMCR, 74-76, 120-26, 140-41. 
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First, the constitutional consensus on special measures for SCs and STs is reflected in 
the clear institutionalisation of these provisions. Although reservations for these groups 
had a ten-year sunset clause, they have been renewed every decade. In fact the scope 
and meaning of reservations have been extended to include promotions, 325  service 
delivery specifically targeted at SCs and STs, and pro-active legislation against caste 
violence. These provisions have also been backed by strong executive and legislative 
overview, both nationally and in the states. Whilst this process of institutionalisation has 
taken several decades, and has been re-enforced by path dependence, which has brought 
‘increasing returns’ to political formations supporting it (Congress in 1950s and 1960s, 
Dalit parties in the 1990s), it has created the normative ideal to which all reservation-
seeking groups aspire.326 In short, the SCs and STs are the benchmark of protective 
equality in the Indian political system. 
 
Second, the Mandal Commission extended reservations and service delivery at 
the national level to OBCs. The commission, which reported in 1980, identified 3,743 
backward castes/classes and estimated that these groups as a whole constituted 54 per 
cent of India’s total population. As a result, it recommended a reservation of 27 per cent 
in both the government and the education sector for the OBCs listed327 − in addition to 
22.5 per cent already reserved for SCs and STs. In the absence of a national directive 
many states in the south had enacted legislation providing reservations for backward 
classes in education and in government, 328  but the decision of the V. P. Singh 
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government in 1990 to implement the Mandal Commission’s recommendations 
nationally had widespread ramifications. At once, it crystallised the process of 
Dalitisation of Indian politics, and further institutionalised a form of path dependence 
around caste-based vote-bank politics that would transform the politics of the states in 
the north (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar). 329  The rise of the OBCs in the states, and then 
nationally, has increasingly sidelined the upper-caste, upper-class elites who dominated 
Congress party politics.330  
 
Third, the emergence of OBCs as a distinct socio-economic category that is 
politically mobilised has created new forms of institutionalisation and path dependence 
in which ‘increasing returns’ arise and generate further demands for extending the scope 
of reservations. Regionally, Chandra has described this phenomenon as ‘patronage 
politics’. 331  Thus, the initial implementation of the Mandal Commission 
recommendations (termed Mandal I) included employment, but the UPA government 
widened this scope to embrace higher education (termed Mandal II), with increasing 
demands for group-specific service delivery.332 As Table 3.1 indicates, the Indian state’s 
response to ‘competing equalities’ − among SCs, STs, OBCs and religious minorities − 
is to keep them separate but respond differentially to group-specific demands.  
 
Fourth, both nationally and provincially, definitional disagreements about what 
constitutes an OBC have led to interminable judicial disputes. These cases are important 
for they determine who is represented on the OBCs reservations list. While the Supreme 
Court has erred toward including ‘caste’ and ‘class’ in the definition, including a 
rejection of reservations for the ‘creamy layer’ (the socially and economically advanced 
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OBCs), nationally and at the state level governments are more comfortable with the 
familiar category of caste. This modularity of caste with class in everyday public policy 
reinforces the normative ideal of ‘caste’ as a Hindu category that remains the ‘most 
important unit of identification’.333 At the same time, it places religious minorities in a 
difficult predicament: despite the existence of the criteria of ‘class’ their inclusion is 
more likely to be entertained if they articulate their case in the language of caste.334 
 
In contrast to the protective provisions for SCs, STs and OBCs, therefore, the 
position of religious minorities is somewhat anomalous, and reinforces a form of path 
dependence that aims to restrict religious minorities’ claims to the cultural sphere, even 
for some of their socially and economically disadvantaged sections. As we have seen 
above, during constitution-making, religious minorities’ claims for political reservations 
were relegated to recognition of cultural difference within a multicultural polity; 
politically, their exercise of collective identity was restricted to the framework of 
individual rights. Given the national trauma over Partition and the construction of 
minorities in the nationalist discourse, the claims of minorities to special treatment, poor 
or otherwise, have not received a receptive political audience. 
 
However, there has been some pragmatic accommodation. Sikhs and Buddhist 
were included as communities within the SCs (Sikhs in 1956, Buddhists in 1990), with 
the right to reservations in employment and education, in addition to protection by the 
Protection of Civil Rights Act (as amended in 1976) and the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act) (1989). But extending this logic to 
similar caste groups among Christians and Muslims has been firmly resisted. 335 
Similarly, the national legislative and executive institutions that oversee the interests of 
religious minorities have been poorly institutionalised, or sometime have emerged as a 
result of external pressure.336 The NCM, for instance, established in 1992 to monitor 
minority rights, still lacks a constitutional status.337 Its remit to protect minority rights, 
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monitor their representation in public employment and safeguard cultural rights has not 
been adequately fulfilled, with some of the annual reports still to be tabled or discussed 
in Parliament.338 It is regularly criticised by minorities as being a ‘toothless tiger’ for its 
inactivity, despite mounting evidence of violence against minorities and increasing 
discrimination and disadvantage among some minority sections (e.g. Christians and 
Muslims).339  
 
To recapitulate: the post-1947 institutionalisation of the constitution-making 
settlement has produced a form of path dependence that has accentuated the difference 
in minority and non-minority rights, especially for socio-economically disadvantaged 
castes. Whereas the nature and scope of reservations for SCs, STs and OBCs have been 
continuously extended, producing ‘increasing returns’ for political formations 
supporting such policies, most notably after Mandal I and Mandal II, similar demands 
from minorities remain constitutionally and politically difficult to negotiate. For 
minority rights, in contrast, the pattern of institutionalisation and path dependence are to 
restrict the extension of cultural rights into socio-economic or political rights. In light of 
this trajectory, the assertion of minorities’ citizenship rights has proved doubly 
problematic because minority rights are also often mediated by high levels of communal 
violence against minorities. Ironically, counter-violence is one way in which minorities 
have attempted to challenge the constitutional settlement. 
 
 
Minorities, communal violence and contestational juncture: the 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s 
 
If racial, ethnic and religious violence against minorities is one indicator of their 
political and social integration, then some of India’s religious minorities remain poorly 
integrated. 340  Violence against religious minorities since Independence, particularly 
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Muslims, has been endemic, with high rates of casualties in urban areas in the north.341 
For other minorities that are regionally concentrated, such as Christians in the North-
east, Muslims in Kashmir, and Sikhs in Punjab, this violence has taken on the form of 
ethno-regional struggles. Whilst the causes of such violence are, undoubtedly, many and 
complex, Brass argues that in many cities in northern India there exists an 
‘institutionalised riot system’ – the presence of political parties, ideological context and 
partisan state actors and institutions that have in-built incentives to ‘produce communal 
riots’ in which Muslims tend to be the main victims. Both militant Hindus and those 
who have no connection with militant Hindu groups suffer from the ‘very present of the 
evidence of Partition and the imagined dangers of future partitions’.342 ‘In every major 
city and town in north India’, writes Brass,  
 
there are further symbols of that presence wherever there are large 
concentrations of Muslim populations. These Muslim concentrations are 
called “mini Pakistans”…[and] in turn are seen as centres of riot 
production designed to intimidate Hindus and generate more and more 
Partitions, more and more violence on the Hindu body.343 
 
Not unnaturally, high levels of violence have produced reactions from minorities too. 
The period from the 1980s to the 2000s saw the emergence of a new contestational 
juncture in which some minorities (Christians, Muslims and Sikhs) sought to contest the 
constitutional settlement but instead precipitated the rise of the Hindu Right.  
 
Partition not only generated a division of India on religious lines, but also ethnic 
consolidation of displaced people and the growth of Hindu nationalism. Migration 
changed the demography of many localities, cities and sometimes provinces. The 
resettlement of large numbers of refugees in many parts of India provoked conflicts 
between the new arrivals and local dwellers.344 But in the 1950s and 1960s a generalised 
conflict was avoided because violent Hindu-Muslim riots had discredited Hindu 
nationalism and Muslim separatism, and the Congress’ political accommodation of 
minorities deflected their religious and cultural demands. Singh has conceptualised this 
form of accommodation as ‘hegemonic control’ because it was not a bargain of equals 
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but traded political support for ‘protection’, and ‘unequal encapsulation’.345 Symbols of 
minority identity (Muslim Personal Law, Urdu and Aligarh University), perceptions of 
discrimination (Sikhs and the Punjabi Suba movement) and constraints on freedom of 
religion (Christians) would eventually lead to competing mobilisations by the minorities 
and the Hindu Right. 
 
This process can be dated from the general election of 1967: the gradual 
political decline of the Congress over the next 20 years, the formation of the Janata 
government (1977-1979), in which the Bharatiya Jana Sangh was a major coalition 
partner, and the mobilisation of minorities – all were key signposts in this development.  
 
By the early 1980s, some religious minorities, especially those in the border 
regions (Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and North-east), had begun to contest ‘hegemonic 
control’ with ethno-religious demands for self-determination. Thus, some political 
formations among Sikhs in Punjab, who had remained unreconciled to the Partition, 
continued to pursue sovereignty within the Indian Constitution, first, through the 
Punjabi Suba (Punjabi-speaking state), and then the Anandpur Sahib Resolution 
(1973).346 The Dharam Yudh Morcha (1981) by the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) led to 
the storming of the Golden Temple by the Indian Army (1984), and a ten-year campaign 
by Sikh militants for a separate Sikh state of Khalistan. This violent rebellion was 
ultimately crushed by the use of overwhelming force (250,000 military and para-
military personnel) but at the cost of nearly 30,000 lives and the suspension of normal 
governance in the state. In the event, the Indian state restructured Sikh politics but 
almost two decades after the return of normalcy, the ethno-religious demands of the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution remain unaddressed.  
 
Similarly, in Jammu and Kashmir decades of failure to evolve a working 
political settlement for the management of the state with special status under the 
Constitution led to full-scale insurgency from the mid-1980s. By conservative estimates 
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almost 50,000 people were killed by militant and security personnel and 150,000 
Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu majority region of Jammu.347 For 
the Hindu Right, the plight of these refugees became a potent symbol of violence 
against the nation. Again the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir was controlled by an 
overwhelming use of force which restored the familiar pattern of ‘violent control’ that 
has characterised governance in the state; and although since 2002 and 9/11 the 
insurgency has subsided, the valley continuously relapses into cycles of violence 
interspersed with semblances of peace.  
 
Christian majority states in the North-east also witnessed a significant rise in 
ethnic and religious violence in the 1980s. Some states like Nagaland have sustained a 
separatist movement dating from Independence that had oscillated between periods of 
sustained insurgency and a willingness to negotiate with the Indian state.348 In others, 
for instance Manipur, the conflict was directed at new settlers, often Hindu and Muslim 
Bengali settlers. Both forms of conflicts, however, further provided ideological grist to 
the Hindutva mill in the construction of Christians as an alien community. Indeed, the 
regular efforts of Christian missionaries to exercise the right to conversion subsequently 
led to episodic violence (Odisha 2007), attempts at reconversion (Gujarat), and pressure 
by BJP and Congress state governments to introduce Freedom of Religion Bills to 
restrict the right to convert to another faith.349 In the early 2000s, the annual reports of 
the US State Department on freedom of religion in India were highly critical of the 
violations of one of the basic fundamental rights.350 
 
Yet, the main mobilisation by a religious minority, and one which produced a 
massive counter-reaction, both within Congress and the Hindu Right, was a defensive 
response by India’s Muslims. A mass conversion of low caste Hindus to Islam in the 
south in 1981 provided political Hinduism with a popular symbol with which to attack 
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Muslims and other religious minority groups.351 The Shah Bano case (1986), which led 
the Congress government to overturn a Supreme Court ruling restoring the status quo 
ante in favour of Muslim personal law, became the mainspring for the BJP’s virulent 
campaign to construct a Hindu temple dedicated to the deity Lord Ram at the site of the 
Babri Masjid in Ayodhya – a mobilisation which saw emergence of the BJP as a major 
national political force committed to an ideological Hindu nationalism. The climax of 
mobilisation by forces of Hindutva was marked with the demolition of the Babri Masjid 
in Ayodhya by Hindu nationalist activists in December 1992. 352  This event was 
followed by the rise of the BJP to national governance (1996, 1998-9, 1999-2004) and 
renewed efforts to build a Hindu nation. 
 
 Although Hindu nationalist efforts to pursue the Hindutva agenda at the national 
level during the BJP-led NDA period (1998-2004) were somewhat stymied by its 
coalition partners − who rejected the demands to abrogate Article 370 of the 
Constitution that gives special status to Jammu and Kashmir, repeal Muslim personal 
law and build a temple to Lord Ram at Ayodhya − these impulses were redirected to the 
state level.353 In Gujarat, communalisation began in earnest when the BJP assumed state 
power in 1998. In coordination with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang 
Dal, the BJP began to target Gujarat’s religious minorities.354 In August 1999, a bill 
against religious conversion was introduced to the state legislative assembly, even 
though it directly contravened an article of the Constitution and SCs, STs and OBCs 
were singled out for ‘reconversion’ to Hinduism. Anti-minority violence reached its 
climax on the morning of 27th February 2002, when a train carrying Hindu karsevaks 
(religious volunteers) was set on fire outside Godhra railway station, allegedly by a 
large Muslim mob. The state government promptly declared the incident an organised 
Islamic terrorist attack. In the ensuing violence, incited by a communalised media and 
government, Hindu mobs unchecked, and often with the support of the state 
administration, embarked on four-day retaliatory massacres in which more than 2,000 
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Muslims were killed and over 150,000 were displaced.355 At the height of the violence, 
there were 125,000 refugees in camps. The Gujarat pogroms were the most serious 
example of ethnic cleansing of Muslims since Partition. 
 
To summarise: the period from 1980s to the 2000s witnessed the emergence of a 
contestational juncture that challenged how the rights of India’s religious minorities had 
been framed at Independence. However, political mobilisation by Christians, Muslims 
and Sikhs in the borderland states evoked a violent counter response in the form of a 
narrow, ideological vision of political Hinduism. Sixty-eight years after Independence, 
minorities’ citizenship rights continue to be mediated by the ‘people’356 in which some 
minorities, particularly Muslims, are regularly constructed as the ‘other’, with high 
levels of discrimination and violence.357 Not unnaturally, for some religious minorities 
these shortcomings have impacted adversely on their identity, security and ability to 
develop economically and socially.  
 
 
Religious minorities and the institutionalisation of ‘competing equalities’: 
the case of India’s Muslims 
 
The argument made so far is that the institutionalisation of ‘competing equalities’ at 
Independence has created different forms of path dependence for minorities and non-
minorities, and has also undermined minorities’ citizenship rights because the assertion 
of these rights is all too often viewed as undermining the national ideal. But not all 
minorities are equally affected: small and prosperous communities, such as Jains and 
Parsis, are among India’s high achievers; others like Christians, Muslims and Sikhs, 
have varying levels of integration, and their socio-economic profile is different in 
regions in which they constitute a majority (North-east, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Punjab). 358  Nonetheless, the pattern of institutionalised difference is most apparent 
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among India’s Muslims for whom insecurity, discrimination and exclusion from state-
sponsored development, either through employment facilitated by reservations, or 
targeted socio-economic development, has produced one of the most disadvantaged 
communities. 
 
  In 1983 the report of the High Power Panel on Minorities (henceforth Gopal 
Singh Panel Report) declared Muslims a socially and educationally backward 
community which needed special measures. It noted that Muslims were educationally 
worse off than most minorities and severely under-represented in the elite IAS (3.22 per 
cent), IPS (2.64 per cent), and IFS (3.14 per cent).359 But almost two decades later, the 
SCR noted a further deterioration in the community’s status: on almost all indicators 
Muslims were as disadvantaged, if not more so, as the lowest caste groups who had 
benefited from reservations and targeted development policies. Since the Gopal Singh 
Panel Report, central and state governments have done little to correct this situation 
despite mass social and poverty alleviation programmes. The dominant policy discourse 
continued to ignore the exclusion of non-Hindu minorities on the assumption that 
policies designed to tackle exclusion are applicable only to historically oppressed 
groups (SCs, STs and OBCs). Even after Mandal, while public policies on the lower 
castes continued to be framed in the language of justice, equality and democracy, the 
concerns of minorities were seen mainly as matters of security and identity. 360  A 
decisive break, however, appeared to take place with the formation of the first UPA 
government in 2004. 
 
 The dominant approach after 1950 towards religion’s claim for public space was 
defined by secularism and development. Often, the state assiduously rejected such 
claims because of the assumed religious intent, with minority claims regularly 
stigmatised as ‘communal’, ‘separatist’ and encouraging ‘fissiparous’ tendencies.361 
However, the SCR (2006) ‘marked an important shift in the popular/political discourse 
on India’s religious minorities’.362  By directly addressing the ‘development deficit’ 
among Muslims, it ‘opened up new ways of talking about religious minorities’.363 These 
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‘new ways’ included inter alia taking the Socio-Religious Category (SRC) seriously, 
recognising the level of deprivation among some of these communities, especially 
Muslims, and developing new approaches to remedy this under-development.  
 
 Despite the wealth of data available to the Planning Commission and other 
executive agencies, for political and ideological reasons it had not been disaggregated 
for religious minorities. As the SCR observed: 
 
While the perception of deprivation is widespread among Muslims, there 
has been no systematic effort since Independence to analyse the condition 
of religious minorities in the country. Despite the need to analyse the 
socio-economic and educational conditions of different SRCs, until 
recently appropriate data for such an analysis was not generated by 
Government agencies.364  
 
One of the major achievements of the SCR was to use new data to examine the 
condition of SRCs. In doing so, it was a significant act of recognition within the secular, 
scientific establishment that disadvantaged communities exist among religious 
communities. This shift, from recognition to accepting SRCs as social categories worthy 
of state policy programmes, acknowledged that the life chances of some communities 
were also determined by their religious identities. ‘Indeed’, as Jodhka concluded, ‘the 
proposals put forward by the Sachar Committee for amelioration of the Muslim 
population are premised on the assumption that religious identity be treated as a relevant 
category in the State policy and perspective on development.’365  
 
 By identifying data on the social and economic development of religious 
communities, the SCR was able to demonstrate the scale of disadvantage suffered by 
some of India’s Muslims. This included, among other things, very poor representation 
in state governance and employment, both at the national and state levels; a dismal 
provision for education, infrastructure and security in areas of Muslim settlement; an 
extremely improvised support from financial services for Muslim corporations; and 
widespread perception of wholesale religious discrimination, resulting in ghettoisation 
and an inward-looking, identity-centred community. 366  Comparatively, on key 
performance indicators, such as education, most SRCs, including SCs and STs, recorded 
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a noticeable improvement. However, similar evidence for developments within India’s 
Muslims was difficult to find. As the SCR concluded: 
 
Our analysis shows that while there is considerable variation in the 
conditions of Muslims across states, (and among the Muslims, those who 
identified themselves as OBCs and others), the Community exhibits 
deficits and deprivation in practically all dimensions of development. In 
fact, by and large, Muslims rank somewhat above SCs/STs but below 
Hindu-OBCs, Other Minorities and Hindu-General (mostly upper castes) 
in almost all indicators considered. Among the states that have large 
Muslim populations, the situation is particularly grave in the states of 
West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Assam…. In addition to the 
‘development deficit’, the perception among Muslims that they are 
discriminated against and excluded is widespread, which exacerbates the 
problem.367  
 
The SCR’s analysis of the Muslim community’s disadvantage is wide-ranging. For 
reasons outlined earlier, our focus is on three dimensions of the post-SCR 
developments: public sector employment, service delivery, and provision for enhanced 
security. 
 
 
Muslims and public sector employment 
 
In terms of employment, the SCR recognised that the profile of the Muslim community 
was heavily biased towards the unorganised sector in urban areas. This sector had faced 
severe challenges following economic liberalisation, making Muslim livelihoods even 
more precarious. However, what was equally striking was the low level of Muslim 
employment in the public sector: ‘Muslims’ shares in employment in various 
[government] departments’, the report noted, ‘are abysmally low at all levels’.368 Table 
3.2 below highlights the level of significant under-representation of Muslim 
employment in government and public sector undertakings. In some of the largest 
undertakings, such as railways, banks, security agencies and state-level departments, it 
is well below 13.4 per cent proportion of the community’s total population. No 
department or undertaking matches or exceeds it. Employment, moreover, was 
concentrated in lower grades (C and D), with significant under-representation in senior 
positions.  
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Table 3.2 
 Muslim employees in government employment, 2006 
 
Departments/Institutions 
Reporting 
Reported Number of 
Employees 
Reported Number of 
Muslim Employees 
Muslims as 
Percentage of 
Reported 
Employees 
State Level – Departments  4,452,851 278,385 6.3 
Railways  1,418,747 64,066 4.5 
Banks and RBI  680,833 15,030 2.2 
Security Agencies* 1,879,134 60,517 3.2 
Postal Service  275,841 13,759 5.0 
Universities**  137,263 6,416 4.7 
All Reported Government 
Employment  
(Excludes Public Sector 
Undertakings) 
8,844,669 438,173 4.9 
Central Public Sector 
Undertakings*** 687,512 22,387 3.3 
States Public Sector 
Undertakings 745,271 80,661 10.8 
All Public Sector 
Undertakings 1,432,783 103,048 7.2 
 
Source: SCR ,165.  
 
Notes: *CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), CISF (Central Industrial Security Force), BSF (Border 
Security Force), SSB (Sashastra Seema Bal – one of India’s Central Armed Police Forces), and other 
agencies; **129 Universities (Central and State) and 84 Colleges; *** Date from 154 Public Sector 
Undertakings.  
 
Table 3.3 below indicates that there has only been a marginal change in the number of 
Muslims employed in senior service posts since 1980: only in the IPS the proportion 
increased slightly. And nor is the situation better in the states: ‘in no state’, did the 
employment of Muslims, ‘match their population share’. Even best performing states 
only matched 50-70 per cent of the proportion.369  
 
Table 3.3 
Percentage of Muslims in senior civil service posts 
 
Name of Service / Year 1980 2006 
Indian Administrative Service 3.2 3.0 
Indian Police Service 2.6 4.0 
Indian Foreign Service 3.1 1.8 
  
             Source: Hasan, Politics of Inclusion, 264; SCR, 165. 
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The SCR concluded its section on employment by noting that a ‘detailed analysis of 
Muslim presence in government employment’ confirmed that a ‘very small proportion 
of government/public sector employees are Muslims and on average they are 
concentrated in lower-level positions’.370 
 
 
Muslims and service delivery 
 
If Muslims are heavily under-represented in public and private sector employment, the 
community’s ‘development deficit’, the SCR concluded, can also be attributed to poor 
service delivery – the provision of public sector goods and infrastructure. The report 
found the community lagging behind in all key ‘human development indicators’.371 In 
education, for instance, it found high levels of deprivation: ‘From lower levels of 
enrolment to a sharp decline in participation in higher levels of education’, the report 
concluded, ‘the situation of Indian Muslims is indeed very depressing as compared to 
most other SRCs; in fact their situation seems to have worsened in relative terms.’372 
The report recognised the centrality of improving the educational performance of the 
community, but noted with interest that the improvement in the educational background 
of SCs and STs, who had been able to ‘catch up with Muslims’, was most likely the 
result of specially targeted programmes to ‘establish schools or improve infrastructure 
and provide incentives for enrolment’. In a telling phrase, the SCR noted that 
reservations for these groups have had an impact in ‘providing the economic means to 
educate children and simultaneously increase the economic returns to education’.373 
 
 In contrast, in the absence of such special programmes directed at the Muslim 
community, the clustering of deprivation – poor educational achievement, high levels of 
poverty and unemployment – was identified with poor service delivery. In large regions 
of the north, Muslim communities were more disadvantaged than most: ‘more than 
1,000 Muslim-concentration villages in West Bengal and Bihar [did] not have any 
educational institutions; in Uttar Pradesh, this figure is 1,943’;374 40 per cent of ‘larger 
villages with a substantial Muslim concentration [did] not have any medical 
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facilities’.375 While poor infrastructure was one of the common features Muslims shared 
with other poor communities, they were especially affected because this was combined 
with a discriminatory attitude, a general ‘secular’ development bias, and a pervasive 
insensitivity by the state and NGOs to the community’s needs. ‘Access to schools, 
health care, sanitation facilities, potable water and means of daily transportation’, the 
SCR surmised, ‘are some of the basic facilities one can expect a state to provide for its 
citizens.’376  With the exception of Kerala, there was ‘relatively low access to such 
facilities for Muslims across India’.377 
 
 
Muslims and insecurity 
 
Although the SCR centred on the socio-economic conditions of the Muslim community, 
it recognised how insecurity had impacted on its development. Muslim identity, the 
SCR noted, had become increasingly ‘problematic in public space’, with growing 
marginalisation of shared common spaces. Perceptions of discrimination by Muslims 
were especially high in sectors such as employment, housing and education. Muslim 
women felt particularly vulnerable. In fact, the SCR noted that ‘lack of a sense of 
security and a discriminatory attitude towards Muslims is felt widely.’ 378  It 
acknowledged that there was a variation in the intensity of feeling across the states, but 
‘communal tension or any untoward incident in any part of the country is enough to 
make Muslims fear for their safety and security.’379 ‘Violent communal conflicts’, the 
Commission concluded: 
 
especially like some recent ones in a state [Gujarat], in which there is 
large-scale targeted sexual violence against Muslim women has a spread 
affect even in regions of the country not directly affected by the violence. 
There is immense fear, a feeling of vulnerability...The lack of adequate 
Muslim presence in the police force accentuates this problem in almost 
all Indian states as it heightens the perceived sense of insecurity, 
especially in a communally sensitive situation.380  
    
According to the SCR, this outcome was largely the failure of law enforcement agencies 
to control communal conflicts and the experience of state agencies in dealing with post-
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conflict situations in which Muslims were victims.381 But the long-term impact of these 
developments was the further ‘ghettoisation’ of Muslim populations in areas of the 
community’s concentration: ‘Fearing for their security’, the SCR concluded, ‘Muslims 
are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country.’382  The impact of 
insecurity had led to cumulative processes that had reinforced discrimination and 
disadvantage.  
 
Increasing ghettoisation of the Community implies a shrinking space for 
it in the public sphere…Social boycott of Muslims in certain parts of the 
country has forced Muslims to migrate from places where they lived for 
centuries; this has affected their employability and means of earning a 
livelihood. Ghettoisation, therefore, has multiple adverse effects: 
inadequacy of infrastructural facilities, shrinking common spaces where 
different SRCs can interact and reduction in livelihood options.383 
 
While some of these conclusions were undoubtedly drawn from the post-conflict 
experience of Gujarat, other independent studies have confirmed the trend towards 
ghettoisation.384 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined how historically minority rights were framed during 
constitution-making, India’s critical juncture which marked a radical rupture with the 
colonial past and embodied the vision of a modern, secular India. Minority rights which 
had assumed political dimensions during colonial rule were severely curtailed while 
group rights were largely limited to socio-economically disadvantaged Hindu castes. 
Equally disadvantaged groups among religious minorities were largely excluded from 
the system of protective discrimination through reservations. As noted previously, the 
writings of Bjapai, Hasan and Verma, to a varying degree, reinforce the reading of the 
caste/religion distinction, though inroads into this were made over time by the dilution 
of the OBC category at the states’ level. Nevertheless, this distinction institutionalised 
different forms of path dependence for socio-economically disadvantaged castes/groups 
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among minorities and the majority, producing rival structures and institutions for 
regimes of ‘competing equalities’.  
 
The SCR was a major turning point in the post-Independence history of India’s 
Muslims: it recognised, for the first time, the degree of discrimination and disadvantage 
(‘development deficit’) suffered by the community.385 The report acknowledged that 
this was determined, to some extent, by factors such as regional variations (the 
concentration of Muslims in some of the poorest states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and 
West Bengal), the community’s own assets, and its cultural capital. However, official 
state policies, or the lack of them, had impacted disproportionately on the community’s 
sense of identity, security, and its overall development. 
 
  Implicitly, the SCR also acknowledged that India’s critical juncture had 
institutionalised different forms of path dependence in terms of equality of opportunity 
between minority and majority disadvantaged groups because in key indicators (e.g. 
education) of progress some minorities, such as Muslims, were at a lower level than 
SCs and STs. Whereas reservations provide ‘increasing returns’ to politically mobilised 
SCs, STs, and from the 1990s onwards the OBCs, poor religious communities became 
further marginalised. Even the inclusion of Muslims in the OBC category after Mandal 
had failed to provide a critical breakthrough: the recognition of these castes/classes 
remains politically contested, though more efforts have been made to implement the 
policy in some states (Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) than 
others.386  
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 From the 1980s to the early 2000s, one response to discrimination and unequal 
treatment by minorities, particularly in the borderland regions, was to mobilise around 
identity and ethno-nationalist demands that produced prolonged insurgencies and 
counter-insurgencies. These also generated a powerful counter-reaction in the rise of the 
Hindu Right and the Gujarat riots in 2002. Perhaps more appropriately for our work, 
these events reoriented some minority communities’ political outlook from ‘identity’ to 
‘development,’ and from the late 1990s onwards, intersected with Congress’ efforts to 
rebuild its relationship with the minorities. 387  Thus, the election of the UPA-led 
Congress government in 2004 marked the beginning of a new contestational juncture in 
which politically mobilised minority groups called for ‘full equality of opportunity’. 
How the UPA responded to this challenge is examined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
The UPA in power: the new equal opportunities 
framework, Muslims and the limits of change 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The formation of a Congress-led UPA government following the Lok Sabha elections in 
2004 marked a new contestational juncture in the efforts of India’s religious minorities 
to establish a more substantive framework of equality of opportunity. Against the 
backdrop of 9/11, the rise of BJP and the Hindutva forces, and the failure of the direct 
assertion of minority rights by ethno-religious communities during the period from the 
1980s to the 2000s, this new approach was distinguished by locating minority concerns 
within the national and international discourse on social exclusion. This debate 
highlighted the need to counter the negative implications of the securitisation of Muslim 
communities and to tackle social and economic disadvantage. For the Congress, which 
had been in the political wilderness since the mid-1990s, the change intersected with its 
reinvention as a social democratic party that was willing to come to terms with coalition 
governance. The new contestational juncture held out the promise of redefining the 
constitutional settlement by addressing the long-term demands of the minorities, 
especially Muslims. Although this development gathered considerable momentum in 
the first few years of the UPA (I)’s administration, by mid-2007 the political 
momentum behind these policies had been largely dissipated with the familiar pattern of 
path dependence reasserting itself. 
 
This chapter, which sets the background for the more detailed case studies of 
policies on employment, service delivery and security in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, 
gives an overview of the UPA’s approach to minorities, with special reference to 
Muslims. It does so by operationalising the framework of institutional policy analysis 
outlined in Chapter Two, particularly the policy process (agenda-setting, policy 
formation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation) and the role of key 
institutions and actors. It begins by outlining how change in policy occurred before the 
2004 general elections. The process of policy formulation is then examined with 
reference to the two seminal reports: the SCR and the RMCR. Of particular interest is 
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how these reports and the associated committees sketched out a new framework of 
equality of opportunity which promised to transform the foundational settlement both 
for minorities and non-minorities. However, institutional and political factors combined 
to frustrate this outcome, with the consequence that the UPA’s decision-making process 
ultimately produced a partial commitment to new policies that were poorly designed, 
ineffectually implemented, and still await systematic assessment. 
 
 
Agenda-setting: UPA and the 2004 general elections 
 
Although the BJP-led NDA’s policies on minorities were Janus-faced – ‘to 
accommodate minority interests while trying to query the concept of minority itself’388 
– state power was used to influence cultural policy and education.389 The events of 9/11, 
the Kargil war, the militants’ attack on the Indian Parliament, and the post-attack 
mobilisation against Pakistan were all skilfully exploited to equate Islam with violence. 
The narrative of Hindu-Muslim conflict, which is so central to Hindutva, became 
entwined with the global ‘clash of civilisations’. What Nussbaum calls the ‘clash 
within’390 was overlaid by a meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’. Thus, the Gujarat 
riots (2002) took place against the background of heightened global and domestic 
Indian Islamophobia; and in the post-conflict management, even the mild-mannered 
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, could not resist the association between Islam 
and violence.391 Although the BJP at the national level tried to backtrack from this 
position, the damage had been done. 
 
The origins of the new UPA-period contestational juncture lie in the 
developments in the 1990s. First, many Muslim and Christian organisations, notably of 
the lower castes, became increasingly disenchanted with their community leadership’s 
pursuit of identity politics. The implementation of the Mandal Commission Report gave 
birth to organisations such as All India Backward Muslims Morcha which was founded 
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in Bihar in 1994 to secure SC status for Dalit Muslims.392 A similar organisation, led by 
Ali Anwar Ansari, the Pasmanda Movement, adopted an oppositional identity to Ashraf, 
and sought to create an awareness of the socio-economic conditions of poor Muslims, 
especially Dalit Muslims. It also campaigned for access to reservations and affirmative 
action programmes for religious minorities and for better representation of Muslims in 
government structures. 393  Although the movement was unable to build a strong 
following across Bihar and among Muslims,394 its mobilisation led to the passage of 
resolutions in state assemblies of Bihar (2000), Uttar Pradesh (2006), and Andhra 
Pradesh (2009) that supported the inclusion of Dalit Christians and Muslims in the SC 
category.395  
 
Second, a number of significant court cases, centred on the definition of OBCs, 
indirectly bore down on the inclusion of religious minorities within this category, 
particularly in states in the south that were inclined to take an expansive definition.396 
Third, from the early to mid-1990s, Congress or Congress-led coalition governments in 
Kerala and Karnataka evolved new formulas for granting reservations in employment 
and education to religious minorities (Christians and Muslims) within the OBC category 
that provided rich returns. Fourth, at this time some sections within Congress began to 
recognise the transformative potential of this policy, despite its historic opposition to the 
Mandal Commission’s recommendations. 397  Following three election defeats (1996, 
1998 and 1999), Congress reassessed its traditional refusal to participate in coalitions. 
Coming to terms with the regionalisation of Indian politics also required building an 
agenda for coalition governance with parties that had spearheaded Mandalisation.398 In 
2003, at meetings in Shimla and Srinagar, the party decided upon a clear preference for 
coalition alliances with like-minded secular parties − a process helped by the loss of 
three states to the BJP (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh) in December 
2003.  
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In this context, minorities, especially the Muslim community, featured 
prominently in the party’s election campaign. Substantive equality of opportunity for 
SCs, STs, OBCs and religious and linguistic minorities was to be the core of the party’s 
agenda on the minorities.399 The party’s 2004 election manifesto stated that:  
 
The Congress believes in affirmative action for all religious and linguistic 
minorities. The Congress has provided for reservations for Muslims in 
Kerala and Karnataka in government employment and education on the 
grounds that they are a socially and educationally backward class. The 
Congress is committed to adopting this policy for socially and 
educationally backward sections among Muslims and other religious 
minorities on a national scale…The Congress will adopt all possible 
measures to promote and maintain communal peace and harmony, 
especially in sensitive areas. It will enact a comprehensive law on social 
violence in all its forms and manifestations, providing for investigations 
by a central agency, prosecution by Special Courts and payment of 
uniform compensation for loss of life, honour and property.400 
 
The BJP was criticised for damaging ‘social harmony by deliberately inciting and 
sponsoring a communal carnage in Gujarat; by glorifying violence against missionaries; 
by encouraging viciously communal and fascist organisations like the VHP/Bajrang Dal 
to spread hate’.401 Vajpayee was attacked for displaying a singular lack of consistency 
and clarity on major national issues such as Ayodhya, the preservation of secularism, 
relations with Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir.402 The 2004 Lok Sabha elections, the 
Congress boldly claimed, were ‘a clash of sharply competing values, of diametrically 
opposite ideologies’, and offered an opportunity to ‘consolidate all forces subscribing to 
the fundamental values of our Constitution’.403  
 
The UPA’s NCMP, agreed by all parties which supported the alliance after the 
elections, including the Communists who gave outside backing, provided the broad 
framework of governance. It committed the administration: 
 
…to preserve, protect and promote social harmony and to enforce the law 
without fear or favour to deal with all obscurantist and fundamentalist 
elements who seek to disturb social amity and peace, [and] to provide for 
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full equality of opportunity, particularly in education and employment for 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and religious minorities.404 
 
The NCMP, furthermore, promised to: reverse the communalisation of education under 
the NDA, especially in higher education; implement the Places of Worship (Special 
Provisions) Act, 1992; encourage negotiation for a settlement on Ayodhya; ‘enact a 
model comprehensive law to deal with communal violence and encourage each state to 
adopt that law to generate faith and confidence in minority communities’; ‘promote 
modern and technical education among all minority communities [for] social and 
economic empowerment of minorities’; establish a National Commission to address the 
socially and economically backward sections among religious and linguistic minorities, 
with reserved places in education and employment; provide adequate funding for the 
National Minorities Development Corporation; provide Constitutional status to the 
Minorities Commission; restructure the National Integration Council (NIC) and ensure 
that it met twice a year; ‘strive for recognition and promotion of Urdu language under 
Article 345 and 347 of the Constitution’; and, ‘take the strictest possible action, without 
fear or favour, against all those individuals and organisations who spread social discord, 
disturb social amity, [and] propagate religious bigotry and communal hatred’.405  In 
brief, both the Congress manifesto and the UPA’s NCMP were committed to a new 
approach towards equality of opportunity for minorities. The real test was whether the 
UPA could deliver. 
 
 
Policy formulation 
 
The process of policy formulation, as with other stages in the policy process, is difficult 
to delineate into a discrete stage. Nonetheless, because of the highly contentious nature 
of the subject matter it did, in large measure, correspond with the policy process 
outlined in Chapter Two (see Figure 2.1). At the core of this process was the need to 
establish sound empirical evidence for policy change while drawing on familiar patterns 
of institutional innovation. Accordingly, policy formulation was undertaken within the 
conventions of Indian policy-making which includes ‘top-down’ expert commissions 
and committees, and engagement with emerging policy networks, such as the network 
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of Muslim activist, academics and politicians. As such, it was heavily influenced by 
substantive constraints (defined by the problem itself) and procedural constraints 
(institutional, constitutional and organisational). The core framework of policy 
formation was provided by reports of one committee, one commission and two expert 
groups: the Sachar Committee Report (2006), the Ranganath Misra Commission Report 
(2007), a report by the expert group on Equal Opportunity Commission (2007) and a 
report by the expert group on Diversity Index (2008). These initiatives are summarised 
in Table 4.1 below:  
 
Table 4.1 
A summary of UPA’s policy initiatives on religious minorities 
 
Policy initiatives Specific measures taken  
Affirmative action for 
minorities 
• Sachar Committee Report (2006) 
• Ranganath Misra Commission Report (2007) 
• Prime Minister’s 15-Point Programme (2006) 
• Executive action to monitor and target employment of 
minorities in national government service (Office 
Memorandum, 2011)  
New institutions 
• Ministry of Minority Affairs (2006) 
• Introduction of a bill to give constitutional status for 
National Commission for Minorities (2004) 
• National Commission for Minority Educational 
Institutions (2004) 
Anti-religious discrimination 
• Expert group report on Equal Opportunity 
Commission (2007) 
• Communal Violence Bills (2005/2011) 
Promotion of diversity 
• Expert group report on Diversity Index (2008) 
• National Commission for Minority Educational 
Institutions Act (2004) 
 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs, National Common Minimum Programme. 
 
Note: This table excludes promotional policies such as provision of scholarship, support for State Wakf 
Boards, increased funding for the Maulana Azad Educational Foundation, the Scheme of Leadership 
Development of Minority Women, the Scheme for Skills Development of Minorities, and the Free 
Coaching and Allied Schemes. 
 
The Sachar Committee was set up following a notification from the PMO on 9th 
March 2005. Its rationale was that because of the 
 
lack of authentic information about the social, economic and educational 
status of the Muslim community of India which comes in the way of 
planning, formulating and implementing specific interventions, policies 
and programmes to address the issues relating to the socio-economic 
backwardness of this community, [the] Government has constituted a 
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High Level Committee to prepare a comprehensive report covering these 
aspects.406 
 
More specifically, the terms of references required the committee to examine the 
geographical locations in which Muslims live, their pattern of livelihoods, socio-
economic development, ‘relative share in public and private sector employment’, and 
whether it was ‘in proportion to their population in the various states’, and if not, what 
were the ‘hurdles’.407 The Committee was also to ascertain the share of Muslim OBCs 
in public sector employment in the centre and the states. Although no specific 
interventions were identified, the Committee’s finding would enable the ‘government to 
address relevant issues relating to the social, economic and educational status of the 
Muslim community’. 408  The Committee was to be chaired by Rajinder Sachar, a 
distinguished jurist with a track record in human rights, and included academics and 
public activists. It was to report within 15 months.409 
 
 Prior to the formation of SCR, on 29th October 2004, the government also set up 
a National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities (or Ranganath Misra 
Commission after its chairman). This commission was charged with three specific tasks: 
to address the issue of developing criteria for ‘socially and economically backward 
sections among religious and linguistic minorities’; to recommend measures...‘including 
reservation in education and government employment’ for the welfare of these groups; 
and to suggest ‘necessary constitutional, legal and administrative modalities required for 
the implementation of its recommendations’.410 But, unlike the Sachar Committee, this 
commission was not formally constituted until March 2005, had its terms of reference 
extended, and despite an initial reporting deadline of six months, belatedly submitted its 
final report in May 2007.  
 
 Mainly because of its terms of reference, the work of the Ranganath Misra 
Commission was deeply contested. Formally, commissions in India have legal 
autonomy from the government in power; they are regarded as independent and 
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objective, and therefore their recommendations are respected. Although many 
governments use a commission to delay policy-making, or defer decision-taking, they 
rarely invite controversy over its composition. However, appointments to the Ranganath 
Misra Commission were highly politicised. According to one member, Tahir Mahmood, 
he initially declined to join, but was prevailed on to do so by the Prime Minister because 
he knew that as a former Chairman of the NCM Mahmood supported reservation for 
minorities.411 Apparently the Prime Minister informed Mahmood that ‘I am not a law 
man. Recommending reservation needs support with legal grounds; that is why I set up 
this commission and that is why I nominated you to this commission.’412  Whereas 
Mahmood’s appointment appear to have been strategically driven, to make the case for 
minorities, the appointment of Asha Das, a retired former secretary of Ministry of 
Social Justice and Empowerment (MSJE), well-known for her BJP sympathies, as an 
additional member-secretary of the Commission in May 2005, counterbalanced his 
influence. She was appointed only after the Commission’s work had commenced, and 
her appointment remains shrouded in mystery. Who recommended this dissenting 
member be added to the Commission, on what grounds the decision was made, and 
whether there was any strong differences between the Prime Minister and other 
decision-makers over her appointment, or whether it was a calculation on the part of the 
UPA to forestall a backlash against the recommendations, are questions that remain 
unanswered.413 Whatever the intentions, Asha Das frustrated the Commission’s work, 
opposed its main recommendations, and ultimately submitted her own dissenting note. 
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Her efforts to continuously prolong the Commission’s tenure when the Chair was 
seriously ill were eventually thwarted in March 2007. 
 
UPA (I) and a new framework of equality of opportunity for religious minorities with 
special reference to Muslims  
 
The four reports of a committee, commission and expert groups − the SCR, the RMCR, 
EOC report and the expert group on Diversity Index report (DI report) – mark a major 
landmark in the development of equal opportunities discourse in India. Together, it has 
been suggested, they represent something of a ‘paradigm shift’ in how to address the 
challenges of delivering equality in twenty-first century India.414 Combining specific 
(directed at minorities) and general (directed at redefining the framework of equality of 
opportunity) measures, the recommendations of these reports recast the framework of 
‘competing equalities’ with a perceptible shift from the focus on national integration, 
which had characterised the earlier construction of religious minorities, to justice and 
equality.415 This change was made possible by the new discourses of social inclusion, 
diversity and anti-discrimination, and was most evident in the desire to shift the debate 
with reference to India’s Muslims from the politics of ‘identity’ to the politics of 
‘development’ and ‘social exclusion’. Religious minorities were to be enabled to fully 
share the glow of citizenship in India’s developing economy. The core elements of this 
framework included: (i) recognising religion as a category of social exclusion; (ii) 
creating a level playing field for religious minorities on a par with SCs, STs and OBCs; 
(iii) ensuring that service delivery reflects the principle of proportionality; and (iv) 
institutionalising the better monitoring of equality of opportunity and promotion of 
social diversity.  
 
Religion as a category of social exclusion 
 
We have noted above that the Sachar Committee was formed because of ‘lack of 
authentic information about the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim 
community of India’.416 This outcome was the result of institutional resistance by the 
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secular state against the recognition of religious communities as SRCs. In the political 
language of the foundational settlement, religion as a category was non-negotiable 
beyond cultural and linguistic rights because it was associated with Partition. As a 
consequence, despite widespread perception of deprivation and discrimination among 
religious communities, notably Muslims, there was no analysis of the socio-economic 
and educational conditions of the minorities. ‘Until recently’, the SCR noted, 
‘appropriate data for such an analysis was not generated by Government agencies.’417 
Much of the initial work of the SCR, therefore, centred on disaggregating such data to 
establish the comparative position of Muslims vis-à-vis other communities. Once this 
was achieved, the assessment of the Committee was clear: 
 
A wide variety of policy initiatives and programmes have been launched 
by successive governments to promote the economic, social and 
educational development of the minority communities in India. However, 
while the Muslims have no doubt made some visible progress, the 
perception remains that the economic and educational gap between the 
Community and the rest of the SRCs has been widening. Once the 
‘development deficit’ among Muslims is assessed policy interventions 
will need to be reviewed in the context of available evidence, and new 
initiatives launched to grapple with the marginalisation of Muslims in the 
social, economic and political space.418  
 
To overcome this ‘development deficit’, the SCR proposed two types of measures: 
specific programmes aimed at enhancing affirmative action through better educational, 
infrastructure and self-help provision and support by private and public sector 
undertakings aimed at the Muslim community, and general initiatives that went beyond 
the conventional conceptual tool-box of the Indian approach to disadvantage. First, it 
proposed the creation of a National Data Bank for transparent, generally accessible and 
relevant data on SRCs so their engagement in public and private programmes could be 
better evaluated. Second, an autonomous Assessment and Monitoring Authority was 
proposed that would highlight areas of concern for further development. Third, to 
enhance the framework of equality of opportunity, the SCR recommended a more 
decisive shift from non-discrimination to anti-discrimination with new legislation that 
would be overseen by the creation of an EOC. Finally, to promote diversity and arrest 
religious ghettoisation, the Committee proposed the construction of a DI that would 
measure diversity in critical areas such as employment in the public and private sectors 
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and housing. The degree of organisational diversity would become the new marker of 
willingness to embrace diverse, plural and equal opportunities-driven modern India.419  
 
Religious minorities and SCs, STs and OBCs – a new level playing field  
 
In addition to the approaches to ensure better equality of opportunity and promotion of 
diversity, a key feature of the new framework was to erase the structural barriers 
between religious minorities, and SCs, STs and OBCs in the recognition of protective 
equality. By creating a level playing field, in which religious minorities would be 
included in the protective and developmental provisions of affirmative action in 
employment and service delivery, the framework sought to eradicate the anomalies 
which had persisted as ineradicable barriers. Potentially, this proposal challenged the 
very essence of the constitutional settlement. 
  
 The RMCR’s main proposal extended protective equality enjoyed by SCs, STs 
and OBCs to religious minorities. To this end, the Commission opted for a criteria of 
socio-economic backwardness in keeping with that defined for the majority (Hindu) 
community with ‘no discrimination whatsoever between the majority community and 
minorities’420 and ‘the criteria now applied for this purpose to the majority community – 
whatever that criteria may be – must be unreservedly applied also to all the 
minorities’.421 The logical extension of this principle, the Commission argued, was that:  
 
all those social and vocational groups among the minorities who but for 
their religious identity would have been covered by the present net of 
Scheduled Castes should be unquestionably treated as socially backward, 
irrespective of whether the religion of those other communities 
recognises the caste system or not.422  
  
To be consistent with this recommendation, which de-linked caste from religion, there 
was a need to delete paragraph three of the Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order 
(1950), ‘which originally restricted the Scheduled Caste net to the Hindus and later 
opened it to Sikhs and Buddhists’ but still excluded Christians, Jains, Muslims and 
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Parsis.423 In making caste religiously neutral, moreover, the Commission was insistent 
that a change in an individual’s religion, for example conversion to Christianity or 
Islam, should not affect his or her SC status. In short, the constitutional logic of 
restricting reservations to former Hindu untouchables (SCs) was now to be extended to 
religious minorities, including the followers of those religions that officially proclaimed 
an egalitarian creed. 
 
 By making caste religiously neutral, the RMCR opened up the possibilities of 
reservations in central and state employment for religious minorities. Given the extent 
of under-representation of some religious minorities in public employment, especially 
Muslims, the Commission suggested that 15 per cent ‘of posts in all cadres and grades 
under the Central and State governments should be earmarked’ for Muslims (10 per 
cent) and other minorities (5 per cent). Such a provision, it argued, was consistent with 
Article 16(4) of the Constitution, which provides the enabling provision for reservations 
for SCs and STs. 424  In the event this proved difficult to implement, the RMCR 
recommended that 8.4 per cent of the 27 per cent OBC quota be reserved for religious 
minorities, with 6 per cent earmarked for Muslims and 2.4 for non-Muslims.425  
 
In addition, the RMCR proposed a raft of legal and institutional measures which, 
among other things, included: firm protection for minority rights to education; the need 
for statutory status for the judicial enforcement of the PM’s 15PP for minorities; a 
Parliamentary Committee on constitutional policy for minorities; a national committee 
for monitoring the educational and economic development of minorities; the 
establishment of state-level Minorities Commissions and Welfare Departments in all 
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states and Union Territories; and the decentralisation of all minority-related schemes to 
the district-level with corresponding structures for minority representation.426 
 
Proportionality in service delivery 
 
Another basic dimension of the new approach was that the principle of proportionality 
should apply in public sector service delivery. In the development of equal opportunity 
policies in the US and the UK it became axiomatic that services provided by the state 
and parastatal organisation should be beyond direct and indirect discrimination, and 
service budgets should be proportionally allocated to target groups, such as black and 
ethnic minorities, to reflect their proportion in the population.427 In India, the principle 
of proportionality had been conceded, to some degree, for SCs and STs in the five-year 
plans − notwithstanding the problems associated with inadequate allocation of funds, 
non-utilisation, implementation and administrative bottlenecks. But this principle was 
not extended to religious minorities because of concerns that any special treatment for 
these groups would contravene the Constitution.  
 
 Although the case for a sub-plan for minorities in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
(2007-12) was rejected,428 the proposals which emerged from the SCR, RMCR, and 
other related initiatives recognised the principle of proportionality within the limits of 
executive and legislative action. Hence, the PM’s 15PP, re-launched in January 2006, 
was the flagship measure at the centre of this drive, with the specific aim of improving 
equal opportunities for minorities by ensuring an equitable share for religious minorities 
in economic activity and employment, improving their living conditions, and preventing 
and controlling communal riots.429 This initiative drew on resources allocated to other 
programmes. Where possible, it aimed to ensure that 15 per cent of the total outlay was 
earmarked for minorities. In 2007-08, the newly created MoMA identified 90 MCDs for 
                                                      
426
 (RMCR) ibid., 154-55. 
427
 See Wendy Ball and John Solomos, eds., Race and Local Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). 
428
 Hasan, Politics of Inclusion, 54. 
429
 Ministry of Minority Affairs, ‘Prime Minister’s New 15-Point Programme for the Welfare of 
Minorities’. Available at: 
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/pdfs/amended_guidelines.pdf [accessed 
on 4 September 2013]. 
116 
 
a MSDP ‘to address the “development deficits” specially in education, employment, 
sanitation, housing, drinking water and electricity supply’.430  
 
 The case for proportionality was also made for some of the high profile UPA 
government programmes – Bharat Nirman (creation of basic rural infrastructure), Prime 
Minister Rozgar Yojana (provision of institutional finance to educated unemployed 
youth), Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (major self-employment programme for 
the rural poor), NREGA, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, and Polio Eradication – aimed at 
poverty reduction.431 Monitoring data available for some of these programmes indicated 
that take-up by religious minorities, notably Muslims, was below the mean;432 and in 
seeking to correct this imbalance through better distribution and monitoring, the case 
was also made for extending this approach to the activities of public sector units, banks 
and private contractors dependent on official contracts. In following this approach, these 
recommendations were building on the existing policies of leveraging change by using 
the state sector. 
 
Institutionalising equality of opportunity and promotion of social diversity (Equal 
Opportunity Commission and Diversity Index) 
 
A further innovation in creating a level playing field for religious minorities was the 
proposal to create an EOC and a DI. Both proposals emerged from the 
recommendations of the SCR, but their origins were to be found in the experience of the 
US, the UK, and Canada in responding to competing social disadvantages on race, 
ethnicity, gender and tribe. Some of these countries (e.g. UK), like India, were faced 
with multiple, competing and overlapping institutions for promoting equality (e.g. race 
and gender) that required integration within a singular overarching framework.433  
 
 In order to face these complex challenges of disadvantage and discrimination, 
often around the existence of multiple axes of deprivation, new thinking was needed on 
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‘how to handle the interaction effects of more than one axis of disadvantage’.434 The 
expert group which examined this subject proposed an EOC with a focus on eradicating 
discrimination against ‘deprived groups’ identified by an objective deprivation index 
defined by ‘sex, caste, language, religion, disability, descent, place of birth, residence, 
race or any other’ grounds.435  The EOC was to be the executive body that would 
initially focus on two domains: education and employment. However, its overall remit 
was policy intervention and coordination: 
 
the Commission will have advisory and consultative functions with 
government departments, private enterprises and autonomous institutions 
in respect of equal opportunity practices for which the EOC will evolve 
Equal Opportunity Practices Codes in different sectors and regions…The 
Commission’s overall role would thus be to work towards ensuring the 
elimination of discrimination and denial of equal opportunities in all 
walks of life.436  
 
Whilst the EOC would focus on advocacy, monitoring, and where necessary, group 
grievances, a more direct effort to promote social diversity in the public and private 
sector was proposed by the expert group’s report on the DI. This recommended the 
creation of a DI to oversee the encouragement of diversity in education, employment 
and housing societies. ‘The case for increasing social diversity in public spaces’, the 
report noted: 
 
can be built on the notion of a fair demographic representation for all 
groups of population. Groups that are subjected to discrimination in 
society tend to get under-represented (as compared to their proportion in 
the population) in several public spheres. This leads to inequity and 
alienation resulting in resentment and frustration among the excluded 
population.437   
 
The DI would measure the ‘diversity gap’ of public spaces of particular social groups – 
religion, caste, gender – in proportion to the population who are eligible to enter the 
institution. Significant under-representation of any category, the report suggested, 
would be met through incentivisation in the allocation of state fund to institutions (e.g. 
universities in the public and private sectors), corporate social responsibility, backed 
with the threat of affirmative action (public and private sector), and ‘incentives to 
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builders for housing complexes that have more “diverse” resident populations to 
promote “composite living spaces” for “socio-religious communities”’.438  
 
Overall, the recommendations represented a decisive shift in the framing of 
equality of opportunity in post-Independence India, especially for minorities. They were 
distinguished by new ‘out-of-the-box thinking that went beyond reservations in public 
employment and education’.439  In recognising religion as an important SRC around 
which deprivation can be clustered, for instance, the SCR challenged the post-
Independence taboo about religion in public policy. By proposing to include 
disadvantaged Christians and Muslims within the framework of reservations, the RMCR 
sought to create a level playing field, one in which caste was de-linked from religion. 
And the proposals to create an EOC and a DI attempted to move beyond a group-based 
system of protective equality, to establish a general equalities framework aimed at 
combating discrimination and promoting diversity. The real challenge before the UPA 
was to translate policy-making into reality. 
 
 
Decision-making: understanding the UPA’s decisions and non-decisions 
 
Whereas the policy-making process was reasonably transparent, decision-making was 
far more opaque. As a coalition, the UPA needed to accommodate the interests of its 
partners and external supporters (e.g. the Left parties, the BSP and the SP)440 who 
competed for different caste and religious constituencies. Within the administration 
itself, moreover, there was a clear division between those in government and the parties; 
and within the UPA there was a two-fold division of authority: the Prime Minister, 
Manmohan Singh, and the President of the Congress, Sonia Gandhi.441  
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 Foremost among these institutional constraints was the BJP’s ability to mobilise 
extensive institutional, political and social opposition to any change in the foundational 
settlement which appeared to ‘appease’ minorities. Although in opposition, the BJP and 
the forces of Hindutva could, as we shall see, readily mobilise political opinion by 
playing on the emotional codes of Indian nationalism such as national unity and 
Partition that had become firmly embedded in the institutionalisation of state policies. 
The BJP and some sections within Congress itself thus represented the ‘permanent 
nationalist establishment’ which could garner extensive sympathy within the civil 
service, both within the centre and the states. 
 
Equally important was the political opposition of SC, ST and OBC lobbies that 
opposed policy change in favour of religious minorities at their expense. As the main 
beneficiaries of the institutionalised reservations system, these lobbies (as we shall see 
in subsequent chapter) objected strongly to any dilution of their existing quotas or 
change in the existing institutional arrangements that underpinned the regimes of 
‘competing equalities’. Sometime this institutional opposition was voiced directly by 
the lobbies’ leadership and apex intuitions; more often than not, it was articulated 
implicitly within the structures of governance which had emerged to oversee their 
interests, and recognised by the government in its policymaking process towards these 
groups.  
 
 Finally, other institutional constraints were not inconsiderable. Since 1947 the 
civil service had been nurtured on the idea that religious demands, especially by 
minorities, were inadmissible. This secular outlook was also underpinned by the 
judiciary, which tended to interpret the foundational settlement in narrow and restrictive 
terms. While it has gradually relented in extending reservations, the inclusion of 
religious minorities within this framework continues to be a source of dispute. As we 
shall see below and in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, judicial activism was to play a 
significant role in limiting the executive’s ability to develop and implement policy.442 
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Sachar Committee Report (SCR) 
 
The SCR became embroiled in controversy even before it was published. When the 
Committee requested data from the armed forces on the proportion of Muslims in the 
army, it was accused in the press and Parliament of ‘trying to “communalise” the army, 
with senior army officers particularly vocal in their protests’.443 Yet, when the report 
was presented to the Prime Minister, his response was supportive. According to one 
member of the SCR: 
 
He found the committee report an accurate assessment of the Muslim 
community in India. He also found the methodology robust. He was 
satisfied because the broad direction of the SCR was more to do with the 
fundamental policies of India.444 
 
Before the report was tabled in Parliament on 30th November 2006, 445  the Prime 
Minister gave it his wholehearted support, affirming the need for ‘fair and legitimate 
share for minorities in central and state government and private sector jobs’. 446 
Addressing the National Development Council on 9th December he said: ‘We will have 
to devise innovative plans to ensure that minorities, particularly the Muslim minority, 
are empowered to share equitably the fruits of development. They must have the first 
claim on resources.’447 In a debate on the report in the Rajya Sabha, A. R. Antulay, the 
Minister of Minority Affairs, announced that the ‘Sachar Committee’s 
recommendations will be implemented’. He, however, avoided direct comment on 
whether the recommendations would be debated in the Parliament, saying ‘I did not say 
that the SCR will be discussed in Parliament during the current session.’448 Although a 
meeting at which minority Members of Parliament (MPs) from all parties attended was 
held, the minister confirmed it was not called to discuss the SCR but because there was 
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no parliamentary Standing Committee scrutinising MoMA.449 Subsequently, there were 
very limited references to the SCR in the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha,450 but formally the 
government remained committed to fully implementing its recommendations. 
Surprisingly, unlike the legislation on extending reservations in educations to OBCs, the 
UPA singularly failed to build a cross-party consensus around the SCR.451 
 
 One reason for this was the predictable response of the BJP which condemned 
the SCR as nothing but ‘vote-bank politics’ and ‘minority appeasement’.452 Pro-BJP 
media headlined the Prime Minister’s earlier comments as ‘Muslims must have first 
claim on resources’. Indeed, the BJP alleged the SCR’s findings had been manipulated 
because evidence from the National Sample Survey Organisation report demonstrated 
that it was Christians not Muslims who suffered the highest unemployment rate. A 
Muslim vice-president of the BJP stated: 
 
We have been saying it all along that the Sachar Committee was created 
for vote-bank reasons. It was designed to serve a political purpose 
especially ahead of the Uttar Pradesh assembly elections. The National 
Sample Survey Organisation report vindicates our assertion.453  
 
This position was also echoed by a senior BJP MP in an interview: 
 
We don’t agree with [SCR’s] recommendations. We believe the SCR is 
divisive in nature, appeasing minorities, pro-Congress, and allows the 
Congress to consolidate the Muslim vote-bank.454 
 
Rejecting the case for a more equitable representation of Muslims in state employment 
as a ‘dangerous doctrine’, the BJP spokesman said the party would fight the 
implementation of the SCR recommendations ‘tooth and nail’.455 In brief, the BJP’s 
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rhetoric of minority appeasement rekindled the spectre of the two-nation theory and 
religious separatism as the root of Partition and communal conflict.456 
 
Ranganath Misra Commission Report (RMCR) 
 
The BJP’s vociferous opposition to the SCR report and institutional engagement with 
the RMCR ensured that the latter’s recommendations would prove difficult to translate 
into policy. The report was completed on 10th May 2007 but not tabled in Parliament 
until after the Lok Sabha elections in 2009. By mid-2007, the UPA had begun to 
backtrack on its commitments to minorities. Among the explanations given for this 
turnaround are the BJP’s opposition, the performance of the Congress party in mid-term 
elections, and the growing difficulties of managing the coalition following the 
withdrawal of Communist support after the vote of confidence over the nuclear fuel deal 
with the US.457 Equally relevant were the internal opposition within the Congress itself, 
and the increasing institutional and judicial opposition to the new proposals. 
 
 Despite the Prime Minister’s support for the RMCR, by the end of 2007 the 
UPA had begun to distance itself from the report’s recommendations. Although the 
contents of the report were widely leaked to the press, it was not immediately tabled in 
Parliament, nor circulated to India’s premier policy-making body, the Planning 
Commission.458 On 9th December 2009, Mulayam Singh Yadav (SP) in the Lok Sabha 
taunted the Prime Minister for not releasing the report: 
 
RMCR was introduced in July 2007. The government is hiding it for two 
years and the report was not tabled in the Lok Sabha. Is it trivial? One 
day, two day, every day has been like that. Liberhan was also similar. 
Why no debate about this report has taken place for about two years? I 
want to ask this. Prime Minister is sitting here. Prime Minister, please tell 
us when this discussion session will take place.459 
 
In fact the report was kept under very restricted circulation. ‘One funny thing’, recalls a 
member of the Commission,  
 
is that a couple of months after the report was tabled in Parliament I 
received a phone call from the former deputy secretary of the 
                                                      
456
 Hasan, Politics of Inclusion, 188. 
457
 Baru, The Accidental Prime Minister, Ch. 12.  
458
 Mahmood, interview, 20 February 2013, Noida. 
459
 LSD, 9 December 2009. Translated from Hindi.  
123 
 
Commission. He said he had been told that all copies of the report from 
all members and chairman must be submitted to the ministry. They were 
trying to suppress it. They didn’t want the report to be circulated. Even 
after it was tabled, we were asked to return our copies. I refused and said 
that now the report is tabled in the Parliament, there is nothing 
confidential about it so I will release the report to the press. So I did that. 
That is how it became public. The government has not sent the report to 
any parliamentarian.460 
 
Although the delay in making the report public might be considered a normal part of 
political calculations in weighing the costs and benefits, its potential implications for 
other groups – SCs, STs and OBCs – also needed to be taken into consideration. The 
government’s referral of the report to the NCSC and NCBC elicited a reply from the 
former that ‘Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims cannot be included in the SC list as they 
do not “satisfactorily” fulfil the key criterion on being SC’. 461  Subsequently, this 
position was modified to one in which such inclusion of Dalit Christians and Dalit 
Muslims would be acceptable provided the share of reservation for 15 per cent of SCs 
were not encroached.462 As late as 24th January 2011, the NCSC’s position was that 
‘reservation should be extended to them but the share of 15 per cent of SCs should not 
be disturbed and the element of reservation for these communities (Dalit Christians and 
Dalit Muslims) should be determined by the Government keeping in view of their 
population. As per the direction of the Supreme Court, the overall reservation of 50 per 
cent has to be maintained.’463 A month later, the NCSC added further conditions that 
such an inclusion would have to demonstrate that after conversion Christian and 
Muslim Dalits were still following caste traditions and customs and were still suffering 
untouchability and discrimination.464 This renewed emphasis on caste, and the need for 
a separate quota for religious minorities, reconfirmed the institutional position of 
‘competing equalities’. 
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Equal Opportunity Commission and the Diversity Index 
 
Similar institutional factors appear to have impeded the UPA’s decision-making process 
in its efforts to push through a new framework for managing equal opportunities and 
promoting diversity. When the expert group on the EOC submitted its report, along with 
the draft bill in February 2008, a Cabinet note was circulated to all ministries and 
departments.465  Initially, the government supported the proposal, including it in the 
President’s Address to Parliament on 4th June 2009; in a debate in the Rajya Sabha on 
13th July 2009, Salman Khurshid (Minister of Minority Affairs) confirmed the proposal 
for an EOC was under serious consideration by the government. The EOC Bill was 
listed for introduction in the winter session of Parliament in 2009, but because of its 
potential implications it was referred to the Group of Ministers, which included 11 
Cabinet ministers. Reluctant to overturn the existing regimes of ‘competing equalities’, 
with their existing executive bodies and oversight, and facing bitter opposition within 
the ministries on whether the new body should be located in MoMA or MSJE, the 
Group of Ministers decided that the remit of EOC should be limited to ‘minorities 
only’.466 The bill was still pending before Parliament in May 2014.467  
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 Interestingly, as with the RMCR, the circulation of the DI report was also 
strictly controlled. 468  Soon after the report was submitted, it was criticised by the 
Central Statistical Office for being ‘conceptually flawed’, ‘over-simplistic’, and 
‘statistically challenging’. 469  There were, as a result, considerable inter-ministerial 
tensions over the report and its ownership. The Chairman of the expert group confided 
in an interview: ‘Ministers have not done anything to promote this index. As far as DI is 
concerned, they received the report, made some copies, distributed a few, and forgot 
about it.’470 Indeed, there was little in the DI to appeal to SCs, STs and OBCs because, 
with established national commissions and exclusive anti-discrimination legislation, the 
proposal either appeared to undermine the status quo, or at best, add another layer of 
unnecessary complexity. In fact, if the EOC and DI proposals had been implemented, 
alongside existing commissions, they would have produced a ‘regulatory nightmare’.471 
The idea of one single regulatory authority was clearly desirable, but institutionally 
difficult within a framework of ‘competing equalities’ backed by powerful political 
lobbies. According to one senior analyst, the proposal for an EOC and a DI lacked a 
clear mandate for where they would be ‘located at the heart of governance’. As a result, 
as generic measures, and without community support, they were ‘killed off by inter-
ministerial in-fighting and the SCs, STs and OBCs lobbies’.472 
 
 
Implementation: executive action, symbolism and promotional policies 
 
As we have seen, the general view of UPA policies on minorities, particularly Muslims, 
is that they were framed by political calculations. The decision to implement, or not 
implement these policies, it is argued, was driven primarily by political calculations and 
the cost and benefits of political payoffs. But this is only a partial explanation. 
Institutional path dependence suggests that the UPA had to overcome three forms of 
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opposition. First, it was the politically institutionalised opposition of the BJP and 
Hindutva forces, which articulated an anti-minorities construction of the foundational 
settlement. This opposition, it needs to be noted, also had a significant constituency 
within the Congress itself. Second, the institutionalised path dependence of SC, ST and 
OBC interests, with increasingly powerful political lobbies, presented a formidable 
obstacle to the inclusion of minorities within India’s framework of ‘competing 
equalities’. At times, as we have seen above, these interests were articulated as zero-
sum conflicts of potential losses. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the 
institutionalised path dependent framework of dealing with minorities as communities 
of culture had become firmly embedded within the structures of the secular state so that 
provision of special programmes for minorities – of affirmative action or reservations – 
brought forth generally hostile responses. Typical of this outlook were, for example, 
comments such as these: 
 
It is not constitutional to have schemes just for Muslims. We cannot 
design schemes just for Muslims, or have budgetary allocations for 
Muslims, or call Muslims, Muslims. It is simply not constitutional. The 
Constitution makes special mention of SCs and STs for affirmative action, 
not of Muslims. We can only have intervention for all minorities.473 
 
These ‘assumptive worlds’, the ‘mental models’ with which the Indian state operated 
illustrate the embedded nature of resistance to policy change. These assumptions and 
understandings of minorities, as we shall see in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, and the 
repertoire of everyday bureaucratic discourses were critical to shaping solutions and 
policy actions. Indeed, in India, the problematic status of some minorities, and the 
associations of Muslims with the break-up of the country in the national imagination, 
suggests that the UPA policies needed a cultural transformation of embedded 
institutional opposition. In the absence of a political commitment and a capacity to 
overcome institutional cultures of resistance, policy implementation was reflected in 
‘executive action’, ‘symbolism’, and ‘promotionalism’.474 
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Executive action 
 
Executive action taken by the UPA government to implement its policy mix was of two 
types: symbolic and substantive. Symbolic measures included the launch of new 
commissions (National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions) and 
reorganisation of existing administrative structures. Foremost among these was the 
creation of MoMA (2006) which was established to ‘ensure a focused approach to the 
issues related to the minorities and to play a pivotal role in the overall policy, planning, 
coordination, evaluation and review of the regulatory and development programmes for 
the benefit of the minority communities’.475 Carved out of existing functions within the 
Ministry of Human Resource Development and other departments, MoMA was 
launched as a nodal ministry with an overseeing role and a ministerial head with 
membership of Council of Ministers. 
 
 However, from the outset the reorganisation of existing administrative structures 
into MoMA was resented by senior administrators as duplicating existing services. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the location of MoMA among central ministries and 
commissions.476 It does not represent the actual lines of authority. It is clear from the 
evidence and fieldwork data presented in subsequent chapters that MoMA was viewed 
as a coordinating ministry rather than an autonomous ministry. Lacking the authority of 
functional ministries, and severely under-resourced, it soon became a ministry for 
advocacy, constantly seeking feedback from, and consultations with other ministries 
and relevant institutions within the administrative structure. Its ability to oversee 
programmes, as we shall see in Chapters Five and Six, was severely limited. In fact 
MoMA and its ministers struggled to fulfil the brief allotted to them, neglecting some of 
the essential parliamentary business. Eight years after its creation, MoMA has struggled 
to establish an authoritative presence within India’s central administration.
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Figure 4.1 
MoMA and organisational dependency: ministries and other structures 
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In contrast to these symbolic measures, executive authority was used to 
implement aspects of affirmative action short of reservation quotas. Thus, in January 
2007, the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (MPPGP) issued an 
Office Memorandum which stated: 
 
[A]vailable evidence indicates that the representation of minorities in 
Government service and public sector employment is not 
satisfactory…Government is committed to ensuring fair representation to 
the minorities in Government employment, including public sector 
enterprises, public sector banks and financial institutions and the 
Railways.477 
 
As a result, all heads of department, public sector undertakings and para-government 
organisations were required ‘to submit Half Yearly/Annual Reports…to Ministry of 
Ministry Affairs.’478  
 
The same approach was also used on 22nd December 2011, when a new Office 
Memorandum was issued establishing a reservation of 4.5 per cent for minorities in the 
OBC quota. Although this action, as we shall see below, was probably more a matter of 
symbolic implementation, the use of an Office Memorandum was indicative of the 
government’s intent to circumvent legal challenges.479  
 
 Substantive executive action was also evident in the case of affirmative action in 
the area of service delivery. The 15-Point Programme, first launched by Mrs Indira 
Gandhi in 1983, and aimed at areas of Muslim concentration, was revamped as the 
Prime Minister’s new 15-Point Programme in January 2006, with a particular focus on 
four areas: education, employment, living conditions and minorities’ security. This 
initiative drew on existing programmes but with the objective that ‘15 per cent of the 
total outlay was earmarked for minorities’.480 In 2007-8, MoMA identified 90 MCDs 
for their socio-economic backwardness for which the MSDP was launched in 2009 to 
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overcome the ‘“development deficit” specially in education, employment, sanitation, 
housing, drinking water and electricity supply’. 481  Significantly, the launch of this 
programme was accompanied by a range of affirmative action provisions that included 
targeting and monitoring of service delivery to ensure effective implementation. To 
what extent these instruments were actually utilised, however, or were effective in 
delivering change to the targeted group (mostly Muslim communities), is something 
that we discuss at length in Chapter Six.  
 
Symbolic implementation 
 
Alongside executive action many of UPA policies on minorities amounted to ‘symbolic 
implementation’ – that is appearing to act on policies but failing to ensure that they are 
legislated for or implemented. This is often viewed as ‘tokenism’, ‘gesture’ or 
‘performative politics’, but it can also be interpreted as framing policy within existing 
institutional constraints. 
 
The case of reservations for minorities in employment and education was firmly 
made by the RMCR. Yet, the UPA’s efforts to implement these recommendations, both 
in the first and second administration, in spite of the fact that RMCR had declared that 
new legislation was unnecessary, were clearly more symbolic than indicative of an 
ability to successfully implement the measure. For most of its tenure, the government 
hesitated to move on the proposal because of the pending appeal to the Supreme Court 
by the Andhra Pradesh state government which had sought to institute 4 per cent 
reservations for Muslims in employment.482 When the UPA did move, in late 2011, on 
the eve of elections in Uttar Pradesh, to institute a 4.5 per cent reservation for minorities 
in the existing OBC quota through an Office Memorandum, it was not only charged 
with opportunism, but accused of inadequate preparations to meet the potential legal 
challenges. Subsequently, as we shall see in Chapter Five, the UPA’s efforts and the 
Andhra Pradesh case became entwined: the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s rationale was 
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only too evident in the Supreme Court judgment rejecting the UPA’s Office 
Memorandum. 
 
Other policy measures that were part of symbolic implementation included the 
communal violence bills (2005 and 2011) and the introduction of a bill to give the NCM 
constitutional status. Both were high profile measures designed to increase the threshold 
of penalties for those committing acts of communal violence and putting the NCM on 
par with other ‘protected minorities’ commissions. Both, however, failed to reach the 
statute books, and were more aspirational rather than deliverable. Whereas the 
institutional obstacles to the Communal Violence Bill (2005 and 2011) still remain 
considerable (see Chapter Seven), the failure to secure constitutional status for the NCM 
needs to be understood both against the backdrop of institutional opposition from the 
key actors identified above, and the shortage of parliamentary time in a congested time-
table.483 
 
Promotional policies 
 
A large number of initiatives undertaken by the UPA can be interpreted as promotional, 
designed to improve the status or conditions of minority groups through ‘low cost’ 
options.484 These initiatives were specific, general and voluntary. They included: the 
vast majority of scholarship schemes targeted at minority students, better support for 
State Wakf Boards (Muslim charitable endowments), more funding for the Maulana 
Azad Educational Foundation (catering for Muslim students), the Scheme of Leadership 
Development of Minority Women, the Scheme for Skills Development of Minorities, 
and the Free Coaching and Allied Schemes.485 Such ‘underfunded and uncoordinated 
proposals’, comments Wilkinson, certainly helped the UPA to publicise the fact that it 
was ‘doing something for minorities’, but they were unlikely to challenge the 
underlying issues of economic and social development.486 Wilkinson’s assertion that 
these measures were part of ‘vote-bank’ politics reconfirms the standard interpretation 
of the UPA’s actions. It overlooks, however, how the administration was constrained 
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from specific action or a more detailed assessment of this action itself. Certainly the 
promotional policies – between executive action and symbolic implementation – 
enabled the UPA to directly appeal to the minorities, especially Muslims, but at the 
same time how these measures were framed and the resources allocated to them were 
also indicative of the institutional constraints within which the UPA was operating.  
 
Thus, overall, the process of implementation was far more complex than the 
electoral incentive model suggests: the broad range of policies resulted in a range of 
implementation strategies which were pursued with unequal vigour. Different 
approaches were used to address political, judicial and institutional constraints. Whilst 
the UPA was clearly mindful of the political pay-off in these strategies, we should not 
overlook the real obstacles to policy formation and implementation in this highly 
contested policy sector.  
 
 
Evaluation 
 
Finally, in making sense of the UPA policies on minorities we need to mention briefly 
the processes of evaluation – political, administrative, and analytical and technical – that 
were undertaken by the UPA. Although these evaluations were partisan, they give 
useful insights into the overall policy process and modes of opposition to the policies.  
 
 Politically, the UPA naturally sought to publicise its achievements. In the 2009 
Lok Sabha elections, for instance, the Congress’ manifesto highlighted the award of 
400,000 scholarships to minorities, special programmes for the 90 MCDs, and then 
went on to trumpet the fact that ‘the Indian National Congress has pioneered 
reservations for minorities in Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in government 
employment and education on the basis of their social and economic backwardness. We 
are committed to adopt this policy at the national level.’487 At a conclave in Jaipur in 
January 2013, the Congress recommitted itself to ‘the recommendations of the Sachar 
Committee’ as a guide to the implementation of ‘the PM’s 15PP and other minority 
related programmes’.488 While this statement betrays a degree of unfinished business, or 
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partial fulfilment of the SCR’s objectives, nonetheless, it is indicative of how the 
Congress and the UPA have politically sought to assess their own achievements.  
 
 Such political self-evaluations have generally been dismissed by activists and 
NGOs working in the field. Several (see Chapter Two) have produced highly critical 
assessments, questioning the very design and implementation of policies which, despite 
public declarations, remain to be assessed. According to press reports, the immediate 
trigger for the UPA to announce a new committee to evaluate the impact of the SCR 
recommendations was ‘another well-publicised research paper by the chief scholar at 
the US-India Policy Institute, Abusaleh Shariff in which he argued that there was no 
perceptible improvement in the status of Muslims’.489 Apparently this paper came on 
the back of several delegations by Muslims groups to the Prime Minister, Sonia Gandhi 
and Rahul Gandhi which made the point that ‘minority welfare schemes [were] being 
ineffective’. 490  These persistent criticisms by Muslim policy networks and NGOs 
exerted some political effect. In February 2013, the Minister of Minority Affairs, K. 
Rahman Khan, announced that the UPA government would appoint a ‘high-power 
committee to review and assess the implementation of Justice Rajinder Sachar 
Committee’ recommendations and Prime Minister’s 15-Point Programme’. 491  The 
committee was to be time-limited and include some leading experts who had 
participated in the policy-making process described above. The review committee on 
the SCR’s recommendations was set up in August 2013 and instructed to submit its 
report within six months. However, at the time of writing (August 2014), only an 
interim report had been submitted to MoMA (March 2014).492  
 
 Beyond the political, and the incomplete administrative evaluations, the UPA 
policies on minorities have yet to be comprehensively appraised. Technically, 
monitoring and evaluation, for example in the delivery of the 15-Point Programme, was 
built into the scheme. Monitoring data on employment of minorities should have been 
collected following the issue of the Office Memorandum in 2007. To what extent these 
data have been gathered, monitored and evaluated for better policy formation and 
implementation remains to be determined. Evidently, as we shall demonstrate in 
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Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, the use of policy instruments to collect such data to 
inform policy evaluation appears to have been highly inconsistent. Furthermore, there is 
very little evidence that such data have been made available to policy groups, activists, 
parliamentarians, or generally placed within the public domain in a systematic form. 
The few case studies that have been undertaken portray weak policy design and 
implementation as well as gross misuse of targeted funds.493  Thus, technically and 
analytically, the process of evaluation remains yet to be undertaken. Analytically, the 
use, non-use and denial of data on some of these policy areas by government officials 
and politicians indirectly raise basic questions about the policy process that need to be 
addressed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the UPA policy process on 
minorities. It demonstrates that the policy process conformed to the ‘policy cycle’ 
outlined in Chapter Two (see Figure 2.1), but the lines of demarcation between the 
stages, for instance, between decision-making and implementation, were sometimes 
unclear and often fused. Between 2004 and 2007, there was a significant momentum 
behind policy change that suggested a wholesale revision of the foundational settlement 
through a new framework of equality of opportunity for minorities which included a 
mixture of affirmative action, reservations and new institutional innovations. These 
measures, furthermore, were designed to promote diversity and combat discrimination 
in the public sphere. Taken together, these proposals represented a new contestational 
juncture which held the promise of bringing religious minorities within the framework 
of protective equality and delivering substantive equality. 
 
 However, between 2007 and 2008 political and institutional factors appear to 
have undermined this momentum. The UPA, which was besieged on a number of fronts 
− and withstood a vote of confidence on the nuclear energy deal with the US − saw the 
desertion of some of its supporters, including the Left parties. At the same time, it began 
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to encounter significant opposition to the proposals from the three main institutionalised 
forces: the BJP-led Hindutva brotherhood, the political lobby of SCs, STs and OBCs 
who viewed the proposals as a potential erosion of their protected equalities framework, 
and sections within the state structure, principally the civil service and the judiciary. In 
the face of this determined opposition, the government resorted to three strategies: 
executive action, symbolic implementation, and the use of promotional policies. Not 
unexpectedly, these approaches heavily diluted the prospects of major policy change 
while the administration attempted to maximise the political returns from its efforts. 
How this policy process worked in the sectors of employment, service delivery and 
security for minorities is examined in detail in case studies in the next three chapters.  
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Chapter Five  
UPA, Muslims and public sector employment 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Equitable representation of racial, ethnic, religious and other minorities in public sector 
employment is recognised as a key outcome of substantive equal opportunities policies. 
Such policies increase the access of previously excluded or under-represented groups to 
public sector employment and can be transformative in challenging cultures of 
exclusion.494 In India, the Constitution specified the percentage of reservations in the 
public sector for SCs and STs (15 per cent, 7.5 per cent respectively) since 1982; they 
were extended nationally for OBCs in 1990. These measures are generally viewed as 
having contributed to significant improvement in the life chances of some of these 
groups. Recognising this fact, and the gross under-representation of Muslims in public 
sector employment, the SCR called for ‘equity and inclusiveness’ in areas of 
‘education’ and ‘employment’,495 a recommendation supported by the RMCR. 
  
 This chapter undertakes a detailed case study of Muslims employment in central 
government during the UPA government. Drawing on the framework of institutional 
policy analysis, it explores the key decisions made by the policy actors, the policy 
formulation process in Parliament and at the executive level, and the debate around 
reservations for minorities. It also assesses the utility of employment monitoring data 
provided by the government – a crucial resource for better progress towards fairer 
representation. The policy process, and the limited monitoring data so far available, 
suggests that no appreciable inroads have been made in the improvement of 
employment of Muslims in the state sector. This outcome, it is argued, is not only the 
result of lack of political will on the part of the UPA, but also the product of entrenched 
institutional factors that have thwarted such change. 
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Agenda-setting 
 
Both the SCR and RMCR − as well as previous surveys − acknowledge the gross under-
representation of Muslims in public sector employment.496 This under-representation 
was at all levels, but particularly striking in some of the large public sector 
undertakings. Nor was the picture noticeably different in the states: whilst the states in 
the south generally tended to have higher levels of representation than those in the 
north, nowhere (with the exception of Andhra Pradesh) did it match the actual Muslim 
population in the state. The highest percentage of Muslims in government jobs was in 
Assam (11.2 per cent), but still significantly below the community’s population in the 
state (30.9 per cent).497 Data provided by SCR also demonstrated that one category of 
Muslims included in reservation policies, the Muslim OBCs, was also significantly 
under-represented, and performed poorly compared to Hindu OBCs or the Muslim 
general category. ‘The relative deprivation of Muslim OBCs’, observes the SCR, ‘is 
highest in the railways.’498  
 
  Conceptually, the SCR and RMCR proposed different policy approaches to this 
imbalance. Whereas the former was inclined towards positive action, 499  the latter 
recommended affirmative action, including reservations for poor Muslims in 
employment and education. 
 
 The SCR acknowledged that there was a case for bringing very poor Muslims, 
who were ‘cumulatively oppressed’, within the Indian reservations system.500 However, 
in general it ‘did not believe in reservations’, because they would ‘benefit only a small 
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number of people’.501 Reservations, as one senior member of the Committee admitted in 
an interview, only contributed to ‘individual gain, not public good’.502 For him positive 
actions, which contributed to realising the principle of ‘proportionality’ and broad-based 
policies, were far more effective in getting ‘Muslims into public sector jobs’.503 Indeed, 
even Justice Rajinder Sachar appeared unsympathetic to the idea of reservations: when 
interviewed he avoided direct comments, declaring ‘I don’t know about the legality part. 
We already have reservation for OBCs and others. Whether the Constitution permits 
this or not, that is a matter for the Supreme Court to give the final verdict.’504 This 
mind-set, the terms and reference of SCR, and the fact that the RMCR was undertaking 
its work with specific reference to the question of reservations – all made the 
Committee reluctant to recommend reservations, for fear that in the absence of a 
constitutional amendment, reservations ran the risk of being challenged in the courts. 
Conversely, generic recommendations for all minorities would not attract any legal 
challenge. 
 
 As a result, the SCR recommendations were couched mainly within the 
framework of positive action: a more transparent system of recruitment by including 
minorities in selection committees; 505  advertising posts in Urdu and vernacular 
newspapers, or including statements in job advertisements that ‘women, minority, and 
backward class candidates are encouraged to apply’;506 strong emphasis on improving 
the educational attainment of Muslim students;507 and a raft of monitoring authorities, 
including the creation of a National Data Bank for data on SRCs, and the formation of 
an Assessment and Monitoring Authority that would monitor and review data on 
religious minorities, including employment data.508 And, as we have seen in Chapter 
Four, these proposals were also accompanied by a shift in emphasis from ‘non-
discrimination’ to ‘anti-discrimination’, including a proposal to outlaw direct and 
indirect discrimination and an EOC and a DI that would measure diversity in 
employment, public and private sectors, and housing.  
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Critics of the SCR found a serious disjunction between its analysis and its 
recommendations. Whilst welcoming some of the recommendations, such as the 
creation of the EOC and DI, for Hasan neither of these proposals dealt ‘specifically with 
the problems of under-representation of Muslims [in public sector employment]’.509 
Where radical and transformative measures were required, the Committee’s 
recommendations were tentative and conservative. 510  Its proposals, moreover, give 
further leeway to policymakers to use their discretion both in interpretation of 
recommendations and formulation of policy.511 In brief, positive action was framed in 
terms of the needs of ‘all minorities’.  
 
In contrast, the recommendations of RMCR for reservation for socially and 
economically disadvantaged Muslims in public sector employment were unambiguous. 
As the report concluded: 
 
Since the minorities – especially the Muslims − are very much under-
represented, and sometime wholly unrepresented, in government 
employment, we recommend that they should be regarded as backward in 
this respect within the meaning of that term as used in Article 16 (4) of 
the Constitution – notably without qualifying the word ‘backward’ with 
the word “socially and educationally” – and that 15 per cent of posts in 
all cadres and grades under the Central and State governments should be 
earmarked for [minorities].512 
 
Of this 15 per cent, the Commission insisted, 10 per cent should be earmarked for 
Muslims, who constitute 73 per cent of all minorities, and 5 per cent for other 
minorities.513 This recommendation, according to the Commission, was consistent with 
Article 16 (4) of the Constitution which sanctioned reservations for SC, STs and OBCs. 
Adding a rider, the Commission suggested that if this approach proved difficult, then 
within the 27 per cent OBC quota, 8.4 per cent should be reserved for religious 
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minorities, with 6 per cent earmarked for Muslims and 2.4 per cent for non-Muslims.514 
In short, in a fundamental departure from the conventional understanding of the subject 
the RMCR insisted that reservations for ‘backward’ Muslims were not only within the 
remit of existing constitutional provisions, but were also necessary and essential to 
establish a level playing field among all minorities and to end religious 
discrimination.515 
 
 To summarise: the SCR and RMCR offered different policy alternatives for 
increasing Muslim employment in the public sector. Whereas the former was largely 
within the framework of positive action, consistent with the constitutional settlement 
that reservations for minorities qua minorities were unconstitutional, the latter held that 
the accepted understandings of the constitutional norms were ‘discriminatory’ and 
‘exclusionary’. This anomaly could be overcome by bringing Christians and Muslims 
within the existing regime of reservations. As we shall see below, the UPA attempted to 
implement both of these approaches. 
 
 
Policy formulation  
 
As noted previously, the stages in the policy process often overlapped. Whereas the 
SCR, despite political differences, was largely accepted by the government, and its 
implementation pursued through executive action, the RMCR, because of its 
recommendations, was less clearly identified with a distinctive policy process. 
 
Sachar Committee Report (SCR)  
 
Following its publication, the government gave the SCR full support. A.R. Antulay, the 
Minister of Minority Affairs, announced in the Rajya Sabha that the ‘Sachar 
Committee’s recommendations will be implemented’.516 Crucially, the initiatives taken 
centred primarily on executive action. The PM’s 15PP,517  for instance, launched in 
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January 2007, required all ministries and departments to implement and monitor the 
schemes, including employment, and provide MoMA with monthly and quarterly 
reports. 518  The MPPGP further directed all heads of departments, public sector 
enterprises, public sector banks, financial institutions, quasi-government organisations 
and autonomous bodies, and all appointing authorities, to include at least one minority 
member in all selection committees/boards for recruitments to Group C and D posts. 
The guidelines also stated that for Group C and D posts information about the vacancies 
should be disseminated through schools or colleges in relevant areas. Furthermore, all 
ministries and government departments were required to submit half-yearly and annual 
reports on the recruitment of minorities to MoMA. In committing firmly itself to 
substantive positive action, an Office Memorandum of January 2007 boldly declared 
that ‘the Central and State Governments will give special consideration to minorities in 
appointments’.519 These guidelines were followed up by MoMA520 in drawing attention 
to the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT)’s instructions that ‘all 
Ministries/Departments and state governments …[should ensure the] representation of 
minority community in selection committee/board for making recruitment to 10 or more 
vacancies in group “C” & “D” posts/services’.521 
 
Ranganath Misra Commission Report (RMCR): the parliamentary and executive 
domains  
 
 
Unlike the SCR, the RMCR and its recommendations on reservations in employment 
for minorities, particularly Muslims, became embroiled in political, parliamentary, 
executive and judicial quagmires. Initial opposition to the report, including within 
Congress, led the Congress-dominated UPA to adopt an institutionally conservative 
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position until the eve of elections in Uttar Pradesh in early 2012. In so doing, this both 
reflected the complex institutionalised opposition to the proposal within the policy-
making subsystems and the party’s desire to exploit the report for political advantage by 
partaking in ‘symbolic implementation’. Congress’ efforts to push through the Andhra 
Pradesh model of reservations for Muslims in employment and education, as we shall 
see below, ultimately faltered on the rock of institutional opposition.  
 
Parliamentary domain 
 
We have seen how the Congress and the UPA backtracked from reservations for 
Muslims after the release of the SCR. Following the well-publicised leak of the RMCR 
(after it was finally submitted in May 2007), the pressure on the government to distance 
itself from its recommendations further intensified. The BJP’s national spokesperson, 
Ravi Shankar Prasad, denounced the recommendations as ‘communal banking’, and 
asserted that opening the SC and ST quota to Muslims would further divide the 
country.522  However, in December 2007 in the Lok Sabha, Deventra Prasad Yadav 
(Rashtriya Janata Dal - RJD) urged an early implementation of the recommendations, 
lamenting the fact that despite the submission of the report, the Cabinet had not given a 
clear direction as to whether its recommendations would to be incorporated into the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan.523 There was no follow-up discussion, and the government 
studiously avoided further parliamentary discussion. Hence, when Mulayam Singh 
Yadav (SP), urged the government to lay the report before Parliament, he was 
frequently interrupted by the Speaker for not giving prior notice of the matter. Despite 
Basu Deb Acharia (CPI (M))’s support, the Speaker prevented Yadav from raising 
discussion of the subject.524 Surprisingly, nor was the matter of the report raised in 
Parliament by Muslim MPs. The absence of a well-organised Muslim – or minority – 
MPs’ caucus, as we shall see, was to prove important.525 
 
                                                      
522
 ‘BJP for Rejecting Ranganath Misra Report on Dalit Converts’, Indian Express, 23 May 2007 
(electronic edition).  
523
 LSD, 1 December 2007.  
524
 LSD, 9 December 2009. 
525
 The successful implementation of equal opportunities policies requires a committed lobby of 
politicians, administrators and civil society activists. The decline of Muslim representation in Parliament 
was noted by SCR, and has been identified as a critical (missing) variable in explaining the failure of 
policy on minorities. See Zoya Hasan, Politics of Inclusion: Castes, Minorities, and Affirmative Action 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), Ch.5.  
143 
 
 Significantly, from May 2007 to August 2014, there was no notable debate in 
Parliament on policy-making on the subject, and nor was the issue raised by Congress 
MPs. Historically, we have seen how Congress has followed a fine path between 
championing minorities whilst also nursing its Hindu majority constituency. These 
tensions surfaced as the government came ‘under pressure from its own MPs and 
ministers…not to concede the demand of inclusion of Dalit Christians and Dalit 
Muslims in the SC list’.526 Allegedly, one of the reasons proffered for this resistance 
was the negative impact of such a proposal on Hindu SCs by lowering the cost of 
conversion to Islam or Christianity.527 The UPA’s ambivalence on policy discussion is 
captured in the words of Mahmood: ‘The RMCR was never discussed in Parliament; it 
was discussed outside Parliament.’528  
 
Executive domain 
 
At the executive level, the inner tensions between the various policy actors and 
subsystems can be seen in how they responded to the RMCR’s recommendations. On 
the eve of state elections in Uttar Pradesh in 2012, the government issued a special 
Office Memorandum providing a 4.5 per cent sub-quota for Muslims in the OBC’s 27 
per cent quota. The initiative for the Office Memorandum came not from the relevant 
ministries but the PMO. Given this, what was the role of MoMA, the MSJE, and the 
DoPT and the MPPGP in policy formation (see Figure 4.1 for an organisational map of 
these ministries)? 
 
  In March 2010, the Minister of Human Resource Development, Arjun Singh, 
urged the government to act on the RMCR, saying ‘we cannot just sleep over it’.529 
Responding to Singh’s remark, Abhishek Singhvi, a senior Congress MP, replied that ‘it 
is this party and the government which had initiated the process. So there is no question 
of disowning [it]. There is no question of sleeping over it.’530 Despite this statement, 
MoMA remained silent on the matter until July 2010. Then Salman Khurshid stated that 
‘we are actively looking at the reservation issue. We have a commitment in our 
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manifesto. I am pushing for it all the time.’531  He emphasised that MoMA was in 
regular touch with the MSJE. 532  However, the nature of this cooperation remains 
unclear because as the guardian of SC, ST and OBC interests, the MSJE appeared 
reluctant to initiate inter-governmental consultations and seemed unenthusiastic about 
adoption of the RMCR report because quotas for minorities posed a potential threat to 
SCs, STs and OBCs. Thus, it requested the NCSC to give feedback on the 
recommendations of the RMCR.533 In response, the NCSC agreed to extend reservation 
to Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims, but without disturbing its share of 15 per cent of 
SCs and without breaching the overall reservation of 50 per cent. 534  The MSJE, 
allegedly, also consulted the NCBC to firm up this opposition.535 The NCBC, perhaps 
because of the expected backlash from the OBCs for diluting their quota with Dalit 
Muslims and Dalit Christians, initially remained non-committal. 536  Whilst these 
manoeuvres were undoubtedly part of the wider consultation process, nonetheless, they 
highlighted the highly institutionalised resistance to change from among the state actors 
managing the administration of SCs, STs and OBCs provisions. Indeed, the MSJE, 
notwithstanding its considerable experience in policy formation in the subject, remained 
reluctant to lead on the matter. 
 
 Perhaps because of the sensitivities around the subject, or because of the 
reluctance to openly oppose the claims of poor religious minorities, the annual reports 
and official documents of the institutionalised caste lobbies – NCSC, NCST, NCBC – 
are largely devoid of any serious debate on the matter; 537  and the NCM’s reports 
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provide only fragmentary comments on the policy process. 538  However, the one 
exception to the rule is the NCBC Annual Report for 2010-11. This report provides a 
damning critique of the RMCR and questions the Commission’s competence to make 
the recommendations that it did.539 It challenged the proposal that religious minorities, 
especially Muslims, be brought into the net of reservations as an effort to ‘rewrite 
Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India’. 540  Reconfirming caste as the primary 
signifier of backwardness, the NCBC rejected the RMCR’s contention that 
backwardness be defined primarily with reference to a uniform criterion in which caste 
and religion are neutral. Indeed, in reconfirming the principles of the constitutional 
settlement, the NCBC asserted that: 
 
Uniform criteria cannot be evolved for the reason that different 
considerations come into play in determining the social backwardness 
among SCs/STs and OBCs. SCs are those who suffered the indignity of 
“untouchability”. Large sections of STs are far removed from civilisation. 
OBCs suffer from social backwardness.541 
 
For the NCBC, the essential signifier of backwardness was the ‘social inequality’ 
arising from caste that has been established in last three millennia.542 In rejecting in total 
the RMCR recommendations, the NCBC annual report justified its response in drawing 
on the constitutional settlement, its affirmation in the Indra Sawhney case, and tellingly, 
the dissenting note of Asha Das to the RMCR which rejected the deletion of ‘religion’ 
from The Constitution (SC) Order of 1950 (see Chapter Four).543 
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 The NCBC statement is remarkable not only as a defence of an institutionalised 
caste lobby’s interests but because of its opposition to a contemporary concept of social 
justice for all. The idea of ‘different considerations’ underpinning ‘competing 
equalities’ which the NCBC supported was , in many ways, at the heart of historical 
path dependence that had solidified around socio-economically disadvantaged castes. 
Indeed, the NCBC reacted with hostility to the RMCR’s suggestion that SCs, STs and 
OBCs had developed a ‘vested interests’ in ‘backwardness’ in the ever-increasing list of 
these categories that were included in reservations. Such an observation, the NCBC 
pithily observed, was ‘a sweeping criticism lacking in particulars and without any 
objectively verifiable data’.544 
 
  The DoPT (in the MPPGP), another important actor in employment policy, was 
even less visible in this process. On 10th August 2011, the Minister of Personnel, Public 
Grievances and Pensions stated in the Lok Sabha that the reservation for minorities in 
central and state governments was under consideration, but that it was not possible to 
fix a time for taking a decision. 545  Yet, apart from this statement, the MPPGP 
deliberately remained in the background, not because it was unfamiliar with the policy-
making process on the subject, but because its efforts appeared to be directed at 
protecting the interests of SCs, STs and OBCs.546 Until the DoPT circulated the Office 
Memorandum, the MPPGP avoided making official announcements or giving a lead on 
policy options. 
 
During this process MoMA also avoided clearly stating its position on the 
matter. Only a few months before the Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly elections in 
2012, the PMO asked MoMA to draft a formal proposal for job quotas for Muslims 
within the OBC sub-quota for consideration by the Cabinet Committee on Political 
Affairs.547 MoMA’s public position at the time was that it wanted 8.4 per cent of the 
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OBC quota for minorities,548 but it was reluctant to lead on the matter because of its 
cautious nature and because employment fell under the jurisdiction of the MPPGP. 
Furthermore, any such change required an amendment to the central OBC list, 
necessitating consultations with the MSJE. Given these powerful institutional players, 
MoMA’s ability to lead and coordinate was heavily compromised. Salman Khurshid 
had admitted that his ministry had evolved into a ‘letter-writing ministry’, constantly 
seeking feedback from and consultation with the other ministries and relevant 
institutions. 549  Khurshid’s successor, K. Rahman Khan, also pointed out that the 
fractured system on minority issues hinders MoMA from developing and implementing 
policy.550  
 
Although these structural constraints certainly impacted on the work of MoMA, 
the ministers in-charge failed to build a momentum for the policy. Meetings of the 
Consultative Committee on Minority Affairs in Parliament, for instance, were limited: 
there was no meeting in 2008-9,551 a sole meeting in 2009-10,552 a relative flurry of 
activity in 2010-11 when the Committee convened on four occasions,553 a halving of the 
frequency of meetings in 2011-12,554 and a final outburst of enthusiasm in 2012-13, 
when four meetings took place.555 Some of these meetings, for example in 2009-10 and 
2010-11, were held in conjunction with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Employment 
was not on the agenda. Rather, they focused on the MSDP and scholarship schemes.556 
While it is possible that the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs did attempt to allocate 
time to MoMA, or that the minority issue was sidelined because of pressing 
parliamentary business, MoMA itself expended little effort to increase the frequency of 
meeting of the Consultative Committee on Minority Affairs, or explore other options by 
holding cross-party forums in which MPs, ministers, and senior government officers 
could discuss policy formulation and implementation. It appears in the absence of a 
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strong lead from MoMA, the government ultimately opted for a lower percentage of 
reservations for minorities at 4.5 per cent of the OBC quota.  
 
The policy-making process in the final stages still remains obscure. On 7th 
December 2011, it was noted in the Rajya Sabha that the percentage of quota for 
minorities was still ‘in the domain of inter-ministerial consultations’.557 However, the 
speed with which the policy was formulated, and without a parliamentary debate, 
indicates that whatever inter-ministerial policy consultation took place they were 
cursory. The decision was contrary to MoMA’s earlier stand of 8.4 per cent, and 
allegedly more in line with the findings of the Mandal Commission than RMCR.558 This 
drastic reduction was both a reflection of the serious political opposition to such a 
proposal and the UPA’s desire to pursue ‘symbolic implementation’ in the face of 
powerful institutionalised resistance from SC, ST and OBC interests.  
 
 
Decision-making  
 
On 22nd December 2011, the UPA government circulated an Office Memorandum to all 
ministries and departments stating that with effect from 1st January 2012 the existing 27 
per cent quota for OBCs would have a sub-quota of 4.5 per cent for SEBCs belonging to 
minorities, as defined in Section 2 (c) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 
1992.559 Announced on the eve of the Uttar Pradesh assembly polls, the decision was 
universally derided. The BJP called it a ‘dangerous political game’, and the CPI (M) 
and SP condemned it as ‘most inadequate’ and ‘tokenism’.560 Since 35 Muslim groups 
in the OBC category were already entitled to reservations, amounting to 2-3 per cent 
under the 27 per cent OBC quota, the creation of a 4.5 per cent sub-quota for ‘all 
minorities’ replacing this existing entitlement potentially threatened to undermine the 
existing provision for Muslims because other SEBCs belonging to minorities, especially 
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Christians and Sikhs, educationally outperformed Muslims. In its haste to exploit the 
announcement for political advantage, the irony of this outcome was lost on the UPA.  
 
  The Muslim community itself was divided over the issue. While some activists 
supported the move, others, particularly those in states in the south, where Muslims 
have been included in OBC category since the pre-Mandal period, expressed 
exasperation at the centre’s decision and held that the most privileged among the 
community, ‘the creamy layer’, would benefit.561 Asaddudin Owaisi, President of the 
All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, and MP from Hyderabad, maintained that the 
move was in the right direction towards more specific quotas for Muslims.562 Similarly, 
Zoya Hasan, a leading academic and policymaker, argued that the institutional bias, 
institutional discrimination and institutional prejudice against Muslims in India made 
reservation necessary, and the government decision gave Muslims a better option, 
despite the very small percentage.563 A leading Muslim member of the NCM, however, 
was less sympathetic: he was in favour of de-linking SC status from a narrow definition 
of Hindu socially disadvantaged castes, so that poor Christians and Muslims could be 
brought under the category, but considered the UPA’s effort too little to effectively 
address Muslim under-representation in government employment. While it is right to 
include poor Christians and Muslims in the definition of SCs and STs, he insisted, as 
caste discrimination was rooted in tradition, not religion, the real issue was the 
exclusion of a large number of backward Muslims from the OBCs list. There was, in 
short, a need for a comprehensive and systematic restructuring of the Muslim OBC 
list.564  
 
However, the government plan soon faced opposition from the Election 
Commission for violating its Code of Conduct. The Commission directed that the sub-
quota should not be implemented in poll-bound states (Goa, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Uttar 
Pradesh, and Manipur) until after the elections.565 Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court struck down the reservation in government jobs on the grounds that it had 
been carved out in a ‘casual manner’, and that an Office Memorandum based on 
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religious lines was not an ‘intelligible consideration’.566 The Court held that the central 
government had violated articles 15 (1) and 16 (2) of the Constitution and failed to 
prove that religious minorities are homogeneous or more backward, hence deserving of 
‘special treatment’. 567  In response, the government filed an appeal to the Supreme 
Court, but this was rejected on three counts: that the Office Memorandum issued by 
central government had no legal support; that the government had failed to produce data 
to back up its decision; and that no policy consultation had been conducted with 
relevant statutory bodies such as the NCBC and NCM.568  
 
The Supreme Court requested the government to submit relevant supporting 
documents to explain how it had reached the figure of 4.5 per cent. These documents, 
including the SCR, extracts of the RMCR, and the Mandal Commission Report, were 
submitted in response. However, despite the Attorney General’s assertion that the 4.5 
per cent sub-quota was based on the calculations of the Mandal Commission Report, the 
Supreme Court refused to stay the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s order. The wording in 
the Office Memorandum, ‘4.5 per cent sub-quota for socially and educationally 
backward communities belonging to religious minorities’, was interpreted as violating 
the Constitution by making religion the basis of classification. In spite of Khurshid’s 
argument that the sub-quota was based on the backwardness of a minority group, not on 
religion,569 and the Solicitor General’s efforts to suggest that the sub-quota was not for 
all religious minorities but aimed at the lowest ranks of Christian or Muslim converts,570 
the Supreme Court rejected that stand on the grounds that it was still difficult to prove 
‘this particular population is poorer than the rest of the OBCs’.571  
 
In the interviews conducted during fieldwork, some leading office holders 
suggested that the government intentionally fielded inadequate counsel in its defence.572 
While this charge is difficult to prove, its post-verdict statements appeared to confirm 
the belief that the government was resigned to the outcome. Three months later, 
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Khurshid was still expressing optimism that ‘when the constitutional bench [of the 
Supreme Court] takes it [the case] over, I am very hopeful that we will get some 
relief’.573 In October 2012, following a Cabinet reshuffle, Khurshid was replaced by K. 
Rahman Khan at MoMA. On taking office, the new Minister reaffirmed his 
commitment to the 4.5 per cent sub-quota, and referred to the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court’s judgment as a ‘misunderstanding’. ‘The court’, he insisted, ‘has not rejected the 
quota… [it] has only said that the procedure adopted to ascertain backwardness is not 
satisfactory’.574 Insisting that reservation is a ‘constitutional right’, he also affirmed 
support for the inclusion of Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims in the SC category, but 
admitted that ‘the government has left it to the court to decide…So let us wait for the 
Supreme Court order.’575  
 
Post-judicial intervention 
 
Judicial intervention, both by the Supreme Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court, 
confirmed the conventional view that the judiciary was inclined to take a conservative 
interpretation of any new proposals that challenged the constitutional settlement.576 
UPA’s efforts to apply the ‘Andhra Pradesh model’ were unable – both in Andhra 
Pradesh and nationally − to overcome institutionalised opposition to reservations for 
minorities.577 At the same time, that the UPA government appeared to be engaged in 
‘symbolic implementation’ is confirmed by a former senior member of the RMCR who 
recalled: 
 
We submitted our report in May 2007, and nearly 6 years later, in fact 2 
days ago (18th February 2013), I received a phone call from the former 
deputy secretary of the commission. He phoned me and said, ‘Sir, we 
have met the Minister of Minority Affairs and he wants some clarification 
of our report’. Six years after, the new Minister of Minority Affairs (K. 
Rahman Khan) is seeking clarification about the report on what ground 
the recommendation of this report was made! I was very upset and 
furious. I said: ‘Where was the Minister of Minority Affairs sleeping all 
these days? Justice Ranganath Misra is dead, he is not available, Anil 
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Wilson, who was an education member, is also dead. If he really wanted 
to seek the clarification, the minister could have called me or Mohinder 
Singh. Why should I reply to you?’. Look what is happening. Six year 
after, they are asking me for clarification about the report. So they have 
no intention of taking any action on it. They are just beating about the 
bush.578 
 
The UPA government showed a certain degree of passivity in allowing the Supreme 
Court verdict to block further movement on reservation for minorities. While the 
Supreme Court judgment clearly invalidated the RMCR suggestion that a constitutional 
amendment was unnecessary for such reservation, the UPA failed to build upon the 
creative proposals in RMCR or create a climate in which a constitutional amendment, or 
Supreme Court reversal of its decisions, could have succeeded.  
 
Minister K. Rahman Khan insisted that constitutional change was a necessary 
requirement for progress on reservation. As he stated in an interview: 
 
My opinion on the RMCR is that it is difficult to implement. In the 
present constitutional mechanism it is not possible. The report 
recommended 10 per cent for all and 5 per cent for particular backward 
people.... Now the Supreme Court verdict is that reservation should not 
be more than 50 per cent. How do you compromise this? We cannot 
implement this because of Constitution. We are not in the position to 
amend the Constitution because we don’t have majority. What is 
recommended should happen but if government has to adopt it… it is not 
necessary that all the recommendations should be implemented.579 
 
This skilful blame displacement was also apparent in the Lok Sabha on 22nd November 
2012 in response to Shiv Sena and BJP interventions about the 4.5 per cent ruling.580 
Khan declined to comment directly, stating only that the ‘Supreme Court observed that 
since similar issues were pending consideration before the Constitutional Bench, the 
matters concerning the 4.5 per cent reservation for minorities be tagged along with those 
matters. The matter is presently sub-judice.’581 In March 2013, at a National Editors’ 
Conference, Khan again sought to strike an optimistic note, referring to the Karnataka 
and Kerala quota system and claiming that the government was ‘trying to expedite the 
matter’.582 And in June 2013, at a conference in Jaipur on the SCR, both Khurshid and 
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Khan expressed their desire to ensure the provision of the 4.5 per cent sub-quota for 
Muslims. Khan stated that the central government was willing to put it before the 
Supreme Court, while Khurshid added that ‘[the government] will try to convince the 
Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court that the sub-quota is not religion-based, but 
is on the basis of backwardness’, and ‘reservation is not granted to a particular caste, but 
if all people of that particular caste are backward, they can be granted reservation’.583 
According to Khan’s most recent statement, the Congress is still:  
 
Committed to what we had promised in our party manifesto about 
reservation to backward among Muslims. We are confident that 4.5 sub-
quota for backward Muslims will see the light of the day. We are trying 
that the case comes up for an early hearing in the Supreme Court. Talks 
are on with Attorney General. We are hopeful that it will happen soon.584  
 
As of August 2014, the case is still pending. The UPA government, before its demise in 
May 2014, failed to take any action either to pursue the matter in the Supreme Court or 
explore alternative avenues to resolve the issue.  
 
 
Implementation and evaluation 
 
We have discussed at length the issue of reservations for minorities, especially 
Muslims, to demonstrate the institutionalised opposition to the proposal within the 
policy process − opposition which has delayed the implementation of the measure. In 
contrast, affirmative action provisions suggested by the SCR faced fewer legal 
challenges, and some of the measures taken under executive action, such as monitoring 
and targeting, were ‘substantive’ rather than ‘symbolic’. In this section we discuss the 
issues related to public access to data on minorities, particularly Muslim employment in 
the public sector. We then review the data provided by MoMA on its websites to 
examine patterns of change in central ministries and departments between 2006 and 
2013. Finally, we reflect on the positive action taken by the Minister of Railways, 
Mamata Banerjee in West Bengal between 2009 and 2011.  
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Data on Muslims in central government employment: public access and denial 
 
Most of the affirmative action programmes launched in pursuit of SCR’s 
recommendations were framed with monitoring mechanisms. Despite these publicly 
declared policy instruments, systematic collection, publication and use of monitoring 
data on employment have yet to become routine features of policy.585 Furthermore, 
MoMA, the DoPT, and the Planning Commission (the report of the steering committee 
on empowering minorities, Eleventh Five-Year Plan report, Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
report), have not clarified whether minority members have been included in selection 
committees, whether there has been any improvement in the proportion of minorities in 
Group C and D posts, in which ministries and departments the proportion has increased, 
decreased or remained the same, the reasons for such variations, or how the monitoring 
system has been used. As Khan acknowledged, monitoring of data on employment is 
yet to become a priority: 
 
The problem is that the monitoring is left to a certain committee which 
has no time to look into it. At the state level, the Chief Secretary is the 
chairman of monitoring committee. They have no time, they have no 
interest. They already have their own work. Monitoring is extra work. So 
they may monitor and they may not.586 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, given this haphazard process of policy formation and 
implementation, these processes have yet to become routinised if not fully accepted 
within the civil service.  
 
 These shortcomings were also demonstrated during fieldwork. Most respondents 
were unaware of such data; some believed that the data might have been collected but 
was not generated into a computable form because of its potential political 
ramifications.587 In an interview with Minister Khan at his residence, it was disclosed 
that time-series data on employment of Muslims does exist, and that the proportion of 
Muslims in government employment has increased.588 However, he failed to keep the 
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subsequent appointment at which he had promised to provide these data.589 Instead, his 
private secretary directed me to the MoMA website which carries general − and not 
Muslim, or any other community specific − data on minorities in central government 
employment. In the absence of Muslim-specific data, we have focused our analysis on 
the MoMA website data. Such an exercise is clearly limited but, nonetheless, highlights 
how this data is distorted, misrepresented and, and at times, deliberately concealed from 
the public. It also illustrates some general trends of the representation of minorities 
within ministries, departments and public sector undertakings.  
 
Since most ministries and departments failed to submit figures on the 
employment status of minorities every year from 2006 to 2013, or even at regular 
intervals, the MoMA data is not sequential. This raises a number of questions: Does 
non-presentation of data in a particular year mean there was no recruitment that year? 
Does the information exist, but has not been generated into presentable format? Did 
recruitment take place, but because minorities were not employed the relevant ministries 
and departments withheld the data? And was the data submitted, but MoMA 
deliberately avoided including ministries and departments with low recruitment of 
minorities in the data sheet? Whilst it was not possible to get further confirmation of 
these concerns from the Minister, or other key informants, the unsystematic way in 
which the information has been presented suggests such considerations required further 
investigation. 
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More worryingly, however, the data provided by ministries and departments is 
frequently incomplete. Each year’s data specifies the total number of persons recruited 
and the number of minorities employed. Clearly, the total number of persons employed 
should be greater than the number of minorities employed. However, in some cases, 
ministries and departments have submitted data which claims that the number of 
minorities employed exceeds the total. Furthermore, what ought to be simple 
calculations are often incorrect. Taking ministries at random and checking whether the 
sum of the total number of people employed in Groups A, B, C, and D matches with the 
total number presented by the government reveals several inaccuracies. Such 
misrepresentation might have originated from the original figure submitted by the 
ministry or department, or with the official who worked on generating the data sheet, 
but the failure to verify or cross-check these figures before placing them in the public 
domain appears surprising.590  
 
These errors were also compounded by technical mistakes: in the data for 2007-
08, for instance, the first row of the first page of the data sheet is half missing, because 
the sheet was unskillfully uploaded onto the MoMA website. Fortunately, as the first 
row includes the names of ministries and departments, it is still recognisable. But this 
error is repeated in the final page of the 2007-08 data sheet, where the last row is 
missing, so that it is not possible to see the number of minorities recruited. Had the 
ministries and departments monitored the summative data file to check whether their 
own employment data was correctly presented, these mistakes could have been easily 
corrected. If this is an indication of deliberate data distortion and evasion, then once 
again questions arise as to whether minorities were recruited in the ministries and 
departments included in this page, or whether other considerations came into play in not 
reporting the numbers. Remarkably, neither the Muslim NGOs active in this policy area, 
nor the Muslim MPs have noticed these glaring errors − an indication not only of the 
weak monitoring regime but the lack of development of an organised lobby 
campaigning for such change.591  
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Finally, MoMA’s data sheet for 2006-13 states ‘minority persons employed 
during the year’, without defining ‘minority’- Buddhists, Christians, Jains, Muslims, 
Sikhs, and Parsis, and whether or not they were recruited through the reservations. 
Whilst the proportion of Christians and Muslims entitled to reservations is relatively 
small (via the OBC route), Buddhists and Sikhs, who are part of the SC category, could 
potentially distort the overall figures. If the Buddhists and Sikhs, who are already 
entitled to reservation, are nevertheless reflected in the figure provided by MoMA, the 
real proportion of employment of minorities who are not entitled to reservation would 
be much lower. These intra-minority factors are not inconsequential: Muslim groups 
have long complained of being squeezed out of minority representation in employment 
and other sectors by more educationally advanced minorities (Buddhists, Christians, and 
Sikhs). 
 
MoMA, minorities’ employment data and monitoring 
 
The data available on the MoMA website covers the period from 2006 to 2013. Of the 
85 ministries and departments recorded, only 25 reported employment status in a 
regular sequence. These 25 were selected for detailed analysis, and ministries and 
departments that returned ‘Nil’ were excluded on the grounds that this could mean 
ambiguity, evasion or no recruitment. The proportion of minorities employed in each 
ministry was also calculated for the various grades (Group A, B, C, and D inclusive) to 
assess whether recruitment of minorities is still concentrated in lower grades.592 The 25 
ministries and departments were further divided into high (more than 10 per cent), 
medium (5 to 10 per cent) or low (below 5 per cent) recruiters of minorities. For 
detailed assessment, 4-5 ministries and departments were selected for each category.593 
A number of observations can be made from this data. 
 
                                                      
592
 The SCR had concluded that the employment of Muslims in ministries and departments was 
‘abysmally low at all levels’ and ‘the share of Muslims increases only marginally for lower level jobs but 
even in group D employment (which requires only a low level of education), the share is only about 5 per 
cent’, SCR, 167. 
593
 Under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules (1965) central civil posts 
are categorised into A, B, C, D according to pay scale. Group A carries ‘a pay or a scale of pay with a 
maximum of not less than Rs. 13,500’. The range for Group B is not less than Rs. 9,000 but less than Rs. 
13,500; for Group C not less than Rs. 9,000 but less than Rs. 13,500; and for Group D over Rs. 4,000 but 
less than Rs. 9,000. In general, employment in Groups A and B requires a high level of education, while 
Group C and D posts are more manual and technical, with low educational requirements. Available at: 
http://www.persmin.gov.in/DOPT_ActRules_CCS(CCA)(Eng)_Index.asp [accessed on 3 May 2013]. 
158 
 
 First, in the high recruiting departments (Table 5.1), in 3 of the 5 departments 
and ministries the average representation of minorities increased between 2006 and 
2013. Recruitment in Agriculture and Cooperation was exceptionally high in 2006-7 at 
45 per cent. Conversely, in the Ministry of Coal no minority candidate was recruited in 
any Group over the period. In general, recruitment of minorities was across the four 
grades, without noticeable concentration in the low grades (C and D). It is worth noting, 
however, that as these functional departments and ministries require a high level of 
educational attainment, and other things being equal, Muslims are likely to have been 
outnumbered by other minorities, especially Christians and Sikhs, though as we have 
seen previously, non-OBC Muslims do have a representation within India’s elite 
services such as IAS and IPS. It is also noteworthy that all departments and ministries 
witnessed a decline in minority recruitment in 2009-10, an election year. Overall, within 
the recruiting ministries and departments, the representation of minorities was still well 
below the proportion of the minorities’ population (19.5 per cent in 2011 census),594 
with the highest figure at 14.79 per cent (Ministry of Commerce and Industry).  
 
 In the medium ranking ministries and departments (Table 5.2), although the 
average recruitment of minorities increased over the 2006-13 period in three ministries 
and departments (Women and Child Development, Post, and Railways), the overall 
recruitment of all categories was insignificant. The two biggest recruiters, Post and the 
Railways, witnessed a significant shift, with the latter’s average of minority employees 
increasing from 2.67 per cent in 2006 to 12.54 per cent in 2012. Numerically, most of 
this increase was in grades C and D, though as a proportion of all higher grades also 
appear to have increased. As we shall see below, executive action by the Minister of 
Railways, Mamata Banerjee, seems to have contributed to the development. Some 
results, on the other hand, may be misleading or of little significance. For example, the 
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs only recruited two minority candidates during the 
period which, due to low total recruitment, represents a large percentage increase in 
minority appointments.  
 
In the low recruiting departments and ministries (Table 5.3) the average increase 
over the period was negligible. The data demonstrates that Departments of Corporate 
Affairs, Biotechnology, and Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs are less likely to recruit 
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minorities. In the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, apart from 2006-
07, when the employment of 16 minority candidates led to a large proportionate 
increase, the representation of minorities is very low: of 284 candidates recruited in 
2011-12, none were from the minorities. Given that most Muslims reside in urban areas, 
the lack of minority employment, particularly in Groups C and D, suggests that the 
‘special consideration’ required by the Office Memorandum (2007) had not been put 
into practice. In the Department of Corporate Affairs, no minority individuals were 
employed in Group C or D in 2006-07, in Group B or D in 2008-09, in B, C, or D in 
2009-10, or in B or C in 2010-11. The Department of Biotechnology presents a similar 
picture: in 2008-09, in a total recruitment of 35, no minority candidate was employed. 
Between 2006 and 2013, in the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, over a period of 7 
years only 10 people were employed, none of whom belonged to minority groups. In 
brief, while the figures for recruitment to these departments and ministries were 
relatively low, the even lower or non-representation of minorities suggests positive 
action in recruitment of central administration had made little impact. 
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Table 5.1 
Central government and departments with high recruitment of minorities, 2006-2013 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs website, compiled by author.                                                                                                              Unit: percentage. A*: Average 
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M/o 
Commerce 
& Industry, 
D/o 
Commerce 
  10.62   10.11   16.75   14.21   21.27   17.62   12.95 14.79 
Group A 21 2 9.52 23 2 8.70 26 4 15.38 14 3 21.43 42 19 45.24 41 10 24.39 138 18 13.04 
 
B 32 4 12.50 65 10 15.38 74 14 18.92 54 5 9.26 86 18 20.93 58 10 17.24 103 14 13.59 
C 56 3 5.36 62 2 3.23 68 9 13.24 89 17 19.10 112 17 15.18 151 22 14.57 172 21 12.21 
D 51 8 15.69 28 4 14.29 23 5 21.74 40 3 7.50 28 3 10.71 5 1 20.00 4 1 25 
D/o 
Information 
Technology 
  7.33   32.78   11.07   9.09   12.03   11.74   9.38 13.35 
Group A 192 13 6.77 260 73 28.08 179 21 11.73 40 3 7.50 82 13 15.85 133 11 8.27 57 5 8.77 
 
B 208 18 8.65 43 22 51.16 51 8 15.69 364 32 8.79 115 11 9.57 328 45 13.72 64 6 9.38 
C 49 2 4.08 56 21 37.50 66 4 6.06 20 2 10.00 65 8 12.31 84 8 9.52 39 4 10.26 
D 1 0 0 4 3 75.00 11 1 9.09 5 2 40.00 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M/o Coal   0   20   26.67   3.33   25   0   16.67 13.10 
Group A 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
B 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 16 0 0 4 1 25.00 14 4 28.57 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 11 1 9.09 
D 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 28 1 3.57 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 2 15.38 
D/o 
Agriculture 
& 
Cooperation 
  45.00   13.57   7.02   6.98   5.64   6.55 
No recruitment 
12.11 
Group A 13 12 92.31 28 7 25.00 5 0 0 26 2 7.69 46 4 8.70 33 2 6.06 
 
B 43 20 46.51 47 3 6.38 22 2 9.09 25 1 4.00 147 9 6.12 26 4 15.38 
C 26 12 46.15 62 9 14.52 22 5 22.73 27 1 3.70 63 2 3.17 101 4 3.96 
D 18 1 5.56 3 0 0 8 0 0 8 0 0 10 0 0 8 1 12.50 
D/o Space   14.66   16.24   13.21   10.95   9.92   10.56 
No recruitment 
10.79 
Group A 245 24 9.80 323 44 13.62 391 52 13.30 470 49 10.43 381 35 9.19 364 23 6.32 
 
B 45 12 26.67 123 33 26.83 175 16 9.14 130 8 6.15 155 14 9.03 107 11 10.28 
C 194 33 17.01 170 22 12.94 322 48 14.91 228 34 14.91 210 25 11.90 381 56 14.70 
D 14 4 28.57 12 3 25.00 8 2 25.00 5 1 20.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5.2 
Central government and departments with medium recruitment of minorities, 2006-2013 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs website, compiled by author.                                                                                                                         Unit: percentage. A*: Average 
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M/o Women 
& 
Child 
Development 
  0   20   16.67   0   5   15.15 
No recruitment 
8.12 
Group A 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
 
B 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 1 14.29 10 1 10.00 
C 2 0 0 3 1 33.33 3 1 33.33 0 0 0 7 0 0 15 3 20.00 
D 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 1 16.67 
D/o Post   7.60   9.65   6.36   8.01   8.27   8.11   8.55 8.08 
Group A 4 0 0 3 1 33.33 5 0 0 8 0 0 10 1 10.00 
Not specified 
20 1 5 
 
B 47 1 2.13 92 11 11.96 40 2 5.00 73 15 20.55 48 7 14.58 147 18 12.24 
C 4382 348 7.94 4682 425 9.08 2419 157 6.49 7473 589 7.88 14840 1175 7.92 2642 222 8.40 
D 610 37 6.07 581 80 13.77 302 17 5.63 152 13 8.55 744 110 14.78 1241 112 9.02 
D/o 
Expenditure   25.00   0   0   13.33   2.04   6.6 
No recruitment 
6.71 
Group A 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 9 2 22.22 3 0 0 30 3 10.00 
 
B 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 34 1 2.94 49 2 4.08 
C 4 1 25.00 1 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0 12 0 0 27 2 7.41 
D 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M/o Railways   2.67   6.31   8.32   6.55   8.72   12.54 
Not specified 
6.44 
Group A 302 13 4.30 17 5 29.41 59 7 11.86 33 3 9.09 28 3 10.71 955 61 6.39 
 
B 0 0 0 450 49 10.89 472 90 19.07 421 35 8.31 422 41 9.72 434 59 13.59 
C 34071 745 2.19 16647 1069 6.42 15285 899 5.88 15793 1014 6.42 12205 978 8.01 19660 2391 12.16 
D 20111 698 3.47 19239 1172 6.09 20397 2016 9.88 9374 653 6.97 5596 569 10.17 7036 1010 14.35 
M/o 
Parliamentary 
Affairs 
  0   0   0   0   25   0   14.29 5.61 
Group A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 25 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5.3 
Central government and departments with low recruitment of minorities, 2006-2013 
 
 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 A* 
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M/o Housing 
and Urban 
Poverty 
Alleviation 
  25.40   8.33   0   0   0   0   0 4.82 
Group A 29 2 6.90 12 1 8.33 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
 
B 9 4 44.44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
C 9 8 88.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 147 0 0 0 0 0 
D 16 2 12.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 134 0 0 0 0 0 
D/o Corporate 
Affairs   4.82   0   0   6.45   1.96   14.07   5.71 4.72 
Group A 39 1 2.56 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 4 13.79 69 2 2.90 21 1 4.76 44 3 6.82 
 
B 36 3 8.33 0 0 0 1 0 0 28 0 0 20 0 0 72 14 19.44 25 1 4 
C 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 0 82 11 13.41 1 0 0 
D 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 28 1 3.57 0 0 0 
D/o 
Biotechnology   5.26   2.44   0   10.53   1.38   5.62   5.36 4.37 
Group A 15 1 6.67 22 0 0 19 0 0 11 0 0 88 10 11.36 52 3 5.77 34 4 11.76 
 
B 10 1 10.00 5 0 0 3 0 0 7 1 14.29 31 4 12.90 25 1 4.00 22 0 0 
C 14 0 0 14 1 7.14 9 0 0 20 3 15.00 37 6 16.22 12 1 8.33 10 1 10 
D 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 16.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M/o Overseas 
Indian Affairs   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 0 
Group A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs website, compiled by author.                                                                                                                         Unit: percentage. A*: Average  
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Overall, the MoMA data does not support the assertion that UPA’s policies of 
positive action significantly improved the representation of minorities in public sector 
employment. Indeed, if overall minority representation did not increase, Muslim 
representation is also unlikely to have improved because even within this category 
Muslims have traditionally struggled to match the recruitment profile of other 
minorities. It would appear that in most cases ‘special consideration’ has been paid only 
in the constitution of selection committees (by including one minority member), but not 
in the actual recruitment of minorities itself.595 Discriminatory recruitment practices 
continue at both central and state levels. For example, Maharashtra State has one 
minority member on its selection boards but the level of Muslim representation has not 
increased. In the state, selection committees continue to insist that the Marathi language 
should be used in applications, thereby excluding local Muslims in Maharashtra who are 
mostly migrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.596 These cases prove that the inclusion 
of a minority member in selection boards is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition 
for improving the chances for employment of minority candidates. Rather, positive 
action has to be accompanied by a range of other measures – active monitoring, political 
support, institutional sympathy, a committed community/lobby behind the measure and 
a determination to address embedded cultures of resistance – if it is to be effective. 
Given the room for discretion in the use of positive action to promote better equal 
opportunities for minorities, it is perhaps unsurprising that these minorities seek 
reservations as the most effective way of improving their status. 
 
Mamata Banerjee, Railways and West Bengal: a successful model of positive action? 
 
That the UPA policies on minorities, especially Muslims, could be turned into a 
potentially successful model of positive action is illustrated by the case of Mamata 
Banerjee, the Minister of Railways (2009-11), and later the Chief Minister of West 
Bengal. Minority employment in the Ministry of Railways witnessed a noticeable 
increase during her tenure. It is generally believed Banerjee used executive discretion to 
push through measures aimed at the Muslim population in West Bengal, a state which 
had been governed by the Left Front – led by CPI (M) from 1977 to 2011 but one which 
the SCR found to have a particularly weak record in terms of minority public sector 
employment and service delivery. Accordingly, Banerjee, who was determined to build 
                                                      
595
 Habibullah, interview, 12 February 2013, New Delhi; See also, Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee 
(New Delhi: GoI, 29 September 2014), 122. 
596
 (Habibullah) ibid. 
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her constituency for the state elections in 2011, used her Trinamool Congress’ (TMC) 
strength ‘in the national Parliament, the Lok Sabha, and [her] control of the Railway 
Ministry …as platforms from which to display its commitment to addressing issues and 
grievances of concern to Muslim voters’.597  Among the measures used to enhance 
employment of Muslims in the Ministry of Railways included: advertising in Urdu 
newspapers; allowing candidates to take tests in Urdu; waving ‘the Railway 
Recruitment Board examination fee for applicants from minority backgrounds’; and 
increasing ‘the frequency of trains in West Bengal to areas with high Muslim 
concentration’.598 Although there was a general anti-Left wave in the state, the elections 
of 2011 brought Banerjee to power, and the desertion of the Muslim vote from the CPI 
(M) played a pivotal role.599 
 
 It would be misleading, however, to interpret the Banerjee example, as Nielson 
does, as election-driven. For one, on the eve of elections the Left Front also made 
extravagant promises to implement reservations for Muslims in the OBC quota, and 
took measures to effect this before the polls were scheduled. 600  For another, the 
institutionalised opposition to Banerjee’s actions was somewhat blunted by the decades 
of neglect of minorities’ interest, the absence of a Dalit caste party in the state, à la 
BSP, and the fact that a large number of OBCs in the state were Muslims. That the 
measures were taken at the level of the state, against a highly unpopular Marxist 
government, further undermined the institutionalised resistance against minorities. 
Hence, since the elections the TMC government has announced reservations for 
Muslims in employment and education but primarily by widening the inclusion of more 
Muslim groups within the OBC category rather than implementing the 
recommendations of the RMCR. According to Banerjee, more than 90 per cent of the 
state’s Muslims were now eligible for reservations in employment, and reservations for 
Muslims in higher education will be introduced from 2014.601  
 
                                                      
597
 Kenneth Bo Nielson, ‘In Search of Development: Muslims and Electoral Politics in an Indian State’, 
Forum for Development Studies 38:3 (November 2011), 347. 
598
 Ibid., 361. 
599
 Ibid. 
600
 Ibid., 355-8.  
601
 According to press reports, ‘Banerjee emphasised that her government had implemented most of the 
recommendations of the Sachar Committee’. ‘The State government’, she said, ‘is setting up a Minority 
Bhavan in each district’, adding that her government would extend help to Muslim youths to start small 
shops, business establishments and other small business in the city and districts. ‘We will set up 
marketing complexes and provide shops to Muslim youths’, she added. The Hindu, 10 August 2013. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined in detail the UPA’s policy process aimed at increasing 
Muslim presence in public sector employment. From the initial commitment of the 
government to support the recommendations of the SCR, to hesitancy and doubt over 
the recommendations of RMCR, the process was characterised by ambivalence, non-
decisions, and twin-tracking. From the limited evidence available in the public domain 
examined above, despite considerable efforts directed at positive action, the share of 
employment of Muslims in central government posts remains low, and is still 
considerably below the community’s proportion of the population as a whole. Although 
a more comprehensive analysis remains to be undertaken, this interpretation was 
supported by the government’s own data which suggest an overall decline in minority 
recruitment to central government posts from 11.56 per cent in 2010-11 to 6.89 per cent 
in 2012-13.602 Such an outcome is all the more surprising given the positive action taken 
following the Office Memorandum (2007) was accompanied by a public announcement 
that ‘special consideration’ would be given to improve the under-representation of 
minorities in public sector employment. Evidently, the use of tried and tested policy 
instruments such as monitoring, targeting and regular reviews have yet to be firmly 
embedded and effectively utilised as tools of policy change. 
 
  It could be argued that this outcome was largely the result of UPA’s reluctance 
to implement the SCR and RMCR recommendations.603 In the face of strong opposition 
from the BJP and Hindutva forces against the recommendations of the RMCR for 
reservations for Muslims in the SC/OBC quotas, the government opted for ‘symbolic 
implementation’, or ‘gesture politics’– appearing to pursue policies while recognizing 
that they would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. This approach was 
underpinned by political opposition to the measure within the Congress itself which 
feared it would undermine the foundational settlement by reducing the religious 
incentive to be a SC Hindu. But perhaps, more importantly, the strongest opposition to 
the measure came from the Hindu SC/OBC institutionalised lobbies and their political 
and state interests. The NCSC and NCBC, for example, viewed reservations for 
minorities as a zero-sum measure that struck at the heart of the foundational settlement 
                                                      
602
 Cited by Minister of State for Personnel, V. Narayanasamy, in reply to a Parliament question, RSD, 19 
December 2013.  
603
 Gautam Navlakha likened this outcome to institutional racism in the West. Interview, 16 March 2013, 
New Delhi. 
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closely identified with socially disadvantaged Hindu castes. Indeed, the judiciary’s 
decision to reject reservations on the grounds of religion was the ultimate confirmation 
of the historically institutionalised approach to the subject.604  
  
The UPA policies on religious minorities can be further contrasted with its 
receptiveness to policy change on caste-based issues.605 Analysts have commented on 
how the government painstakingly sought to build a consensus on Mandal II – the 
imposition of reservations in higher education for OBCs.606 As a result, the subsequent 
legal challenges were both limited and ineffectual. Similarly, the UPA was also 
favourably disposed to the BSP-sponsored Promotion Quota Bill (2012) – The 
Constitution (117th Amendment) Bill – to provide quotas for SCs and STs in senior 
government promotions.607 This bill was brought in response to the High Court and 
Supreme Court decisions rejecting the Uttar Pradesh BSP government proposal to 
provide quotas for promotion for SCs and STs. The speed with which the government 
acted was not just the pay-off to the BSP for its support on the Foreign Direct 
                                                      
604
 Some studies attribute the low representation of Muslims in civil service to the low level of 
participation of Muslim students in civil service examinations. But this aspect is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. See Naseem A. Zaidi, ‘Muslims in the Civil Services’, EPW 49:3 (18 January 2014).  
605
 In stark contrast, consistent efforts were made for SCs, STs and OBCs with similar policy instruments 
to monitor the employment status of these groups. For instance, Chapter Six of the ‘Brochure on 
Reservation for SC, ST & Other Backward Classes in Services’ provides detailed guidelines on how to 
fill reserved vacancies. It explains the recruitment process in detail, from advertising the post to reporting 
to the DoPT, with the number of vacancies reserved for SCs, STs, and OBCs out of the total number of 
reserved seats. For example, it requires that whenever recruitment is to be made one single advertisement 
should be issued, specifying clearly the vacancies reserved for SCs, STs, and OBCs. It also requires 
ministries and departments to send a requisition including the number of vacancies reserved for SCs, STs, 
and OBCs out of the total vacancies. Hence, the ministries and departments must show that the number of 
vacancies reserved for SCs, STs, and OBCs match the reservation quota fixed by government. If the 
number of SC/ST candidates is insufficient for the reserved posts, the DoPT requires the appointing 
authority to report the reserved vacancies to the Director of SC/ST Welfare in the State and Union 
Territory. The Brochure also clearly states that ‘where sufficient number of candidates belonging to 
SC/ST/OBC are not available to fill up the vacancies reserved for them in direct recruitment, the 
vacancies should not be filled by candidates not belonging to these communities’. Clearly, the de-
reservation was systematically forbidden to ensure that benefit of reservation reaches the intended 
beneficiaries. The monitoring system is further confirmed in Chapter Nine of the Brochure, which 
explains the ‘Monitoring and Institutional Safeguard’. Every January appointing authorities are required 
to send SC/ST/OBC reports to ministries and departments, including the total number of employees and 
the number of SCs, STs, and OBCs among them, and the representation of SCs, STs, and OBCs in 
various levels. In addition, the guidelines specify the way in which the ministries and departments 
consolidate the reports received from appointing authorities and submit them to the DoPT by 31st March 
each year. The publication of such guidelines in a brochure provides a clear picture of who is responsible 
for collecting data, the date by which the data should be collected, how the data should be consolidated 
and the date for final submission. Hence, the DoPT has successfully provided directions for employment 
policy and practice with regard to SCs, STs, and OBCs, and restricted as far as possible the potential for 
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Classes in Service’, 2011. Available at: 
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Investment vote, but an underlying demonstration of institutional consensus in favour of 
caste issues. Remarkably, while the 4.5 per cent sub-quota for minorities was still 
pending before the Supreme Court, the Congress continued to insist that ‘[the 
Promotion Quota Bill and SCR] are not contrary or contradictory’.608  
 
The unevenhandedness of the UPA’s approach to the ‘competing inequalities’, 
of caste and religious minorities, was further demonstrated during the debate on the 
Promotion Quota Bill. The Minister of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions 
asserted that there are no SCs among the 102 secretary-level officers in the central 
government. Of the 113 additional secretaries, only five were SCs, one ST and no 
OBCs. Furthermore, he claimed the representation of SCs and STs in Groups A, B, and 
C was not equal to their proportion of the population, so that ‘from our side we are 
convinced that [the SCs and STs] are backward per se’.609 In addition, the MPPGP 
launched a special recruitment scheme to fill vacant reserved posts in government jobs 
for SCs, STs and OBCs, and even fixed a date for implementation by central ministries 
and departments.610 Such efforts, as we have seen, were singularly absent for religious 
minorities, particularly Muslims. In short, the underlying principle of different 
approaches to different social categories (caste groups and minorities), dating from the 
critical juncture of Partition was the prime determinant of UPA’s path dependence 
policy-making and implementation.  
 
Lastly, in assessing the UPA’s policies on employment it would be mistaken not 
to acknowledge their enabling qualities under the appropriate conditions. The example 
of Mamata Banerjee in West Bengal illustrates that positive action on employment can 
deliver if the appropriate conditions are in play. Yet, importantly, to avoid the pitfall of 
her initiatives being struck down by the judiciary, Banerjee exercised her initiatives 
within the existing framework of affirmative action (i.e widening the scope of the OBC 
                                                      
608
 ‘Quota Bill also a Fair Deal to Muslims: Cong’, Outlook, 17 December 2012 (electronic edition). The 
provision of promotion quotas for SCs and STs in high posts is in stark contrast to the state’s approach to 
minorities. The SCs and STs have been entitled to reservation in promotion since 1955, and the quota was 
increased in the 1970s. After the quota was discontinued by the verdict of the Supreme Court in 1992, the 
government amended the Constitution, reinstating the quota in 1995. In 2001, there was further 
amendment, using reservation to ‘provide consequential seniority to SC and ST candidates promoted’. 
‘Promotion Quota, if Passed, to be Implemented from 1995’, The Hindu, 9 September 2012. In a context 
where there exists reservation in promotion from low to middle, and from middle to high level of jobs 
(from Group C to Group B, within Group B, from Group B to the lowest rung of Group A), the 
Promotion Quota Bill of 2012 is an extension to the existing job quota for SCs and STs. 
609
 ‘Controversial SCs/STs Quota Government Promotions Bill Passed in Rajya Sabha by Huge Majority’, 
Indian Express, 17 December 2012. Emphasis added. 
610
 ‘New Drive Launched to Fill Vacant Reserved Posts’, Hindustan Times, 25 July 2011. 
168 
 
category to include Muslims). As we shall see in the next chapter, demands for 
improved service delivery for religious minorities would also have to operate within 
similar restrictive constraints. 
  
169 
 
Chapter Six 
UPA, Muslims and service delivery 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Equal access to services provided by the state is a necessary condition of effective equal 
opportunities policies. Historically, excluded ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities 
have often complained of the colour-blind practice of states in the provision of 
collective goods which produces discriminatory outcomes. With the development of 
affirmative action policies in the West, the principle of proportionality in resource 
allocation became an essential requirement of non-discriminatory service delivery.611 In 
India, with its regime of ‘competing equalities’, this principle was conceded for SCs and 
STs but not for religious minorities. In seeking to correct this imbalance, the UPA 
introduced a multitude of programmes for religious minorities, with a range of 
affirmative action provisions, including the targeting and monitoring of service delivery 
to ensure better implementation. However, despite these initiatives, it appears that 
efforts to improve service delivery for religious minorities, notably Muslims, 
encountered institutional barriers that remain to be overcome.  
 
 Given the vast range of the subject matter, we can only hope to review the 
policy process in key areas of service delivery. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on 
education (specifically the provision of scholarships for minority students), better 
provision of finance, and a concentrated drive to improve socio-economic infrastructure 
in areas of Muslim concentration (MSDP). These areas were selected because they 
provide a representative spectrum of the schemes under consideration: a recipient-led 
initiative (scholarships), a highly institutionalised and regulated sector drive (finance), 
and a broad area-based programme (MSDP). The different policy approaches reflect the 
constitutional and institutional constraints under which special programmes for religious 
minorities were developed. Finally, the chapter reflects on the policy process to assess 
the modes of resistance to policy change.  
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Agenda-setting 
 
Both the SCR and RMCR recognised the alienation of Muslims from, and their limited 
access to, state services. In education, though the enrolment of Muslim students had 
improved, the disparities between Muslims and other SRCs had widened.612 The SCR 
found that limited availability of good government schools in Muslim localities resulted 
in pupils either attending private school or dropping out, particularly at primary, middle 
and higher secondary levels.613 The literacy rate among Muslims (59.1 per cent) was 
below the national average (65.1 per cent).614 Contrary to the popular myth, only 3 per 
cent of Muslim children of school age attend madrasas.615 The presence of Muslims in 
elite education institutions, such as Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and the 
Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), was notably low: the enrolment data for the 
years 2004-05 and 2005-06 indicates that Muslims accounted for a mere 1.3 per cent of 
students in all courses in all IIMs in India and 3.3 per cent in IITs.616 Muslims had the 
lowest proportion (3.6 per cent) of graduates among all the religious minorities.617 
Reflecting on this data, the SCR concluded that ‘the changes in educational patterns 
across SRCs suggest that SCs and STs have reaped at least some advantages of targeted 
government and private action supporting their educational progress. This reflects the 
importance of affirmative action.’618 As a policy recommendation, the SCR called for a 
‘sharper focus on school education combined with more opportunities in higher 
education for Muslims’ in addition to skill development initiatives for those who do not 
complete school education.619 
 
 In addition to education, easy access to credit is especially important for 
Muslims, a large proportion of whom are engaged in self-employment. However, the 
data indicates that Muslims possess a smaller proportion of loan accounts and amounts 
outstanding than other minorities.620 Despite the RBI’s effort to extend banking and 
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credit facilities, the chief beneficiaries of these drives were other minorities.621 The SCR 
pointed to an enduring difficulty because ‘banks are…able to direct credit to minorities, 
[but] they are not being able to do so specifically for Muslims’.622 Even more 
problematic was the fact that some banks had identified ‘negative geographical zones’ 
(large areas of Muslim settlement) with poor provision of bank credit and other 
facilities.623 To address these discriminatory practices, the SCR recommended that 
‘steps should be introduced to specifically direct credit to Muslims, create awareness of 
various credit schemes…[and] bring transparency in reporting of information about 
SRCs on provision of banking services’.624  
 
 Perhaps more important than education or credit facilities, areas of high Muslim 
settlement were generally found to suffer an acute development deficit brought on by 
years of deliberate neglect, which often resulted in an absence of basic infrastructure. 
The SCR found an inverse correlation existed between the proportion of the Muslim 
population and the number of schools in small villages.625 A similar pattern was also 
discernable in relation to medical facilities and post/telegraph offices. To put it 
differently, the availability of basic facilities sharply declined with the increase in the 
proportion of Muslim population. This trend was reported to increase as the size of the 
village increased.626 Although there is no indication that majority Muslim villages had 
fewer infrastructural facilities than non-Muslims ones, the picture in states like Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Assam and Jharkhand, with large Muslim populations was bleak 
because it was here that the community’s population was heavily concentrated.627 
Under-development and a high Muslim concentration produced a profile of a 
community suffering from cumulative disadvantage.  
 
 In short, underperformance in education, restricted access to finance and the lack 
of infrastructural development drew attention to discriminatory practices by the state in 
service delivery. As the SCR noted, ‘the perception of being discriminated against is 
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overpowering amongst a wide cross section of Muslims…[the] sense of discrimination 
combined with issues of identity and insecurity has led to an acute sense of inferiority in 
the Community which comes in the way of its full participation in the public arena and 
results in collective alienation’.628 A wide range of inter-linked factors, such as poverty, 
poor access to schools, low perceived return from school education, madrasa education, 
the usage of Urdu, and the unwillingness of state governments to recognise minority 
educational institutions, had caused Muslims to feel discriminated against and led to the 
further deterioration of their educational condition. Similarly, perceptions of 
discrimination, by both public and private sector banks, in the provision of credit were 
widespread in most of the states.629 And with regard to access to basic facilities, 
Muslims pointed to the poor civic amenities and infrastructure in the Muslim-
concentrated areas, while officials denied any discrimination in the provision of these 
services.630 
 
These findings led the SCR and the RMCR to adopt different policy approaches. 
While the recommendations of the SCR were centred on affirmative action, including 
positive action, for all minorities, the RMCR argued that in addition to providing 
general welfare measures a certain proportion of reservations should be provided for 
socially and economically disadvantaged Muslims, in line with the provision of 
reservations for SCs, STs and OBCs. Despite these different policy approaches, as 
Table 6.1 below shows, there was concurrence in the recommendations on 
proportionality and targeting.   
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Table 6.1 
Some of the main recommendations of SCR and RMCR on education, finance and infrastructure 
Area SCR RMCR 
Education Initiation of evaluating the content of the school text book to prevent 
religious intolerance and caste bias  
Enactment of comprehensive law detailing minorities’ educational rights  
 Creation of local community study centre Amendment of the National Minority Educational Institutions Commission to 
widen its functions and responsibilities 
 Setting up of high quality government schools in Muslim concentration 
areas 
Revision of Madrasa Modernisation Scheme 
 Creation of mechanism to link madrasas with higher secondary school 
board to enable students to shift to mainstream education 
Lower eligibility criteria for admission and lower rate of fees available to SCs 
and STs applicable to minorities 
 Mapping of Urdu speaking population and provision of primary education 
in Urdu in areas where Urdu speaking population is concentrated. 
Selection of at least one institution in states and Union Territories with 
substantial Muslim population to ensure it promotes education at all levels 
 Technical and educational training for non-matriculates, skill development 
initiatives of Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) in Muslim concentrated 
area, making madrasa-educated children eligible for such programmes  
Earmarking 15 per cent seats in all non-minority educational institutions for 
minorities (10 per cent for Muslims, 5 per cent for other minorities). If 
difficult, 8.4 per cent (6 per cent for Muslims, 2.4 per cent for other minorities) 
 University Grants Commission to evolve a system that allocation is linked 
to diversity in recruitment 
Provide enhanced aid to Muslim-run schools and colleges 
 Creation of alternative admission criteria to improve minority recruitment  
 Provision of hostels at reasonable cost to minority students  
 Teacher training programme for sensitisation of marginalised communities   
 Running Urdu medium schools  
 Setting up of exclusive schools for girls  
Finance Policy formulation in the micro-credit schemes of National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development to enhance participation of minorities  
Revision of Central Wakf Council to focus on educational development of 
Muslims 
 Provision of incentives to banks to open more branches in Muslim 
concentration area 
Earmarking proportionate distribution of fund of Maulana Azad Educational 
Foundation  
 RBI’s priority sector advances (PSA) reports to include data on ‘sanctions 
or disbursements to minorities’ along with the ‘amount outstanding’  
 
 Promotion of Muslims’ access in PSA  
Infrastructure Introduction of schemes with large outlays for welfare of minorities Development of an effective mechanism for the development and 
modernisation of industries where minority groups are involved and for 
training of artisans and workmen 
 Sensitisation of service staff regarding social exclusion 
 Facilitation of registration of trusts set up by the community 
 Provision of basic amenities 
Source: SCR, 237-254; RMCR, 150-53. 
174 
 
Policy formulation 
 
Although policy formulation was based on the recommendations of the SCR and the 
RMCR, it also included a revamped PM’s 15PP which had been running independently 
since 1983. Initially it was launched by Indira Gandhi to: tackle the situation arising out 
of communal riots; ensure equitable representation of the minority communities in 
employment under the central and state governments as well as public sector 
undertakings; and implement community development programmes.631 As a part of the 
new policy approach to the minority communities following the publication of the SCR, 
in June 2006 the UPA revised and re-launched the PM’s 15PP as a flagship measure 
through executive action. Development projects in areas of minorities’ concentration 
would now ensure that 15 per cent of the outlays under various schemes were 
earmarked for minorities. All central ministries, departments, state governments, and 
Union Territory administrations were directed to implement the 15PP. The five central 
ministries − Human Resource Development, Labour and Employment, Housing and 
Poverty Alleviation, Rural Development, and Women and Child Development − were 
given particular responsibilities in the relevant areas. Naturally, these initiatives led to a 
proliferation of complex and overlapping programmes under different ministries, while 
the newly created MoMA was given overall coordination role for the MSDP and the 
scholarship scheme for minority students (see Figure 4.1). Table 6.2 below indicates the 
complex and diverse range of service delivery policies for minorities launched by the 
UPA government.  
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Table 6.2 
The multitude of schemes and programmes for minorities under the UPA 
 
Programme Theme Name of schemes / programmes Lead Ministry/department 
PM’s 15 PP / 
MSDP 
Enhancing 
opportunities for 
education 
Improving access to school education: Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA, universalisation 
of elementary education) 
Ministry of Human Resource 
Development, Department of School 
Education & Literacy 
  Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Ministry of Women & Child Development 
  Greater resources for teaching Urdu Ministry of Human Resource Development 
  Modernising Madrasa education Ministry of Human Resource Development 
  Scholarships Ministry of Minority Affairs 
  
Improving educational infrastructure through the Maulana Azad Education 
Foundation Ministry of Minority Affairs 
 
Equitable share in 
economic activities 
and employment 
Self-employment: Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY, provision of 
sustainable income to the rural poor); Swarn Jayanti Shahari Rojgar Yojana (SJSRY, 
provision of employment to the urban unemployed and poor) 
Ministry of Rural Development / Ministry 
of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation 
  Upgrading of skills through technical training Ministry of Labour & Employment 
  
Credit support: by strengthening National Minorities Development & Finance 
Corporation (NMDFC) 
Ministry of Finance / Ministry of Minority 
Affairs 
 
Improving the 
conditions of 
minorities 
Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY, provision of housing to the rural poor); Integrated 
Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP); Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) 
Ministry of Rural Development/ Ministry 
of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation / 
Ministry of Urban Development 
  
Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns 
(UIDSSMT); National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) 
Ministry of Urban Development / Ministry 
of Drinking Water & Sanitation 
Special initiatives 
by Ministry of 
Minority Affairs 
 
Equity to NMDFC (additional equity contribution to NMDFC for development of 
Wakfs has been merged with Grant-in-aid to NMDFC)  
  Corpus fund to Maulana Azad Education Foundation  
  
Scheme of grants-in-aid for strengthening the infrastructure of Special Central 
Assistance of NMDFC 
Implemented by MoMA through 
University Grants Commission  
  Computerisation of the records of State Wakf Boards Scheme  
  Grant-in-aid scheme to Maulana Azad Education Foundation  
  Maulana Azad National Fellowship for Minority Students scheme  
  Nai Roshni (leadership development of minority women)  
  Seekho aur Kamao (skill development of minorities)  
 
Specific institution 
for minority research 
Research/studies, monitoring and evaluation of development scheme including 
publicity 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Women & Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Housing & 
Urban Poverty Alleviation, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Drinking Water & Sanitation websites. 
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 Viewed more broadly, the UPA’s policy making on service delivery was also 
shaped by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-12). In a report by the Planning 
Commission’s Working Group on Empowering the Minorities, submitted in November 
2006, the need to recognise the developmental disadvantages of minorities, especially 
Muslim, was clearly acknowledged. 632  As a result, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
accorded the ‘highest priority to the development of innovative programmes, expansion 
of existing schemes, implementation and monitoring of all initiatives for the minorities 
by making adequate budgetary allocation at every level of governance’.633 However, 
proposal for a specific Minority Sub-Plan soon faced opposition in the Planning 
Commission. Prof. Zoya Hasan, who was chairperson of the Working Group on 
Empowering the Minorities, recalls: 
 
There was a strong opposition within the Planning Commission. Some 
people were supporting it but most opposed to it on the ground that this is 
unconstitutional. You can have special programmes for SCs and STs, but 
not for minorities. It is unconstitutional. That is what they said. That was 
the reason given. But the real reason was that they just did not want to do 
it because they would have had to face the opposition from the SCs and 
STs, and within the Congress itself, and there were some communal 
elements. But the official reason was that it is unconstitutional and the 
Ministry of Law said any special concern given to the minorities is 
against the secular basis of Constitution.634  
 
 This was in stark contrast to a Scheduled Caste Component Plan, which 
provided a policy framework to address the backwardness of caste groups, and came 
with clear directions for service delivery to these communities. Consequently, service 
delivery for minorities was not to be specifically defined by the Planning Commission’s 
parameters but regulated by the norms and guidelines of the existing Centrally 
Sponsored Scheme, including the PM’s 15 PP. In hindsight, the reluctance to create a 
specific Minorities Sub-Plan within the institutionalised and heavily regulated 
framework of national and state planning gave considerable room for manoeuvre to 
state governments and administrations to determine the implementation of these 
programmes.  
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 At the same time, the newly created MoMA was tasked with identifying 90 
MCDs for a MSDP.635 In policy-making on the MSDP, its Empowered Committee was 
given authority to approve the plans of blocks/towns/clusters from state level 
committees, to change the allocation of the blocks/towns to encourage better performing 
blocks/towns/villages, and to monitor implementation. In identifying the 90 MCDs, the 
Empowered Committee measured backwardness according to two criterion: the 
religion-specific socio-economic indicators at the district level, and basic amenities 
indicators at the district level.636  
 
 To sum up: in formulating new policies to address the Muslim ‘development 
deficit’, policymakers came up against a strong institutionalised opposition to special 
programmes for religious minorities. As a result, they were inclined to support positive 
action but principally through executive action. At the same time, these policies suffered 
from a serious lack of executive ownership and clear coordination, producing 
contradictory and overlapping programmes without adequate monitoring, evaluation or 
sensitivity to the needs of the targeted recipients.637 It is against this backdrop that we 
examine the decision-making process and the policy tools used in the face of 
institutional resistance.  
 
 
Decision-making  
 
This section examines closely three policy areas – education, access to credit, and the 
MSDP. It highlights how the UPA compensated for its constitutional and political 
inability to provide reservations for religious minorities in education and other state 
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services by adopting new policy tools to enhance service delivery to the Muslim 
community.  
 
Education – provision of scholarships to religious minorities 
 
Soon after the creation of MoMA, the Minister of Finance in the 2006-07 Budget 
Session announced the distribution of 20,000 merit-cum-means-based scholarships to 
minority students. 638  This was also underpinned by the Cabinet’s approval for the 
revamped PM’s 15 PP in June 2006, and the tabling of SCR in Parliament in November 
2006. Anticipating opposition from political parties, particularly the BJP, and from state 
governments, the UPA used executive action to limit the need to bargain with other 
policy actors. As reservations in education for religious minorities were considered 
unconstitutional, and carried the risk of being challenged, the provision of scholarships 
‘which have passed the constitutional test’ was used to overcome institutional 
opposition − both political and administrative.639 The Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Affairs chaired by the Prime Minister gave approval to expand the provision of 
scholarships which had long been available to lower caste groups (in addition to 
reservation in educational institutions).640 Following this executive action the merit-
cum-means scholarship scheme was approved for religious minorities in June 2007,641 
the post-matric scheme in November 2007, 642  and the pre-matric scheme in April 
2008.643 While all these scholarships were to be implemented from the financial year 
2007-08, the reasons behind this staged approval are somewhat unclear, though state 
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assembly elections – in Goa, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Punjab, Uttarkhand, 
and Uttar Pradesh (in February 2007) – might have influenced the timing. In any case, it 
appears the use of scholarships as a policy tool was chosen because of its promotional 
value, low cost and high visibility as the number of scholarships was relatively small in 
relation to the total pupil population.644  
 
Finance – access to credit 
 
In light of the SCR recommendation to promote Muslims’ access to PSA, the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan report also acknowledged Muslims’ poor access to bank credit, and 
suggested that all public sector banks should have targets for PSA to minorities, 
especially Muslims. As a result, measures were deemed necessary to ‘create awareness 
about various credit schemes, organise entrepreneurial development programmes, and 
bring transparency in reporting on credit availability’.645 Government recommendations 
included the opening of more branches, emphasis on transparency, promoting 
awareness of available schemes, an entrepreneurship development programme, micro-
finance, enhanced authorised share capital of NMDFC, and Priority Sector Lending 
(PSL). PSL specified that a portion of bank lending be made to a number of specific 
sectors, such as agriculture, micro-credit, education and housing. Therefore, in a broader 
context, PSL to minorities aimed at more rounded development of the whole economy 
rather than limited development in the financial sector. This was particularly important 
for Muslims because large numbers are engaged in self-employment.  
 
  A circular issued by the RBI in June 2002 required that ‘all banks are advised to 
initiate steps to enhance/augment flow of credit under Priority Sector to artisans and 
craftsmen as also to vegetable vendors, cart pullers, cobblers etc., and [those] belonging 
to the minority communities (Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, and 
Zoroastrians)’.646 In April 2003, a master circular was issued containing the formats of 
the half yearly/quarterly statement showing PSA granted to the members of the 
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specified minority communities vis-à-vis overall PSA, a list of MCDs,647 and a list of 
circulars consolidated in the master circular.648 In addition this document suggested 
corrective measures to be taken by the relevant banks. It highlighted the importance of 
each bank having a special cell to ensure the smooth flow of credit to minority 
communities, and recommended that lead banks in MCDs should appoint an officer 
responsible exclusively for dealing with the credit flow to minority communities; that 
monitoring data on credit assistance provided to members of minority communities 
should be submitted to the RBI, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Welfare on a half-
yearly basis; that progress should be monitored by District Consultative Committees 
and the State Level Bankers Committees; that bank staff should receive training on the 
various schemes for welfare of minorities, while sensitisation workshops should be 
organised for bank officials; and that banks should ensure good publicity about 
government anti-poverty programmes, particularly about MCDs. 649  Furthermore, 
monitoring was to be strengthened by directing primary cooperative banks to submit 
half-yearly statements on the progress made in deployment of credit to minority 
communities.650  
 
 After the UPA came to power in 2004, there was no discernable change or new 
direction in the regulations and master circulars issued until 2007. In a 2005 master 
circular, a section was added to state that ‘Lead Banks of the MCDs will have to 
exercise the pro-active role expected of them to ensure that the minority communities, 
particularly those who are poor and illiterate have access to bank credit for taking up 
productive activities’. 651  However, this section was inserted as a recommendation, 
without any enforcing mechanism. Following the approval of the revised PM’s 15PP in 
June 2006, a circular was issued to commercial banks and the urban cooperative banks 
to issue necessary instructions to their branch offices that sufficient care should be taken 
to ensure an equitable proportion of credit to minorities within the overall targets of 
priority sectors and the sub-targets of 10 per cent earmarked for weaker sections. 
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BPD./ 52/09.09.01/2002-03 (13 June 2003). 
651
 Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular, Priority Sector Advances – Credit Flow to Minority 
Communities, RPCD NO. SP.BC.07 /09.10.01/2005-06 (1 July 2005). 
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Following the tabling of the SCR in November 2006, and in light of its findings, in 
January 2007, the central government circulated a proposal to banks to reserve a 6 per 
cent share of loans for minorities.652 The BJP inevitably condemned this proposal as ‘in 
contravention of prudent banking norms’, ‘communalising a secular financial system’, 
and suggested that it was motivated by concerns regarding the state assembly 
elections. 653  ‘The Prime Minister’s refrain of “first claim” of Muslims on India’s 
development resources’, a BJP spokesman claimed, ‘is being systematically 
implemented in phases by communalising sector after sector.’654 The RBI and Indian 
Banks’ Association also expressed strong reservations on the ground that banks’ lending 
practices are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and not his/her caste or creed.655 
Nevertheless, the Minister of Finance issued an executive order to the RBI to amend the 
priority sector norms to include minority communities under ‘lending to weaker 
sections’.656 As a result of this executive order, religious minorities were included in the 
RBI list of weaker sections, and hence, entitled to secure loans from domestic banks – 
both government-owned and private – which were mandated to lend 10 per cent of their 
total loans to ‘weaker sections’. The move was reflected in the master circular directing 
scheduled commercial banks to ensure ‘minority communities receive a fair and 
equitable portion of the credit within the overall target of the priority sector’.657 The 
centre pushed through further positive action by identifying additional MCDs, and 
almost immediately the RBI circulated this list to relevant banks to ensure equitable 
credit flow to minorities in the MCDs. In the following month, the RBI directed the 
scheduled commercial banks to issue necessary instructions to controlling offices and 
branch offices to monitor the credit flow to minorities in the final list of 121 MCDs. 
 
 Overall, the RBI was pro-active in directing banks located in MCDs to ensure 
credit flowed to minority communities. It issued at least four important regulations and 
master circulars in 2007 – in contrast to one a year in 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, and two 
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each in 2002 and 2003. This policy drive was further backed up with the Minister of 
Finance’s executive order to widen the RBI’s definition of ‘weaker sections’.658 Yet, 
while the provision of credit to religious minorities gained momentum, to what extent 
this facility was utilised by minorities, especially Muslims, will be assessed in the 
implementation cycle of the policy process.  
  
MSDP 
 
As one of the largest development initiatives since Independence, the MSDP was 
launched to address the chronic under-development of MCDs. Following the findings of 
the SCR that a majority of the Muslim population resides in states with poor 
infrastructure and amenities, and required the focused intervention of government in 
infrastructural development, the MSDP aimed to fill the gaps in the existing government 
schemes by providing additional resources, and take-up of new projects for the welfare 
of minorities (e.g. in education, skills development, health, sanitation, roads, and 
drinking water). An inter-ministerial task force was constituted under the chairmanship 
of Bhalchandra Mungekar, a member of the Planning Commission, to devise an 
appropriate strategy and action plan for developing areas of minority concentration. As 
mentioned above, backward districts (in terms of socio-economic and basic amenities 
indicators) were selected with a ‘substantial minority population’ of at least 25 per cent 
of all five minorities, with no specific targets for Muslim concentration. However, by 
making the district the unit of programme implementation, observes Hasan, ‘funds 
could be spent anywhere and a project could be set up anywhere where Muslims are not 
present in substantial numbers, and yet it [would] meet the criteria regardless of its 
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benefits going to the intended beneficiaries’. 659  Despite the Secretary of MoMA 
admitting that the unit of planning needed to be more tightly focused below the district 
level, and the Planning Commission’s Eleventh Plan Working Group on Empowering 
the Minorities recommending the unit be changed to the block,660 the district was used 
as the unit of implementation. Following the submission of the Implication of the 
Geographical Distribution of Minorities in India: Report, 2007661 to the Prime Minister 
in November 2007, the MSDP was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Affairs in March 2008.662 Thereafter, the Empowered Committee in MoMA initiated the 
process by receiving proposals from states and approving proposed programmes and 
schemes in MCDs.  
 
 
Implementation and evaluation  
  
Education – provision of scholarships targeted at religious minorities 
 
In this section we analyse the state-wise take-up of the scholarship scheme. In a federal 
structure, the performance of the state government is the critical variable. As critics 
have argued, the scheme was accompanied by many problems which included: the low 
utilisation of funds, limited awareness among parents, complex and cumbersome 
procedures for applicants (domicile, income, opening of bank accounts, income, and 
religion certificate), poor institutional mechanisms, lack of administrative funds 
earmarked for implementing the scheme, and state governments’ failure to prioritise the 
minority agenda.663 Moreover, despite the high take-up against the target set by the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan, that target itself was very low in proportion to the numbers of 
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Muslim students enrolled in educational institutions.664 Yet, despite these shortcomings, 
the beneficiary-oriented scholarship scheme appeared to be one notable success in an 
affirmative action programme bedevilled by poor implementation and monitoring.665 
But did implementation vary according to the political party in power in the states?  
 
 The data available on MoMA website covers the period from 2008 to 2013. The 
degree of implementation (in percentages) was calculated by comparing the numbers 
given for the ‘target’ and the ‘implementation’ achieved in government data. The result 
was further divided into high (more than 100 per cent), medium (50 to 99 per cent) and 
low (below 50 per cent).666 The findings indicate significant variation across states in 
the take-up of pre-matric, post-matric, and merit-cum-means scholarship. To see if 
implementation varied with the ideological outlook of the governing party, Table 6.3 
below identifies the ruling state parties.  
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Table 6.3 
States and political parties in distribution of scholarships (mid 2008-mid 2013) 
 
Degree of implementation Pre-matric Political parties Post-matric Political parties Merit-cum-Means Political parties 
High (100% +) Kerala CPI(M)/INC Karnataka BJP/BJP Sikkim SSP/SDF 
 West Bengal CPI(M)/TMC Mizoram MNF/INC Tamil Nadu DMK/AIADMK 
 Karnataka BJP/BJP Kerala CPI(M)/INC Kerala CPI(M)/INC 
 Tamil Nadu DMK/AIADMK Tamil Nadu DMK/AIADMK Karnataka BJP/BJP 
 Maharashtra INC/INC West Bengal CPI(M)/TMC Jammu and Kashmir PDP/National Conference 
 Andhra Pradesh INC/INC Andhra Pradesh INC/INC Rajasthan BJP/INC 
 Rajasthan BJP/INC Uttar Pradesh BSP/SP Uttar Pradesh BSP/SP 
 Uttar Pradesh BSP/SP Gujarat BJP/BJP Bihar JD(U)/ JD(U) 
 Mizoram MNF/INC Rajasthan BJP/INC West Bengal CPI(M)/TMC 
 Madhya Pradesh BJP/BJP Punjab INC/SAD   
 Punjab INC/SAD     
 Jammu and Kashmir PDP/National Conference     
 Bihar JD(U)/ JD(U)     
 Odisha BJD/BJD     
 Delhi INC     
Medium (50-99%) Manipur INC/INC Manipur INC/INC Madhya Pradesh BJP/BJP 
 Meghalaya INC/INC Madhya Pradesh BJP/BJP Gujarat BJP/BJP 
 Chhattisgarh BJP/BJP Maharashtra INC/INC Manipur INC/INC 
 Himachal Pradesh BJP/INC Bihar JD(U)/ JD(U) Punjab INC/SAD 
 Haryana INC/INC Jharkhand JMM/BJP Mizoram MNF/INC 
 Jharkhand JMM/BJP Sikkim SSP/SDF Haryana INC/INC 
 Daman&Diu INC Himachal Pradesh BJP/INC Andhra Pradesh INC/INC 
 Chandigarh INC Chhattisgarh BJP/BJP Puducherry INC 
 Sikkim SSP/SDF Jammu and Kashmir PDP/National Conference Jharkhand JMM/BJP 
 Assam INC/INC Assam INC/INC Delhi INC 
     Nagaland NPF/NPF 
     Goa INC/BJP 
     Assam INC/INC 
     Maharashtra INC/INC 
     Chhattisgarh BJP/BJP 
     Himachal Pradesh BJP/INC 
     Odisha BJD/BJD 
     Uttarakhand BJP/INC 
     Meghalaya INC/INC 
     Tripura CPI(M)/ CPI(M) 
     Chandigarh INC 
Low (50% -) Tripura CPI(M)/ CPI(M) Haryana INC/INC Daman&Diu INC 
 Puducherry INC Puducherry INC Andaman&Nicobar INC 
 Dadra&Nagar Haveli INC Dadra&Nagar Haveli INC Arunanchal Pradesh INC/INC 
 Andaman&Nicobar INC Odisha BJD/BJD Dadra&Nagar Haveli INC 
 Nagaland NPF/NPF Delhi INC Lakshadweep INC 
 Uttarakhand BJP/INC Tripura CPI(M)/ CPI(M)   
 Goa INC/BJP Chandigarh INC   
 Arunanchal Pradesh INC/INC Goa INC/BJP   
 Gujarat BJP/BJP Lakshadweep INC   
 Lakshadweep INC Daman&Diu INC   
   Andaman&Nicobar INC   
   Uttarakhand BJP/INC   
   Meghalaya INC/INC   
   Nagaland NPF/NPF   
   Arunanchal Pradesh INC/INC   
        Source: For full names of political parties, see abbreviations. The data for this table was derived from MoMA website, compiled by author. 
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Among the high implementation states, Uttar Pradesh ranked near the top, 
unsurprisingly given its large Muslim population. Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu 
also performed equally well. In Karnataka, notwithstanding the fact the BJP was in 
power from 2008 to 2013, the take-up rate was also high. A similar pattern can be seen 
in Madhya Pradesh and Odisha, ruled by the BJP and its ally (Biju Janata Dal - BJD), 
with a high record in the provision of pre-matric scholarships. Interestingly West 
Bengal and Bihar also achieved high rates of implementation. West Bengal showed high 
implementation in all three scholarship schemes, while Bihar scored high in the pre-
matric and merit-cum-means scholarships, and achieved a medium level of 
implementation for the post-matric scheme.  
 
 State capacity, ‘the ability to monitor the progress of reform, coordinate the 
actions of different players, and mobilise administration for the achievement of 
goals’,667 perhaps explains the variations in policy performance. Under this definition, 
Gujarat clearly scored high on state capacity, but the take-up of schemes was lower than 
in states with much less effective administrations. Table 6.3 indicates that while West 
Bengal and Bihar ranked high in implementation of all scholarship schemes − only 
medium achievement in post-matric in Bihar − Gujarat achieved high implementation 
only in the post-matric. It should be noted that the Gujarat state government led by 
Narendra Modi refused to provide pre-matric scholarships to minorities on the ground 
that this would be discriminatory. However, the Gujarat High Court ruled that provision 
of scholarships to Muslim students is based on their educational backwardness on 
account of their poverty and economically weak position, and hence justified. In reply, 
the Gujarat state government filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court arguing that the 
Sachar Committee was illegal and unconstitutional as it was set up by the UPA to 
investigate the socio-economic and educational status of Muslims only, and ignored 
other religious minorities. The state government also argued that it had a similar state-
sponsored programme for all students from backward communities − irrespective of 
their religion.668 The SCR, according to the State Government of Gujarat, had neither 
legal nor constitutional justification, and central government policies based on the 
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recommendations of the SCR, including the provision of scholarships to religious 
minorities, were ultra vires.669 
  
 West Bengal, Bihar, and Gujarat are contrasting examples of state capacity, 
political will, and institutional resistance in policy implementation. Despite the strong 
capacity of the Gujarat state government, political opposition to the scheme and the 
institutionalised resistance against measures in favour of Muslims played a crucial role 
in poor implementation. Conversely, despite poor state capacity in Bihar and West 
Bengal, the take-up was impressive, perhaps aided by the fact, as we have seen in 
Chapter Five in the case of West Bengal, that these schemes nurtured an important 
political constituency.  
 
Finally, in assessing policy implementation, the historical background of the 
state is also relevant. Karnataka and Gujarat, for instance, were both ruled by the BJP, 
but showed a considerable divergence in performance. As noted in Chapter Three, states 
in the south, particularly Karnataka, had recognised Muslims as backward classes 
before the pre-Mandal period, and provided 4 per cent reservations to religious 
minorities in education and employment. Among the 16 backward castes recognised by 
the state government in 1977, Muslims were recognised broadly as a single category 
with a quota provided exclusively for them. Therefore, in southern states Muslims have 
been entitled to reservation in central government services as well as state level 
reservation. In Gujarat, with no such tradition or history of interpretation of the OBC 
criteria, implementation remained weak.  
 
 The argument that policy implementation is more related to political 
commitment and determination than to the label of the political party in power is further 
supported by the Congress in Andhra Pradesh, and other Congress-led states, including 
the Union Territories. Andhra Pradesh showed high implementation in pre-matric and 
post-matric scholarships, with medium implementation in merit-cum-means. However, 
the Maharashtra state government, also led by Congress, over-achieved in pre-matric, 
while it demonstrated medium implementation in post-matric and merit-cum-means. 
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Surprisingly, the Union Territories, ruled directly by the centre, showed the weakest 
implementation in all schemes. This can be partly attributed to the small number of 
minorities in some of the Union Territories, or lack of policy focus in these urban 
regions, or alternatively, the generally high rates of education and income found in these 
localities.670  
 
Finance – access to credit 
 
We have noted that the UPA pursued a pro-active lending policy towards minorities, 
especially Muslims, but the actual take-up of these loans did not substantially increase. 
In the absence of a more systematic review of this data, and the shortcomings of 
monitoring and evaluation, here we focus on the debates which took place within the 
Rajya Sabha on the issue. The government was continuously questioned on whether 
positive action based on proportionality was actually legal and tantamount to quotas. 
Responding to a point made by a MP from Tamil Nadu, Minister of Finance P. 
Chidambaram played down the issue, declaring that:  
 
There is no particular direction that loans should be given in some areas 
and loans should not be given in some areas. It is true that in areas where 
there is a large concentration of minority communities, banks have been 
advised that their lending must lean towards the minority communities 
which are concentrated in those areas. That does not mean that minority 
community borrowers in any other area will not get a loan.671  
  
Throughout the debate, the Minister of Finance emphasised that the banks had been 
‘advised’ to provide lending to minorities. But nowhere was there any mention of 
regulatory mechanisms to combat institutionalised resistance in the banking sector. In 
fact, in the Rajya Sabha debates from 2004 onwards on the subject, the responses of the 
Minister of Finance or other government members were to highlight the directions to 
RBI on guidelines, or assert that substantial allocations of loans to minorities had been 
made. Whenever a specific question was raised about the exact figure, or by what 
percentage the provision of PSL had increased compared to the previous year, the 
government fell back on rhetoric such as the ‘RBI has advised banks to ensure equitable 
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flow of credit to minority communities’.672 From 2004 onwards it is hard to find any 
debate that specified the percentage of PSL for each minority community. Sometimes 
the debates were deliberately interrupted. 673  For instance, on 19th December 2006, 
Brinda Karat (CPI (M), West Bengal) pointed out that while the amount of PSA had 
increased during the UPA administration, the percentage had decreased compared to 
that under the NDA government. She asserted that the decrease in percentage was a 
reflection of blatant discrimination against minorities, particularly Muslims. When she 
argued, on the basis of the SCR’s findings, that a large number of self-employed 
Muslims could not survive without bank credit, she was interrupted by the Chairman. 
The answer to her query from the Minister of Finance is noteworthy: 
 
P. Chidambaram: [as regard to 15PP], an appropriate percentage of PSL 
in all categories is targeted for minority communities. As I understand, it 
does not say 15 per cent of credit must go to the minorities. It is 15 per 
cent of outlays of scheme that must be targeted towards minorities and an 
appropriate percentage of credit must go to the minorities.  
Brinda Karat: What is that appropriate thing? Please quantify. 
P. Chidambaram: I cannot quantify. What it means is that they must step 
up sharply the lending to minorities and that is precisely what we are 
going to do.674  
 
 As the Minister continued to prevaricate, Karat criticised him by saying: 
 
What is this? Is this the way to answer a question? Sir, every time when 
the Finance Minister gets up he teaches us lessons, which we do not need 
to learn from him…we want to know what the percentage is.675 
  
Despite interruptions from the Chairman, and other MPs, after several further attempts 
Karat eventually managed to ask the Minister of Finance about the 15 per cent of credit 
earmarked for minorities. In response, the Minister of Finance confirmed the 
government’s position by stating that ‘we are not earmarking any percentage’ and the 
debate was abruptly ended by the Chairman.  
 
The RBI began providing figures for PSL from 2007-08. Table 6.4 below 
illustrates that as a result of the Finance Minister’s executive order, the percentage of 
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PSL provided to minority communities steadily increased, reaching 15 per cent by the 
end of the UPA (II) administration.  
 
Table 6.4 
Provision of PSL to minority communities 
 
 
Year 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
Proportion 
(percentage) 10.6 12.24 13.01 14.16 14.55 14.59 
 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs, ‘Implementation of Recommendations of Sachar Committee’, 
Press Information Bureau, 21 February 2014. 
 
However, the data was not classified according to religion, despite the RBI having 
issued a pro-forma instruction to submit a report on lending to religious minorities. The 
first religion-specific data reveal that for the year 2013-14 up to September 2013, the 
proportions of PSL to minorities were as follows: Muslims (47.01 per cent), Christians 
(21.58 per cent), Sikhs (27.49 per cent), Buddhists (2.15 per cent), and Parsis (1.77 per 
cent).676 Notwithstanding the increase, it remains difficult to estimate the real proportion 
of PSL provided to Muslims between 2007 and 2012. In the absence of religion-specific 
distribution of PSL data, it is worth looking at the PSA in 121 MCDs by scheduled 
banks between 2008 and 2011. Figure 6.1 below indicates that while the percentage of 
accounts for Muslims increased in 2007-08 and 2008-09, the share declined in 2009-10 
and 2010-11, and hence the share decreased over the period as a whole. Since the 
figures are cumulative for each year, the declining share of the Muslim community is 
correlated to an increase for other communities. While these figures clearly have 
limitations, they do indicate that the share allocated to Muslims declined during that 
period.677  
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Figure 6.1  
PSA in 121 MCDs by scheduled banks 
 
 
 
 
Source: Abusaleh Shariff, Six Years after Sachar: Review of Socially Inclusive Policies in India since 
2006 (New Delhi: US-India Policy Institute, 2012), 88. 
 
Although the percentage of PSL provided to minorities steadily increased, the 
situation for each religious community still remains unclear. The failure to generate data 
on religious minorities could be attributed to the political risks it might entail, but it also 
may have something to do with the gaps in the instruction provided by the RBI, which 
states that ‘the [monitoring] data on assistance provided to members of minority 
communities should be furnished to RBI and to the Government of India, Ministry of 
Finance, and Ministry of Welfare, on a half yearly basis’ by the relevant banks.678 
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Credit Flow to Minority Communities, RPCD NO. SP.BC. 37 /09.10.01/2004-05 (29 September 2004); 
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However, it is unclear who was to process this data into a consolidated data set. 
Interestingly, during the UPA’s tenure little effort was invested in improving 
monitoring of these services to enhance service delivery, and the problems that arose in 
employment data (see Chapter Five) were also ever present in finance.679 
    
Once again the case of Gujarat demonstrates persistent institutional resistance in 
service delivery. Over the period 2009-12, the banks in Gujarat failed to achieve the 
target set for loans for minorities. In 2011-12, they provided only 3.52 per cent of the 
total PSA to minorities.680 Minorities have claimed that their applications for loans were 
rejected by the banks because they live in ‘blacklisted areas of Ahmedabad’.681 On the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Sector Lending – Credit Flow to Minority Communities, RPCD NO.SP.BC.09 /09.10.01/2006-07 (5 July 
2006); Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular, Priority Sector Lending – Credit Flow to Minority 
Communities, RPCD NO. SP.BC. 12 /09.10.01/2007-08 (5 July 2007); Reserve Bank of India, Master 
Circular, Priority Sector Lending – Credit Flow to Minority Communities, RPCD NO. SP.BC. 
6/09.10.01/2008-09 (1 July 2008); Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular, Priority Sector Lending – 
Credit Flow to Minority Communities, RPCD.SP.BC.No.5/09.10.01/2009-10 (1 July 2009); Reserve 
Bank of India, Master Circular, Priority Sector Lending – Credit Flow to Minority Communities, 
RPCD.SP.BC.No.4/09.10.01/2010-11 (1 July 2010). 
679
 The Department of Financial Services in the Ministry of Finance, and the RBI, did not often specify 
the date a datasheet is generated, and it is common to find typos, misrepresentation, omissions, and lack 
of data on implementation monitoring. With regard to access to credit, the direction of the Ministry of 
Finance to include minorities in the ‘weaker section’ of the RBI norm was substantive executive action to 
push through positive change, but it turned out to be ineffective in solving the core of the problem, since 
it failed to introduce any enforcing mechanism, or to combat discrimination in the banking structure. 
Overall, the failure centred on two problems: the weak monitoring mechanism of the RBI, and the 
reluctance of the relevant banks to submit data. First, to meet the objective of generating data on PSL 
provided to religious minorities, a form of statement showing PSA granted to the members of the 
specified minority communities vis-à-vis overall PSA had been sent to relevant banks by the RBI since 
the pre-UPA period. The form was designed to report the figures for Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, 
Sikhs and Zoroastrians, and carried the instruction that ‘monitoring data on credit assistance provided to 
members of minority communities should be submitted to RBI, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of 
Welfare on a half yearly basis’. In other words, data generation on religious lines was not a newly 
introduced measure by the UPA, and banks were already aware of the reporting system. However, there 
had been no enforcing mechanism to monitor the performance of relevant banks, and even after the UPA 
came to power, no noticeable changes were introduced. While the RBI was active in issuing circulars and 
instructions to relevant banks, neither the RBI nor the government made efforts to strengthen the 
monitoring system − the key measure to improve service delivery. While the government took a positive 
step in publicising data on the proportion of PSL given to religious minorities from 2012, the data 
generation process on the proportion of PSL provided to all religious minorities from 2007 onwards 
remains unclear. Second, although the RBI issued master circulars and guidelines every year to scheduled 
commercial banks in regard to credit facilities to minority communities, along with pro-forma instructions 
to submit an elaborate report on lending to minorities (on religious lines), in the absence of any 
monitoring mechanism the relevant banks continued to be inactive and reluctant to report and share data 
with RBI and central ministries on PSL for minorities. As a result, religion-specific data became available 
only from 2012, although it remains to be investigated whether the RBI did in fact collect religion-
specific data from banks, but was reluctant to make it public.  
680
 Dena Bank, Minutes of 133rd State Level Review Meeting for Gujarat State for the Year Ended March 
2012 (Ahmedabad: State Level Bankers Committee, 24 May 2012), 15. Available at: 
http://www.slbcgujarat.com/newdata/133-slrmmnts.pdf [accessed on 4 March 2014]. 
681
 ‘The first question that banks ask is about the area in which an applicant lives and then, on the basis of 
the area of residence, they take a decision on the application for loan. There are certain areas such as 
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other hand, the bankers argued that the failure to reach the target was due to the small 
amount sought by minority communities, while loan refusals were due to the absence of 
guarantors, proper documents and the capacity to repay. Despite the Finance Minister’s 
executive order and the guidelines and circulars, the practice noted in the SCR, whereby 
some banks had identified ‘negative geographical zones’, continued in Gujarat. As one 
Ahmedabad-based lawyer put it: ‘He [an applicant] may have all the necessary 
documents but if he lives in a blacklisted area, he may find it difficult to get finance.’682 
 
Although a more comprehensive assessment needs to be undertaken, our 
analysis of the limited data available in the public domain suggests that efforts to 
improve service delivery in the area of finance faced considerable institutional 
opposition. Executive action by the UPA government led to a steady increase in PSL 
provision to all minorities, but these efforts were insufficient to overcome institutional 
resistance. The absence of robust mechanisms for monitoring and constant evaluation of 
government and RBI data resulted in ineffective use of such data for policy change. As 
a result, as of August 2014, no disaggregated data on the percentage of PSL for each 
minority group had been made public.683  
 
MSDP 
 
The MSDP programme incorporated a wide range of programmes aimed at improving 
the conditions of minorities, especially Muslims. Whilst it is important to examine the 
outcome of each scheme, our objectives here are to assess how MSDP policy was 
designed, presented and funded. Given that the MSDP was a flagship measure in the 
overall policy framework of the UPA, what does it tell us about the policy process and 
the modes or resistance to this policy?  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Juhapura and Jamalpur which have been blacklisted.’ Bhavesh Shah, ‘Banks Fail to Reach Target for 
Loans to Minorities’, DNA, 29 May 2012.   
682
 Ibid. 
683
 Shariff also highlighted that ‘neither RBI nor the Finance Ministry has reviewed or made public the 
reports on the access of development funds to the minorities although such data are collected as a matter 
of routine by RBI across India. The disaggregated information on the share of PSA for the minorities is in 
fact not being made accessible to the public at large.’ Shariff, Six Years after Sachar, 84. 
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According to the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the MSDP was to ‘adopt an area-
based approach’ 684  with an emphasis on both infrastructure development and 
beneficiary-oriented programmes. This focus was confirmed by minutes of Empowered 
Committee meetings which directed the state governments to implement schemes under 
the MSDP to development of the area rather than the development of a minority or a 
particular community. From August 2008 to July 2011, in 39 out of 47 meetings, 
MoMA repeatedly emphasised the need for implementation of the scheme to focus on 
area development rather than minorities.685 In the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, based on the 
2001 Census, 90 districts were identified as MCD using criteria of ‘backwardness’,686 
gradually rising to 121 districts. Table 6.5 below identifies these districts within the 
relevant states and, where available, the proportion of the minorities within the district: 
Muslims were the largest minority in 64 districts, Christians 14, Buddhists 9, Sikhs 1, 
and data for 33 is unavailable. 687 
 
A number of points are worth noting about this data. First, though Muslims are 
in an overall majority in these districts, the MCDs cover only 47.66 per cent of the 
community. 688  Second, given the significant urban concentration of the Muslim 
population, these localities were excluded from the scheme. Third, the geographical 
dispersal of the Muslim community – in contrast to Christians, Sikhs and Buddhists 
who are more concentrated – makes the benefits of a district-based approach less 
effective than if the programme were targeted specifically at the community. Fourth, 
Table 6.6 below indicates that as more MCDs were added the percentage of Muslims 
decreased. The government’s effort to increase the number of MCDs using the above  
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 Planning Commission, Eleventh Five-Year Plan 2007-2012, 128. 
685
 Out of 47 meetings, in the minutes of 8th - 35th, and 37th - 47th meeting, it is stated that ‘the fact that 
these districts were not just MCDs, having a substantial minority population, but also comprising of other 
communities who suffer from the same backwardness and deprivation, should not be lost sight of. It was 
important to keep in mind that the large presence of minorities may have resulted in the identification of 
such districts for appropriate developmental intervention, but the scheme, while giving priority to 
villages/areas having a substantial minority population, was intended to benefit the district as a whole.’ 
For instance see Ministry of Minority Affairs, Minutes of the 8th Meeting of Empowered Committee, 19 
December 2008. Available at: 
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/pdfs/8thEC.pdf [accessed on 3 May 
2014]. Emphasis added. 
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 This included, for the religion-specific socio-economic indicators at the district level, literacy rate, 
female literacy rate, work participation rate, and female work participation rate; while the basic amenities 
indicators at district level comprised percentage of households with pucca walls, percentage with safe 
drinking water, and percentage with electricity. Planning Commission, Eleventh Five-Year Plan 2007-
2012, 128. 
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 Ministry of Minority Affairs, India Map Showing Minority Concentration Districts, 14 June 2011. 
Available at: http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/all_india_map [accessed on 15 January 2015].  
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 Shariff, Six years after Sachar, 78. 
195 
 
Table 6.5  
Proportion of minorities in 121 MCDs as per Census 2001 
 
 States Districts Muslims Christians Sikhs Buddhists 
1 Andamans Nicobars N/A Andamans 
2 Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad N/A 
3 Arunanchal Pradesh Tawang 0.58 0.79 1.08 74.72 
East Kameng 0.67 25.45 0.08 1.23 
West Kameng 1.55 3.30 0.57 44.38 
Lower Subansiri 0.84 24.51 0.05 0.29 
Changlang 0.93 17.49 0.04 34.08 
Tirap 0.75 50.04 0.10 0.67 
Papum Pare 4.36 29.98 0.22 2.73 
4 Assam Kokrajhar 20.36 13.72 0.01 0.17 
Dhubri 74.29 0.76 0.01 0.02 
Goalpara 53.71 7.87 0.01 0.02 
Bongaigaon 38.52 2.07 0.06 0.04 
Barpeta 59.37 0.32 0.02 0.01 
Darrang 35.54 6.47 0.03 0.12 
Marigaon 47.59 0.10 0.01 0.01 
Nagaon 50.99 0.93 0.13 0.05 
Cachar 36.13 2.17 0.04 0.05 
Karimganj 52.30 0.87 0.01 0.03 
Hailakandi 57.63 1.00 0.00 0.11 
Kamrup 24.78 1.75 0.19 0.07 
North Cachar Hills 15.23 54.57 0.05 0.28 
5 Bihar Araria 41.14 0.06 0.02 0.05 
Kishanganj 67.58 0.22 0.04 0.03 
Purnia 36.76 0.17 0.05 0.00 
Katihar 42.53 0.21 0.09 0.00 
Sitamarhi 21.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Pashchim Champaran 21.25 0.20 0.02 0.05 
Darbhanga 22.73 0.02 0.01 0.00 
6 Delhi North east Delhi 27.24 0.43 1.05 0.27 
 Central N/A 
7 Goa South Goa N/A 
8 Haryana Gurgaon N/A 
Sirsa 0.63 0.15 27.13 0.03 
9 Himachal Pradesh Lahul&Spiti N/A Kinnaur 
10 Jammu & Kashmir Leh (Ladahk) 13.78 0.29 0.43 77.30 
11 Jharkhand Ranchi 12.52 9.10 0.27 0.05 
Gumla 4.44 31.56 0.04 0.02 
Sahibganj 31.26 6.33 0.03 0.00 
Pakaur 32.36 5.86 0.06 0.01 
12 Karnataka Dakshina Kannada N/A 
Bidar 19.69 2.87 0.04 8.13 
Gulbarga 17.60 0.59 0.02 4.91 
13 Kerala Wayanad 26.87 22.48 0.00 0.01 
Malappuram 
N/A 
Ernakulam 
Kottayam 
Idukki 
Pathanamthitta 
Kozhikode 
Kasaragod 
Thrissur 
Kannur 
Kollam 
Thiruvananthapuram 
Palakkad 
Alappuzha 
14 Madhya Pradesh Bhopal 22.86 1.11 0.62 1.12 
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15 Maharashtra Buldana 12.78 0.11 0.07 13.73 
Hingoli 10.45 0.05 0.05 14.99 
Parbhani 15.97 0.09 0.05 10.03 
Washim 10.96 0.12 0.05 14.76 
Akola 
N/A 
Mumbai 
Aurangabad 
Mumbai (Suburban) 
Amravati 
16 Manipur Senapati 0.41 78.41 0.10 0.82 
Tamenglong 1.28 94.88 0.06 0.01 
Churachandpur 1.13 93.54 0.05 0.02 
Ukhrul 0.63 95.16 0.07 0.06 
Chandel 1.96 92.23 0.11 0.05 
Thoubal 23.85 1.41 0.03 0.01 
17 Meghalaya West Garo Hills 15.23 54.57 0.05 0.28 
18 Mizoram Mamit 1.75 80.53 0.04 13.66 
Lawngtlai 0.31 44.66 0.10 52.17 
19 Orissa Gajapati 0.31 33.47 0 0.38 
20 Pondicherry Mahe  N/A 
21 Rajasthan Ganganagar N/A 
22 Sikkim North Sikkim 0.95 3.96 0.36 55.09 
East  
N/A West 
South 
23 Tamil Nadu Kanniyakumari N/A 
24 Uttar Pradesh Bulandshahar 21.07 0.13 0.16 0.07 
Budaun 21.33 0.11 0.09 0.16 
Barabanki 22.04 0.08 0.12 0.09 
Kheri 19.10 0.12 2.64 0.66 
Shahjahanpur 17.86 0.11 2.14 0.20 
Moradabad 45.54 0.23 0.23 0.06 
Rampur 49.14 0.38 3.21 0.12 
Jyotiba Phule Nagar 39.38 0.28 0.37 0.02 
Bareilly 33.89 0.26 0.80 0.20 
Pilibhit 23.75 0.11 4.59 0.11 
Bahraich 34.83 0.09 0.32 0.14 
Shrawasti 25.60 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Balrampur 36.72 0.08 0.08 0.18 
Siddharthnagar 29.43 0.06 0.06 0.39 
Bijnor 41.71 0.11 1.56 0.11 
Saharanpur 39.11 0.17 0.71 0.13 
Muzaffarnagar 38.09 0.09 0.54 0.07 
Meerut 32.55 0.25 0.88 0.09 
Baghpat 24.73 0.09 0.09 0.03 
Ghaziabad 23.79 0.27 0.64 0.10 
Lucknow 20.52 0.34 0.63 0.12 
25 Uttaranchal Hardwar 33.05 0.21 1.20 0.05 
Udham Singh Nagar 20.59 0.31 11.45 0.12 
26 West Bengal North 24 Parganas 24.22 0.23 0.12 0.07 
Kolkata 20.27 0.88 0.34 0.14 
Koch Bihar 24.24 0.09 0.01 0.02 
Uttar Dinajpur 47.36 0.54 0.01 0.01 
Dakshin Dinajpur 24.02 1.47 0.01 0.01 
Maldah 49.72 0.25 0.01. 0.00 
Murshidabad 63.67 0.23 0.01 0.00 
Birbhum 35.08 0.24 0.01 0.01 
Barddhaman 19.78 0.23 0.32 0.02 
Nadia 25.41 0.64 0.02 0.01 
Howrah (Haorah) 24.44 0.15 0.09 0.03 
South 24 Parganas 33.24 0.76 0.02 0.03 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs  
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criteria resulted in a reduction in the Muslim share of the population benefiting from the 
scheme while increasing the coverage of other minorities (Christians, Sikhs and 
Buddhists). The criteria for the creation of MCDs and their subsequent expansion has 
led some critics to suggest that the area-based approach did not always seriously address 
the concerns of Muslim (and other minorities’) under-development because ‘programme 
implementation can take place in such a way that the state religious groups are excluded 
from accessing the services’.689 
 
 The Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee in its review of the MSDP was highly 
critical of the performance of the scheme in targeting Muslim deprivation. It identified a 
number of concerns. These  
 
ranged from the fact that it is largely an area development scheme and 
does not focus on individual families…and as the minorities are not 
uniformly concentrated in districts, the schemes under the programme 
can be carried out without really benefitting minorities. Only about 30 per 
cent of the Muslims…can benefit from targeting 90 districts as 
implementation unit for MSDP; non-inclusion of a large section of 
Muslims in Below Poverty Line (BPL) list keeps them away from the 
benefits of many schemes.690 
 
The Committee’s finding largely confirmed the evidence collected by NGOs and 
advocacy organisations that the MSDP had been in general badly designed as a means 
of addressing the needs of poor Muslims.691 
 
Table 6.6 
Share of minority in total minority population in MCD 
 
Minority 
districts 
Total 
minority 
(millions) 
Muslims 
(%) 
Christians 
(%) 
Sikhs 
(%) 
Buddhists 
(%) 
Zoroastrians 
(%) 
India 189.5 72.92 12.71 10.14 4.20 0.04 
121 MCDs 81.7 80.64 13.44 2.01 3.85 0.06 
90 MCDs 58.2 89.96 5.67 1.87 2.50 0.00 
41 MCDs 45.9 93.31 3.44 0.91 2.32 0.03 
 
Source: Shariff, Six Years after Sachar, 78.  
 
Note: In the first and last rows, the sum of share of minorities is slightly more than 100 per cent due to 
reduction in the number of decimal places (rounding error). 
 
                                                      
689
 Ibid., 79. 
690
 Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee (New Delhi: GoI, 2014), 148.  
691
 Ibid. Space precludes a mode detailed assessment. The Committee’s findings are reviewed in the 
Conclusion. 
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The list of 90 MCDs, identified in the revised 15PP, covered only 37.9 per cent of the 
Muslim population, but this rose to 47.66 per cent as the number of MCDs increased to 
121.692 As the minutes of Empowered Committee meetings make clear: 
 
These districts have a substantial minority population, but also have other 
sections of the society who suffer from the same backwardness and 
deprivation, as the identification of the district as backward have four 
parameters which are for the whole district. The initiative is, therefore, a 
joint effort of the Centre and the States/Union Territories for inclusive 
growth/development, accelerating the development process and 
improving the quality of life of the people. MSDP aims at focused 
development programme for backward MCDs to help reduce imbalances 
and speed up development.693 
 
On the question of whether Muslims in MCDs were able to secure equitable access to 
various government programmes, much more rigorous analysis is required. As noted 
above, the government had decided to adopt the norms and guidelines of Centrally 
Sponsored Scheme in implementing the MSDP. Table 6.7 below lists the schemes for 
minorities in MCDs, with the budget allocations during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. 
 
Table 6.7 
Budget allocation by union government for minorities in eleventh five-year plan 
 
Schemes Amount (Rs Crore) Share (percentage) 
Basic Services to Urban Poor (BSUP) 31431.08 29.73 
IHSDP 8147.59 7.71 
Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) 26495.95 25.06 
UIDSSMT 7825.81 7.40 
IAY 8216.426 7.77 
NRDWP 14045.31 13.28 
ITI 163 0.15 
SJSRY 192 0.18 
Madrasa Modernisation Programme 450 0.43 
 
   Source: Jawed Alam Khan, Policy Priorities for Development of Muslims in the 11th Plan: An    
   Assessment (New Delhi: Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, 2012), 12. 
 
Four schemes − the JNNURM, which was an umbrella scheme, and included 
BSUP, IHSDP, UIG, UIDSSMT − constituted 69.9 per cent of the total funds allocated 
for minorities. Launched in December 2005, as the largest initiative of the government 
                                                      
692
 Ibid., 78. 
693
 For instance see Ministry of Minority Affairs, Minutes of the 48th Meeting of Empowered Committee, 2 
September 2011. Available at: 
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/48thECmimutes.pdf [accessed on 3 May 
2014]. Emphasis added.  
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for the planned development of cities, JNNURM aimed to improve urban infrastructure 
and provide services to the urban poor. As more Muslims reside in urban areas than in 
the countryside, and the poverty ratio among urban Muslims is high,694 this flagship city 
re-development programme should have disproportionately benefited community 
development. However, upon closer examination, it appears minorities, particularly 
Muslims, were almost non-existent in areas where the JNNURM was implemented.695 
Moreover, most of the allocations made under the JNNURM only reported the number 
and costs of projects sanctioned, not the beneficiary or data on minorities.696 Thus, the 
use of Centrally Sponsored Scheme guidelines in implementing the JNNURM was a 
major missed opportunity: it resulted in the failure to develop adequate policy tools to 
address the exclusion of Muslims in one of the largest development schemes sponsored 
by the central government.697 In effect, the MSDP became a mechanism for increased 
funding for existing programmes rather than a qualitatively new departure from 
approaches pursued by previous governments. 
 
With the exceptions of JNNURM, IAY, SJSRY, and SGSY, other schemes in 
Table 6.7 were beneficiary-driven and aimed at poverty reduction. Yet, once again, 
large numbers of Muslims were excluded from these schemes because their names were 
omitted from the BPL list. Although the SCR had pointed out that many poor Muslims 
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 SCR, 158. 
695
 According to Jawed Alam Khan, ‘MoMA provides the data on financial allocation made for minorities 
by JNNURM on its website but without any physical outcome. When I tried to probe it in states like Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar and Haryana, the officials were unable to provide any data on 
Muslims/minorities.’ Interview, 11 April 2014, New Delhi. In the word of an official in Bihar: ‘there is no 
exclusion of any section from these schemes, but no targeting of minorities too’. Centre for Equity 
Studies, Promises to Keep, 34. 
696
 It is in stark contrast to the budget statement for SCs and STs of the amount allocated under different 
ministries. In the guidelines of JNNURM there is neither provision for religious minorities nor a budget 
reporting mechanism. 
697
 ‘Most of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes that are part of the [15PP] have not been altered in any way 
(by way of bringing about changes in the scheme guidelines) to cater to the specific disadvantages and 
needs of the community. The state and district level implementing agencies do not have adequate clarity 
on the share of allocations available towards the programme given the lack of disaggregated data in most 
schemes’. Khan, Policy Priorities for Development of Muslims in the 11th Plan, 19. Another example of 
rigidity adopted in using Centrally Sponsored Schemes in government programme is the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) − the largest and most ambitious 
social security and public works programme in the world – according to the Ministry of Rural 
Development. In MGNREGS only 13 per cent of Muslims were included while they constitute 36 per 
cent of the population and 45 per cent of the job card holders. But a field survey conducted in Mewat (74 
per cent Muslim population) in Haryana revealed a worse scenario that people were unwilling to work 
through MGNREGS due to low wages and subsequent delays which contributed to the low take-up of the 
scheme. Centre for Equity Studies, Promises to Keep, vii-viii; Khan and Parvati, ‘Government’s 
Commitment towards Development of Muslims’, 260. 
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do not have BPL cards,698 this shortcoming was poorly accounted for in policy design or 
execution, particularly in poverty reduction programmes, which were still being 
designed to benefit those in possession of the cards.699 But such failure in policy design 
and execution should be understood in a broader context: the last update of the BPL list 
was conducted by the government in 2002 although it should have taken place in 2007 
and 2012. In the absence of the BPL census for 2007 and 2012, the government initiated 
a new census named ‘Socio Economic and Caste Census’ in June 2011.700 However, as 
of August 2014, the final results of this census had not been published.701  
 
As well as poor policy design and execution, expenditure under SSA, SGSY, 
and ICDS was badly publicised and monitored. While many government schemes were 
aimed at area development, the few beneficiary-driven ones (IAY, SJSRY, and SGSY) 
provided limited opportunity for Muslims.702 The absence of any fund allocation report 
for these schemes makes it difficult to assess whether Muslims have benefited at all. 
Similarly, the NRDWP reports data by state but it is difficult to estimate the number of 
minorities who benefited. The ITI also provides state data on targets and achievements, 
but does not specify which minority communities benefit.703 The funds for the Madrasa 
Modernisation Programme, the promotion of Urdu, and Haj subsidies combined were 
less than one per cent of the total allocation. Overall, the budget allocated to MoMA for 
the various schemes merely combined the existing allocation under different schemes 
and ministries. 
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 ‘Muslims are often not able to avail of the reservation benefits available to OBCs as the officials do 
not issue the requisite caste certificates…many eligible Muslim OBCs were not included in the official 
list which results in denial of several benefits to the community’. SCR, 24. 
699
 See Prashant K. Trivedi, ‘Rural Power Structure, State Initiatives, and the Muslims: Divergent 
Experiences in Four States’, in Council for Social Development, Zoya Hasan and Mushirul Hasan, eds., 
India Social Development Report 2012, 239.   
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 Ministry of Rural Development, ‘Socio-Economic and Caste Census, 2011 is not a BPL Survey, Says 
Rural Development Minister’, PIB, 8 August 2011. According to the Minister of Rural Development, this 
census was to generate a rank listing of rural households based on automatic inclusion criteria and 
deprivation indicators, and to be sent to state governments to determine the BPL households in states. The 
outcome of this census is particularly important for Muslims whose large population is excluded in the 
BPL list for caste impacts on inclusion into BPL list and provision of BPL certificates. Also the result of 
this survey is crucial because the government delayed its action on replying to Supreme Court query in 
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Muslims and Christians until the survey was complete. ‘With the knowledge of proportion of SCs in the 
Muslim and Christian communities, the government wants to use the outcome as evidence in its reply to 
the Supreme Court.’ Jawed Alam Khan, interview, 11 April 2014, New Delhi. 
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 As of 27 August 2014, only draft list of 274 districts out of 640 is available. See 
http://www.secc.gov.in/state [accessed on 27 August 2014]. 
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 Khan, Policy Priorities for Development of Muslims in the 11th Plan, 19. 
703
 Ibid., 5 ‘If [ITIs] are to be build, there is no robust system to ensure that these will be located in 
Muslim localities’. Centre for Equity Studies, Promises to Keep, viii. 
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  Yet even with this limited allocation MoMA’s funds remained poorly utilised. 
Table 6.8 below shows the fund utilisation by MoMA. 
 
Table 6.8 
Fund utilisation by MoMA during the eleventh five-year plan  
 
Year BE RE Actual expenditure Utilisation (%) 
2007-08 500.00 350.00 196.65 39.33 
2008-09 1000.00 650.00 619.02 61.90 
2009-10 1740.00 1740.00 1709.425 98.24 
2010-11 2600.00 2500.00 2008.87 77.26 
2011-12 2850.00 2750.00 2283.415 80.12 
Total (2007-12) 8,690 7,990   6,817.38 78.45 
Unit: Rs. Crore. 
 
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs, Statement Indicating BE, RE and Actual Expenditure for the Year 
2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 & 2013-14. Available at: 
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/BE_RE&Exp_2006-2012.pdf [accessed 
on 25 August 2014]. 
 
Note: BE: Budget Estimate, RE: Revised Estimate. Utilisation has been calculated based on the BE.  
 
During the eleventh plan, the Ministry spent only Rs 6,817 crore (78 per cent), and 
surrendered Rs 1,872 crore. MoMA attributed this underspend to state governments: 
 
Unfortunately in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, and the first year of the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, we could not spend the amount earmarked for 
MSDP, because states have to send the proposals, but they didn’t send 
proposal in time. So we were not able to process them. The major 
responsibility is with the states. We had the money, we could have 
transferred it, but most of the states did not send the project. They are not 
interested in these projects. State governments say it is central 
government projects, let them have it. They sometimes have their own 
state projects. States’ bureaucracy was the source of [the] problem.704  
 
The same explanation is found in the report of the Steering Committee on 
Empowerment of Minorities of the Planning Commission which concluded that ‘whole 
amount allocated could not be spent due to non-submission of complete and adequate 
proposals by the States/Union Territories, late submission of utilisation certificates by 
the States/Union Territories, [and the] promulgation of code of conduct for elections in 
some States’.705 The non-submission of proposals was also noted in Parliament: ‘four 
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 K. Rahman Khan, interview, 12 February 2013, New Delhi, emphasis added. Low utilisation of funds 
was also discussed in the standing committee report on social justice and empowerment. See, Ministry of 
Minority Affairs, Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment (2011-2012): the 27th Report 
(New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2012), 29-33. 
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 Planning Commission, ‘Report of the Steering Committee on “Empowering of Minorities” for the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan’, 14. Available at: 
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states, viz. Arunanchal Pradesh, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh, Sikkim have not submitted 
their district plans’.706  
 
Data, monitoring and evaluation  
 
Many of the shortcomings in service delivery could have been anticipated by effective 
regular monitoring of data, constant evaluation, and reassessment of targets. Yet, 
throughout the fieldwork it was repeatedly stated by government officials and 
policymakers that it is against the spirit of the Constitution to generate data on religious 
lines. Even schemes designed for minorities, particularly those ‘officially’ sanctioned to 
earmark a certain portion of benefits to them, do not clarify the actual number of 
recipients among religious minorities. None of the monitoring data on schemes with 
flow of funds to MCDs707 specifies the actual recipient.708 Furthermore, the data by state 
on schemes under various ministries is incomplete as many states fail to file proper 
status/monitoring reports with the ministry. 
 
In general, monitoring data on government schemes for minorities is 
inaccessible and poorly organised. The situation with the budget data is not an 
exception; rather, it can be convincingly argued that Indian government data is 
fragmented, sometimes deliberately misrepresented and incomplete. While the 
expenditure data are relatively well-structured and produced at regular intervals, they 
fail to show how the funds were utilised and whether they benefited the intended 
recipients. The government’s inactivity is well illustrated by an answer given in a Rajya 
Sabha debate by the Minister of State for MoMA. Asked whether benefits from the 
schemes had reached the minorities, he responded that ‘funds are released as per the 
norms’. 709  Parliamentary debates on monitoring are almost non-existent, and the 
remarks made by policymakers often give the impression that the government considers 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/strgrp12/sc_emp_minorties.pdf [accessed on 4 
February 2014]. 
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 See RSD, 7 December 2009; RSD, 14 December 2009. 
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 The weak monitoring system and improvement of monitoring mechanism was noted in the standing 
committee report on social justice and empowerment. See, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Standing 
Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment (2011-2012), 48, 50-1, 67, 69; Centre for Equity Studies, 
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funds released and benefit to minorities as one and the same thing.710 As a result of this 
inertia, of the various schemes under the PM’s 15 PP, not a single one reported the 
targets/outlays for minorities, or the religious status of the recipients.711 Data that does 
exist, on the other hand, is very difficult to access, due to the absence or complexity of 
systematic reporting mechanisms on the various ministry websites, and because the 
many different schemes are homed in different ministries with no consolidated or 
coordinated presentation of statistics. This is despite the fact that when the MSDP was 
launched, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs announced that ‘a suitable 
monitoring system would be put in place. An independent in-depth evaluation would be 
made after two years to assess the need for any mid-term correction.’712 At the end of 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the monitoring effort made by the government proved 
symbolic: it only generated data by state on financial and physical progress in the 
MSDP, without specifying the religious identity of the recipients.713  
 
However, as a result of these weaknesses some policy changes have been made 
in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In July and October 2011, MoMA held consultations 
with experts, academics and intellectuals from minority communities. Based on these 
consultations, and the recommendations of the Working Group on Empowerment of 
Minorities in the Planning Commission, MoMA formulated new proposals for the 
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 The Minister of Minority Affairs, Salman Khurshid, stated in the Rajya Sabha debate that 
‘implementation of the scheme of MSDP for MCDs is reviewed regularly by the government with the 
state government/Union Territory administration concerned’ (RSD, 7 December 2009). He further added 
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Available at: 
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Planning Commission. In addition, MoMA received recommendations from the 
National Advisory Council (NAC) on education and employment schemes, and made 
revisions to the MSDP guidelines. As a result the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012-17) 
demonstrates a more concentrated effort on proportionality. The Steering Committee of 
Planning Commission recommended that for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan the 
government should adopt the ‘block’ as a unit of planning, allowing for better targeting 
of minorities; and the population criterion to identify MCDs should be reduced from 25 
per cent to 15 per cent. 714  A noticeable shift can be seen in the minutes of the 
Empowered Committee, with a new focus on proportionality. As the minutes of the 
Committee note:  
 
Secretary…[of] Ministry of Minority Affairs emphasised that the benefits 
accrued by the implementation of MSDP should go to the Minority 
Community properly. Therefore, not only location of the assets in the 
areas having substantial minority population is important, but it is also 
equally important to see that the assets created are actually imparting 
benefits to the minorities. He requested the state governments to propose 
the locations accordingly.715  
 
In the twenty-five meetings of the Empowered Committee that took place since 
September 2012, this focus on proportionality and targeted benefit has been mentioned 
in at least twenty-four occasions.716  
 
Despite these official changes, institutionalised opposition to special treatment 
for Muslims remains strong. At the end of 2011, the Centre for Budget and Governance 
Accountability initiated a process to prepare a memorandum for the 2012 Budget 
Session on the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, with the aim of bringing government’s attention 
to the need for specific planning intervention to address Muslim backwardness. 717 
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Following the endorsement of the memorandum by MPs, the Centre held a meeting 
with the Minister of Minority Affairs in May 2012. After the Minister’s positive 
response, in July and August 2012, the principal secretary to Prime Minister invited the 
line ministries, which fall under 15PP, to provide beneficiary data on religious 
minorities. But this request was refused.718 To what extent the changes in the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan are likely to be transformed into reality remains to be seen. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focused on limited case studies − scholarships, credit and MSDP – 
aimed at improving service delivery for socio-economically disadvantaged Muslims. 
These policy initiatives were very different but encountered similar problems. In 
general, they were beset by poor design, ambiguous executive control, weak 
implementation, 719  chronic under-funding, bewildering complexity and overlap, and 
above all, weak mechanisms of monitoring, evaluation and targeting of religious 
beneficiaries.720 The absence of the latter, as we have noted, was all the more surprising 
given that in policy announcements monitoring was regularly mentioned as an essential 
requirement of service delivery.721 In large measure, these shortcomings stemmed from 
                                                                                                                                                            
earmarked budget heads in the detailed demands for grants like SCSP and TSP, 3) annual reports of all 
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UPA’s reluctance to develop its policies for disadvantaged Muslims as a special 
programme à la SCs and STs. As any such special programme was equated by UPA’s 
opponents (and some of its own supporters) – political as well as administrative – with 
reservations and special treatment, the government was compelled to use executive 
discretion rather than primary legislation. But as the UPA leadership struggled to 
explain satisfactorily the distinction between positive action and reservations, as we saw 
in the Minister of Finance Chidambaram’s response to a parliamentary question, 
opposition to the schemes mounted nationally and within the states. While there have 
been some notable successes, for instance the take-up of the scholarship scheme, and 
the UPA’s executive action also created an enabling environment in which pro-minority 
policy actors could mobilise and influence policy, such as the revisions for the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan, the overall picture is one of determined political and institutional 
resistance. As the UPA’s commitment to positive action for Muslims after 2007 waned, 
the potential momentum for a new critical juncture to create a new paradigm of equality 
of opportunity for religious minorities had been lost. The familiar pattern of historical 
path dependence was all too evident in symbolic implementation and political 
distancing from these policies long before May 2014.   
                                                                                                                                                            
of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Minority Affairs, ‘Ministry of Minority Affairs Launches 
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Chapter Seven 
UPA, Muslims and communal violence bill  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Equal protection under the law for racial, ethnic, religious and other minorities is 
considered a fundamental right, and in the 1980s and 1990s, western democracies 
increasingly adopted legislation that outlawed specific forms of hate crime targeted at 
minorities.722 In India, special legislative provisions for vulnerable groups, such as the 
anti-discrimination measures in the Protection of Civil Rights Act (1955) and the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989), have 
provided strong legal protection and security to caste groups in the wake of violence. In 
contrast, though religious minorities, especially Muslims, have been the target of 
violence during communal riots, they (and other) religious minorities lack equivalent 
protection. Hindu-Muslim riots and anti-Muslim pogroms have become the defining 
feature of post-1947 collective violence in India, and the regular recurrence of such 
events presents a serious challenge to the principles of secularism and religious 
tolerance. Recognising this fact, the UPA government promised to ‘enact a model 
comprehensive law to deal with communal violence’.723  
 
 In this chapter we undertake a detailed case study of the UPA’s efforts to 
legislate a model anti-communal violence bill by focusing on draft bills produced in 
2005 and 2011 and the policy process thereafter. We highlight how UPA’s efforts to 
produce ‘top-down’ legislation were frustrated by the institutionalised opposition to 
such a measure – political, administrative and judicial – and how they supported a 
Muslim civil society network that sought to build momentum for the bill. The goal of a 
new, normative legislation that could have significantly increased the penalties for 
committing communal violence, however, continued to elude the UPA. Faced with 
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opposition within its own ranks, the Congress-led UPA eventually opted for symbolic 
implementation.  
 
 
Agenda-setting 
 
After 2004, the UPA government was determined to prevent Gujarat-type anti-minority 
massacres. Historically, in the aftermath of violence, state and central governments have 
usually taken actions, some stronger than others, to deal with riots. State government 
and police have often been partisan in controlling the violence, managing the post-
conflict situations, and providing relief and rehabilitation.724  Discrimination against 
Muslims has been most visible in the use of force, preventive arrests, treatment of 
persons detained, investigation, and the detection and prosecution of cases registered 
during riots.725 Thus, the Gujarat riots resulted in the death of 2,000 Muslims and the 
displacement of 150,000 into relief camps, in significant part due to the ambiguous 
attitudes of the authorities and their failure to control the violence.726  
 
 Following the Gujarat riots, the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom designated India in its ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ list in 2002 
and 2003.727 However, India was removed from this list in 2005 on the grounds that the 
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UPA had pledged to tackle anti-religious discrimination and to bring domestic 
legislation addressing increasingly active anti-religious discrimination following 9/11. 
The Congress-led UPA’s NCMP promised:  
 
…to preserve, protect and promote social harmony and to enforce the law 
without fear or favour to deal with all obscurantist and fundamentalist 
elements who seek to disturb social amity and peace.728 
 
 
Earlier, the Congress manifesto had promised to ‘enact a model comprehensive law to 
deal with communal violence’729 by stating that:  
 
The Congress will adopt all possible measures to promote and maintain 
communal peace and harmony, especially in sensitive areas. It will enact 
a comprehensive law on social violence in all its forms and 
manifestations, providing for investigations by a central agency, 
prosecution by Special Courts and payment of uniform compensation for 
loss of life, honour and property.730  
 
Although the SCR focused on the socio-economic conditions of the Muslim 
community, it also expressed concerns about the lack of a sense of security among 
Muslims. This insecurity felt by the Muslim community, the SCR noted, was due to the 
lackadaisical attitude of governments in controlling the outbreak of communal riots, 
inaction in punishing the guilty, particularly state officials, and the attitude of the police 
and the media in reporting the involvement of Muslims in violence. It also 
acknowledged that a bare minimum of compensation is awarded to the riot victims, and 
highlighted the particular delay in payments when the victims are Muslims.731  The 
heightened fear of insecurity among Muslims has occasioned increasing ghettoisation. 
The SCR also attributed the bias within the police and law and order agencies to the 
lack of an adequate Muslim presence in the police force.732 While the concern about 
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fear for security of the Muslim community is rightly emphasised, the committee 
avoided specific recommendation on this matter.733  
 
 
Policy formulation and decision-making 
 
In terms of the policy cycle, whilst the agenda-setting stage was clearly identifiable, the 
process of policy formulation spanned both UPA (I) and UPA (II). In fact it began 
properly with the introduction of legislation in Parliament.734 There seem to have been 
limited consultations before the Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and 
Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill (2005) was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 5th 
December 2005. In moving the bill, the Minister of Home Affairs claimed its aims were 
to:  
 
…empower the State Governments and the Central Government to take 
measures to provide for the prevention and control of communal violence 
which threatens the secular fabric, unity, integrity and internal security of 
the Nation and rehabilitation of victims of such violence and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.735 
 
These aims were so broad that turning them into legislation would stoke the ire of 
opponents and supporters alike. The key challenge facing the government was not only 
to build effective political support for the measure among the states and national parties, 
but to draft the legislation in a way which distinguished it from existing statutes. Thus, 
the bill created a new offence of communal violence, identified the target groups, 
enhanced the powers to control communally disturbed areas, increased the 
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accountability of officials involved in the management of communal violence, and 
provided for more effective rehabilitation and relief for the victims than hitherto. Not 
unnaturally, these radical innovations faced significant challenges.  
 
 The bill sought to create a new framework for tackling communal violence. 
First, it redefined ‘communal violence’ as ‘any act of omission or commission which 
constitutes a scheduled offence’.736 Second, the target group was to include not only 
religious communities but ‘any group, caste or community’.737 Third, new powers were 
given to state governments to declare an area ‘communally disturbed’ when ‘criminal 
force or violence is committed against any group, caste or community resulting in death 
or destruction of property; [when] such use of criminal force or violence is committed 
with a view to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between 
different group, caste or communities; and unless immediate steps are taken there will 
be danger to the secular fabric, integrity, internal security of India’. 738 All three 
conditions had to be satisfied for an area to be declared communally disturbed. Fourth, 
new enhanced powers were also given to District Magistrates to empower them to 
prevent and control communal violence.739 Fifth, the powers of the centre to deal with 
states in situations of communal violence were further strengthened: the centre could 
‘draw the attention of the State Government to the prevailing situation in [violence 
afflicted] area’ and ‘direct the State Government to take all immediate measures to 
suppress such violence or use of criminal force’.740 If the centre’s voice were ignored, it 
could issue ‘a notification declaring any area within a State as a “communally disturbed 
area”’, and deploy armed forces ‘on a request having been received from the State 
Government to do so’. 741  Sixth, penalties to be imposed on public servants were 
enumerated. These included police officers and any public officer who failed to provide 
protection to victims, to record any information pertinent to the commission of any 
scheduled offence or to investigate or prosecute any scheduled offence.742 Finally, an 
elaborate institutional mechanism – at the district, state and national level – was 
outlined for providing relief and rehabilitation to victims of communal violence.743  
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Following its introduction in the Rajya Sabha, the draft bill was referred to the 
Standing Committee on Home Affairs. 744  While the Standing Committee sought 
comments from experts, state governments, political parties, and civil society, there was 
strong opposition to the measure in Parliament. Almost all political parties, including 
the BJP, BJD, SP, BSP, CPI (M), and RJD, opposed the bill because it threatened states’ 
rights, especially the right to control law and order. In the words of Devendra Prasad 
Yadav (RJD): ‘We do not want the central government to encroach upon the rights of a 
state. Law and order is a State subject.’745  As Bhartruhari Mahtab (BJD) candidly 
admitted: ‘no political party today wants police to become neutral. Nobody wants police 
to become independent in one way or other, each and every party is enjoying power 
either in some state or at the Centre.’746  
 
Despite this opposition the UPA was determined to pass the measure. The 
Minister of Home Affairs, Shivraj Patil, insisted that the ‘bill is before the Standing 
Committee and we are expecting [that] the bill should be passed immediately’.747 He 
highlighted that ‘everybody will be surprised that the bill is going to be very good for 
controlling the communal violence in the country’, emphasising its key provisions, 
including the compensation for riot victims. Referring to the system of compensation as 
‘path-breaking’, Patil noted it was the ‘responsibility of the society to see that there is 
no communal violence and if anybody suffers in the communal violence, compensation 
should be given to him’. In response to the states’ objection over the increased powers 
of the centre to intervene, he offered a consensual approach: 
 
…we are not going to thrust this idea on the country without obtaining 
the cooperation of the State Government[s]. If you want that this should 
be done, we will do it. Otherwise, we will keep it aside, and try to 
persuade them…It needs the concurrence of the State Governments. Our 
intention is not to impose this on the state governments without their 
concurrence. If there is concurrence, then something can be 
done...Supposing something happens in a State that is not controllable, 
then the only remedy available with the Union Government is to remove 
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that Government from its position and impose President’s Rule to take 
action. This is the extreme step. If one area is disturbed in a particular 
State, then by taking this extreme step you are disturbing the entire state. 
Furthermore, if this extreme step is taken, then also objections are raised 
about it. This is the reason that it cannot be done very quickly.748 
 
Even after the minister’s request that the members consider his statement carefully, no 
follow-up discussion took place until the report of the Standing Committee of Home 
Affairs was laid before Parliament on 13th December 2006. Chaired by Sushma Swaraj 
of the BJP, the Standing Committee made no substantive recommendations. 749 
Although the Cabinet gave its approval for the enactment of legislation in March 2007, 
and notice was given several times (March 2007, December 2008 and February 2009) in 
the Rajya Sabha for consideration and passing of the bill, and for moving official 
amendments, it was not reintroduced. In fact, while the bill was pending there were 
several major incidents of communal violence: Mau (2005), Lucknow, Aligarh, and 
Vadodara (2006); and Bangalore, Gorakhpur, Mewat-Parbhani, and Indore (2007)750 
followed by debates in the Rajya Sabha.751 But these debates took place without any 
substantive discussion on the Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and 
Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill (2005). Indeed, despite the UPA’s declarations that the 
bill was part of its core agenda, there was no debate on its provisions until the end of the 
Fourteenth Lok Sabha.752 
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The bill, Muslim organisations and civil society networks 
 
From 2007 onwards, as we have seen in Chapter Four, the momentum in policy change 
was arrested by the broader political developments affecting the UPA; the bill was no 
longer perceived as a ‘core’ part of the UPA’s agenda, and hence marginalised in 
parliamentary debates. In the absence of policy focus on the bill, the Muslim civil 
society network was brought into the policy process.  
 
 The first national consultation of Act Now for Harmony and Democracy 
(ANHAD), a socio-cultural organisation set up in response to the 2002 Gujarat riots, 
was held on 16th June 2007. At this meeting, jurists, academics, activists, and legal 
experts concluded that the bill was ‘so flawed that it cannot be remedied by amending a 
few components’.753 In this consultation, former Chief Justices and judges, including 
Justice Rajinder Sachar, criticised the UPA for failing to provide the promised 
‘comprehensive legislation’ to fill the legal vacuum. The bill was characterised as 
‘entirely misplaced in its intent’, as it empowered the centre and state governments, but 
not citizens or victims of communal violence.754 Ironically, the contributors felt the 
enhanced powers could be misused to intimidate minorities rather than protect them. 
Second, it was suggested the bill inadequately defined the ‘scheduled offence’ because 
communal violence was often a targeted mass crime synonymous with genocide and, 
increasingly, aggravated acts of sexual violence directed at women of the targeted 
community. Genocide and sexual violence, therefore, were considered essential 
elements of communal violence in contemporary India. M. Ahmadi, a former Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, suggested that provisions related to genocide should be 
modelled on the Protection of Human Rights Act (1993). The proposed measure was 
also heavily criticised for affording limited protection to victims while continuing to 
provide significant loopholes for officials and administrators against acts of commission 
and omission. Amongst other groups, the NCM proposed that the language of the bill 
should be accessible to lower level state functionaries, the word ‘communal’ should be 
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replaced with ‘sectarian’, and a uniform scale of compensation should be paid within 
thirty days of each incident. 755  Rejecting the bill in its entirety, the participants 
requested that the central government set up a Drafting Committee to formulate a new 
bill with the active participation of civil society.756  
 
It appears that despite these recommendations and pressures, the UPA 
government remained lukewarm in pushing forward with the legislation. There seems to 
have been little movement on the bill until early 2009. ‘In UPA (I)’, recalls a member of 
NAC, ‘there was no process around the bill. The government brought its own draft in 
2005. From 2005 to 2009 all we had was civil society opposition to the bill.’757 In a 
context in which serious debates on the bill were missing from Parliament, the active 
engagement of civil society in discussion and the submission of recommendations to 
government played a crucial role in the decision-making process. The efforts made 
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through civic engagement appeared to counterweigh the state’s ‘top-down’ process, and 
seems to have been reflected in the 59 amendments cleared by the Cabinet in December 
2009.  
 
As we saw in Chapter Four, the nuclear deal with the US, the subsequent vote of 
confidence against the government and the loss of key coalition partners, as well as the 
loss of major state elections in 2007, are often cited as the reasons for this 
backtracking.758 Yet, these considerations and the exigencies of coalition politics proved 
less of a barrier for major constitutional initiatives on SCs, STs, OBCs, and women.759 
The policy process around the 2009 amendments before and after the Lok Sabha 
elections remains obscure: it appears unclear whether the amendments were shared with 
relevant institutions, political parties, and state governments; nor is the immediate 
reaction of the political parties public knowledge.760 What is clear, however, is that the 
UPA followed the familiar twin-track approach of announcing amendments to the 2005 
draft barely a few months before the closing of the Fourteenth Lok Sabha. However, the 
problem was not simply that the provisions in the draft bill were weak and 
inappropriate; rather, the embedded culture of institutionalised resistance in the policy 
process, and political and institutional opposition, acted to frustrate the legislation.  
 
 
Policy formulation: UPA (II) 
 
In its 2009 election manifesto the Congress committed itself to ‘ensuring the right to 
compensation and rehabilitation for all victims of communal, ethnic and caste violence 
on standards and levels that are binding on every government’. The ‘Indian National 
Congress’, the party’s manifesto continued, ‘will propose a law that empowers the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to monitor investigation and trial in all 
cases of communal and caste violence’.761 While the 2004 manifesto had dealt with 
‘social violence’, the 2009 manifesto delineated more precisely the target of the 
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proposed bill as ‘communal, ethnic and caste violence’. Now more emphasis was given 
to victims’ right to compensation and rehabilitation, and the NHRC was to be 
responsible for monitoring investigations and trials.  
 
Soon after the UPA won the 2009 general elections, Sabir Ali (Janata Dal 
(United) - JD (U) Bihar), asked about the status of the bill in the Rajya Sabha.762 
Questioned whether the government proposed to enact the bill, the Minister of State for 
Home Affairs simply pointed to the events following the introduction of the bill in 
2005. Despite an attempt by Bihar MPs to raise the issue,763 the Minister defended the 
position of central government by responding that police and public order were states’ 
jurisdiction, and guidelines to promote communal harmony had already been circulated 
to states and Union Territories in 2008. Concurrently, in the Lok Sabha the Congress 
MP, P. C. Chacko, confirmed the party’s intent to adopt and implement the bill in full 
measure.764  
 
Prior to the closing of the Fourteenth Lok Sabha, in early 2009, the UPA 
announced 59 amendments to the 2005 draft. The most notable amendment was that it 
gave the central government exclusive power to constitute a ‘Unified Command’ 
following communal violence. The central government’s obligation to constitute a 
‘Unified Command’ was substituted for the 2005 draft which stated both ‘the central or 
state government may constitute’ a Unified Command. The 2009 provisions was 
changed to ensure that ‘the central government shall constitute’ a Unified Command 
whenever central forces were deployed to control communal riots.765 In addition, while 
the previous draft only allowed the central government to intervene and issue 
instructions to the state in the case of death or destruction of property, the 2009 
amendments empowered it to intervene even where there has been no loss of life.766 
Thus, the centre was empowered to deploy forces at sites where communal violence 
were likely to occur, or had occurred; it was also enabled to prevent further riots, even if 
state governments with anti-minority leanings were unwilling to act. If the central 
government were to play a partisan role, and choose not to deploy forces, the state 
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governments would still be able to act independently. But despite these provisions, the 
2009 amendments failed to make major revisions.767  
 
After the Fifteenth Lok Sabha election, the Union Cabinet cleared the bill for 
introduction in Parliament in December 2009. The decision came a week after the 
government tabled the Action Taken Report (ATR) on the Liberhan Commission Report 
on the 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid on 24th November 2009. The ATR 
contained the promise that government would bring in the bill at the earliest 
opportunity. 768  By tabling the long-awaited report in Parliament and the action 
promised, the government appeared to have signalled its intent on the legislation. Vijay 
Bahuguna (Congress) welcomed the government’s move by stating that the 2009 
amendments to the bill: 
 
…would enable the centre to intervene in a situation of communal 
violence without waiting for orders from the Unified Command, district 
magistrate or state government. The state government will no longer have 
authority to set [up] Unified Command in situation of communal 
violence.769  
 
The need to empower central government was articulated by the Minister of Law, M. 
Veerappa Moily, who noted that during incidents, such as those in Gujarat and Odisha 
(2002 and 2007), ‘the nation had to be a mute spectator. Sometimes, the party in power 
becomes [the] party in what is happening.’770 
 
 Predictably, however, political parties, particularly the BJP, condemned the bill 
and the power it would give to central government. A senior BJP leader, Arun Jaitley, 
claimed that the measure was a major encroachment on the federal structure of the 
country, and expressed ‘serious doubts about the legislative competence of Parliament 
on a subject which deals with law and order’.771 Parties on the Left, including the SP, 
BSP and CPI, chose not to take an official stance on the bill because they were unaware 
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of the specific amendments. As noted earlier, it remains unclear whether the 
amendments were shared with these parties. 
  
The bill, National Advisory Council and civil society networks – UPA (II) 
 
After the clearance of the amendments by the Cabinet, ANHAD held a second round of 
national consultations with more than 200 participants across India to discuss 
possibilities and make recommendations. One outcome of this process was the 
formation of a core group for more engaged interaction with the government. These 
participants played crucial roles as policy network actors at the regional level, 
organising public meetings across India to discuss the bill. The Delhi core group held 
consultations with the Minister of Law, ministry officials, and the sub-group of the 
NAC to discuss amendments to the bill.772 Additional national consultations were also 
held, with seminars and conferences at the regional level. The engagement of the 
networks of Muslim activists, academics, and jurists with the policy process marked a 
new departure from the traditional passivity of such groups. It represented a 
groundswell of ‘bottom-up’ mobilisation of Muslim activists. 
 
Prompted by the suggestions made by civil society networks and communal 
violence, the NAC Working Group proceeded to draft a new bill.773 A year later, The 
Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) 
Bill (2011) was published online to garner further public feedback. Among the 
provisions, several were noteworthy. 
 
First, the bill made a crucial distinction between the dominant and non-dominant 
groups as the targets of communal violence. Groups were identified by religion, 
language, or caste (SCs or STs), with the aim of providing equal treatment to non-
dominant groups under the law. 774  This distinction was established to correct the 
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institutional bias against groups, considered particularly vulnerable at the state level. 
Second, it provided a more comprehensive definition of ‘communal and targeted 
violence’ as ‘any act or series of acts, whether spontaneous or planned, resulting in 
injury or harm to the person and or property, knowingly directed against any person by 
virtue of his or her membership of any group’.775 Third, the range of offences in the new 
legislation included ‘sexual assault’.776  Fourth, to make officials and administrators 
more accountable for dereliction of duty, the bill proposed the punishment of public 
servants, with imprisonment for two years, extendable to five years, and liability to a 
fine.777 In contrast to the 2005 draft, which provided legal immunity from prosecution to 
central or state governments and public servants if any action had been taken in ‘good 
faith’ or was ‘intended to be done under the Act’, the 2011 version significantly reduced 
the possibility for the exercise of discretion or institutional bias. Fifth, the bill 
introduced the idea of ‘breach of command responsibility’ – the exercise of superior 
command – to cover public servants, non-state actors, and heads of associations.778 
Sixth, as in the previous legislative proposal, the new bill proposed to create new 
national and state authorities to give advice and recommendations, and to monitor the 
investigation, prosecution, trial of offences and provision of relief in order to ensure 
‘public functionaries act’ in the wake of communal violence.779 Seventh, the Indian 
Penal Code (IPC) was superseded by not allowing the defence of ‘sovereign 
immunity’780 − a defence which hindered questioning or prosecution of state officials. 
Finally, relief and rehabilitation was to be awarded not only to religious and linguistic 
minorities, SCs and STs, but also to non-religious and linguistic minorities, non-SCs 
and non-STs affected by the communal violence. State Assessment Committees were to 
assess the extent of injury to life and property and all aspects of reparation and 
restitution, including the quantum of compensation and other measures to be taken in 
the wake of communal and targeted violence. Compensation was to be awarded within 
thirty days of the incident, and the amount of compensation for death and rape was 
specified. The failure of public servants to take all reasonable steps to ensure the 
provision of relief measures was defined as a dereliction of duty.781  
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In the new NAC draft, dereliction of duty by public officials was placed at the 
heart of the bill. In the words of a member of NAC Working Group:  
 
The bill not only held the public officials accountable but structurally 
gave them confidence and liberation from political control...[it would 
empower] public officials to turn around to a political master and say 
‘No, you want me to do something, but I will not do it. Why? Because 
when it comes to facing prison sentence it is me, not you!’ So the bill was 
to hold both of them accountable and liberate them from political control, 
because it is political control that commits and manipulates the 
communal violence. This is why we need a law.782  
 
Response to the draft bill 
 
The draft bill was submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs on 25th July 2011, along 
with the suggestions received. It was to be cleared before the Cabinet with a view to its 
introduction in Parliament, but the government avoided an official announcement on the 
measure.783  Thus, when the draft was made public, some jurists opposed it on the 
grounds that India already had more laws than anywhere else in the world.784 In a 
similar vein, the sociologist Dipankar Gupta criticised it as an unwelcome development: 
 
The bill is stupid and useless. It is only a way of passing the buck. The 
basic point of the bill should be that when anyone is in power, and if 
something happens under his watch, the person should be responsible. 
But that is not the case here. There is nothing wrong with our laws and 
we don’t need any new bill. The main problem is not the bill, but the 
politicians and those who are ruling. Across the world, very strong 
administrative support and riots always go together. The Communal 
Violence Bill does not raise this issue. What is its point?785  
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The main criticisms from the BJP and other political parties were based on three 
grounds. First, most parties and state governments criticised the bill as a serious 
encroachment on the federal structure of India. Second, the BJP in particular argued that 
it was anti-majority, since it could be invoked only when minorities were attacked.786 
Finally, the BJP objected to the fact that the measure was drafted by the NAC, a body 
without constitutional or parliamentary status, and without consultation with state 
governments.787  
 
Responding to these criticism the Congress spokesperson, Manish Tewari, 
defended the party’s position: 
 
Jaitley is giving the bill a communal twist and deliberately trying to 
spread misinformation. I am a Hindu from Punjab which makes me a 
minority and a protected species under this bill…if there is a riot 
instigated by a minority community in any state, then they will be dealt 
with in accordance with ordinary law. If instigated by the majority in any 
state, then this bill would apply in addition to IPC.788  
 
The Minister of Minority Affairs, Salman Khurshid, also confirmed that ‘an attempt to 
emphasise protection for a minority…is consistent with affirmative action under the 
Constitution. These are not departures from equality but the very effective 
implementation of equality.’789  
 
 
Decision-making: UPA (II)  
 
UPA (II)’s efforts to manage the policy formulation process soon ran into the ground. 
While the bill was embroiled in political, executive and judicial quagmires, the Prime 
Minister called a meeting of the NIC − a national platform for states, MPs, ministers, 
and senior government officers. The agenda of the 2011 meeting included 
communalism, discrimination against minorities, civil disturbances, and the 
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radicalisation of youth; 790  and despite requests from attendees to discuss the 
implications of the bomb blast in Delhi the previous week, the government placed The 
Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) 
Bill (2011) at the top of the agenda. Opening remarks made by the Prime Minister 
confirmed the UPA’s commitment to the new legislation:  
 
We…need to recognise that members of minority communities often 
have a perception of being unfairly targeted by law enforcement agencies 
in the aftermath of unfortunate incidents. While law must take its own 
course, we need to ensure that our investigating agencies are free from 
bias and prejudice of any kind.791  
 
However, a close examination of the record of the proceedings reveals that discussion of 
the bill was hastily conducted, and the NIC meeting was used by the government to 
‘displace blame’ onto other policy actors. 
 
At the NIC the bill was opposed by the BJP-ruled states. Party leaders in the 
Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha, Arun Jaitley and Sushma Swaraj, argued that it would 
‘encourage’ rather than curb communal violence by increasing the divide between 
majority and minority communities.792 West Bengal, ruled by the Congress’ ally, TMC, 
failed to back the measure. It was also opposed by most political parties – the BJP, 
SAD, JD (U), CPI (M), BJD, RJD, and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(AIADMK) – and states because it made a distinction of victims on the basis of religion 
and language, and because it would erode the rights of the states in dealing with law and 
order. The CPI (M) explained its opposition on the grounds that ‘the existing legal 
framework is adequate to deal with all kinds of law and order situations including the 
communal disturbances’.793 Naveen Patnaik (Odisha) pointed to ‘many objectionable 
provisions, which impinge on the autonomy of the states’.794 Similar objections were 
expressed by Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and most states in the North-
east. The Chief Ministers from Gujarat (Narendra Modi), Bihar (Nitish Kumar), Uttar 
Pradesh (Mayawati), West Bengal (Mamata Banerjee), Tamil Nadu (J. Jayalalithaa), 
Punjab (Parkash Singh Badal), Rajasthan (Ashok Gehlot), and Kerala (Oommen 
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Chandy) abstained from supporting the measure. Kumar expressed concern that the bill 
would create an impression that the majority community was ‘always responsible for 
communal incidents’,795 while Mayawati refused to make an official comment for she 
had not read the draft, criticising the centre for seeking the states’ views without 
sending them the draft. The bill was supported by only four participants: John Dayal, a 
member of the NAC and NIC, and three social activists, including Asghar Ali 
Engineer.796 Perhaps most significantly, the absence of leading Chief Ministers from the 
NIC sent a clear message. As a result of this opposition, the Prime Minister had to give 
assurances in his concluding remarks that the UPA had no intention of disturbing the 
federal structure by enacting the legislation.797 The following day Home Secretary R. K. 
Singh reconfirmed the government’s commitment to keep the federal framework, and to 
engage in several rounds of consultation with states.798 
 
It would appear that by placing The Prevention of Communal and Targeted 
Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill (2011) at the top of the NIC meeting 
agenda the government was signalling – as well as showcasing – its intent. However, 
the path taken by the UPA before that meeting was a clear indication of its ambivalence 
on minority issues.799 As pointed out by Mayawati, the draft bill had not been circulated 
to political parties and state governments before the NIC meeting; and given the stiff 
opposition and criticism since its introduction in 2005, it was perhaps to be expected 
that Congress would proceed cautiously.800  
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  Following the NIC meeting, the government avoided any official announcement 
or parliamentary debate. It is unclear whether the draft bill was circulated to state 
governments and political parties. Meanwhile, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
amplified the BJP’s characterisation of the bill as anti-majority.801 At a seminar held by 
the Advocates for Dharma, leading judiciary and police officers forcefully argued that 
such a measure was both undesirable and unacceptable. K. T. Thomas, a former judge 
of the Supreme Court, asserted that the bill would not stand the scrutiny of the Supreme 
Court because it contravened Article 21 of the Constitution.802 Arguing that it would 
damage ‘national unity and integrity [and] divide society and disrupt social harmony’, 
he said it would lead to ‘disintegration’.803 Such powerful institutionalised resistance 
was also evident in the words of Joginder Singh, a former Director of the Central 
Bureau of Investigation. He termed the measure as ‘absolutely stupid’. He insisted that 
India had never discriminated against minorities, and such a ‘bill [was] more 
appropriate to Pakistan than to India’.804  
 
Despite the launch of the third national consultation by ANHAD on 21st April 
2012, and occasional campaigns by activists for the bill to be tabled, the government 
made no official move until August 2013, when communal violence erupted in 
Muzaffarnagar, leading to the displacement of over 50,000 Muslims.805 The Minister of 
Minority Affairs urged the Prime Minister to take immediate action,806 and he vowed 
that perpetrators would be given the strictest punishment. 807  In the light of the 
Muzaffarnagar violence, the executive committee of the All-India Muslim Personal Law 
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Board demanded the bill’s early enactment.808 The 2013 annual meeting of the NIC was 
held on 23rd September 2013 but the bill was not on the agenda.809  
 
Three months after Muzaffarnagar, the government finally tabled the bill in the 
Winter Session of Parliament in December 2013. 810  Before the session, the Home 
Secretary called for a meeting with the state Home Secretaries and Secretaries of central 
Ministries of Law, Social Justice, Minority Affairs, and DoPT.811 Not unexpectedly, the 
Home Secretaries from BJP-ruled states vehemently opposed the initiative. While the 
decision to convene the meeting may have seemed to indicate that the government was 
serious, one Home Ministry official candidly admitted that: 
 
though the communal violence bill is being taken up on a priority basis, 
tabling it in parliament is more a statement of intent by the ruling 
dispensation. The government wants to showcase its commitment to 
enacting a tough law against communal violence, whether or not it gets 
the support of other parties.812  
 
This symbolic approach was further underpinned by the institutionalised 
opposition to the bill expressed in letters received from Chief Ministers of Gujarat, 
Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Odisha. Banerjee castigated the proposal as a ‘political 
vendetta’, denouncing it as ‘totally anti-federal and unconstitutional’. 813  Similarly, 
Jayalalithaa warned that ‘any hasty attempt to bring in such legislation without wide 
consultation amongst all political parties and stakeholders would be a completely 
undemocratic move’.814 Reiterating her objection to the 2011 draft, and her position in 
the 2011 NIC meeting, she argued that the changes were ‘cosmetic at best’ and that 
‘many of the serious issues with the earlier draft bill still remain[ed]’. On the day the 
Winter Session was scheduled to begin, 5th December 2013, Narendra Modi, the BJP’s 
prime ministerial candidate in the forthcoming general elections, questioned the UPA’s 
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timing, terming the new proposal as ‘ill-conceived, poorly drafted and a recipe for 
disaster’.815  
 
Following Modi’s letter, the Minister of Home Affairs, Sushil Kumar Shinde, 
declared that ‘we will definitely pass the bill. The bill will be passed in this session. 
Modi is doing his work; we will do ours.’816 The Minister of Minority Affairs, K. 
Rahman Khan, also confirmed that ‘it is our duty to pass the bill, as it will be of benefit 
to the people. Only certain states are opposing this bill. I think there is no basis to 
Modi’s argument. His comments are unfortunate.’ 817  Yet, despite these comments, 
media reports suggested that the bill underwent some dramatic modifications. Some of 
the major changes included:818 the deletion of the distinction between minority and the 
majority groups; the rejection of the provision to create a new national authority; a 
reduction in the compensation for death caused by communal violence from Rs 15 lakh 
to Rs 7 lakh; reinstatement of the district magistrate and commissioner of police as the 
competent authority in a communally disturbed area; and limitation of the target group 
to ‘religious or linguistic minorities’.819 The government’s response appears to have 
been shaped by what was politically feasible. As a senior official from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs observed ‘the reworked draft bill ensures that the centre does not override 
the states’ powers, dispelling the so-called anti-federal concerns raised by BJP as well 
as parties like AIADMK, TMC and BJD’.820 
 
At the beginning of the Winter Session of Parliament, which opened on 5th 
December 2013, the UPA became preoccupied with passing the Lokpal and Lokayuktas 
Bill following reversals in the state elections in Delhi, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh 
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and Rajasthan.821 It appeared that passage of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, and the 
determination of the BJP and dissidents within Congress (over the creation of a new 
state of Telangana) to disrupt Parliament would crowd out the time for the bill. Fearing 
that it might be lost, Muslim organisations tried to increase the pressure on the 
government. The Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind held a conference in Delhi to demand the bill’s 
enactment, attended by thousands of Muslims and around 200 clerics from India and 
neighbouring countries. 822  Regionally, there were Muslim-led protests against 
victimisation and exclusion: victims of the Muzaffarnagar riots and lawyers from the 
Aligarh Muslim University Lawyers Forum demanded immediate clearance of the 
bill.823 Unexpectedly, on 16th December the bill was cleared by the Cabinet − after 
further revisions, including a greater role for the NHRC to monitor the performance of 
civil servants in preventing and controlling riots. The Minister of Home Affairs 
announced that he would table the bill in Parliament the following day, despite uproar 
from the states and political parties.824 Nitish Kumar, Bihar Chief Minister, welcomed 
the government’s move, emphasising that the centre should be empowered to intervene 
in cases of communal riots. 825  On the increased role of the NHRC, however, the 
Chairman of that body, Justice K. G. Balakrishnan, lamented that it would place an 
added burden on the commission.826 He later also noted that the monitoring the work of 
civil servants during riots was outside the purview of the institution, 827  and that 
collecting information on the violence and issuing advice to the states were excluded by 
the Protection of Human Rights Act.828 The NHRC’s reluctance to take on the new role 
for which it was cast was perhaps due to legal limitations and lack of capacity: the 
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institution had lobbied for the inclusion of SCs and STs as a target group under the 
bill.829  
 
In the event, the final Winter Session of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha was 
unproductive. It transacted very little legislative business as a result of disruptions, 
walkouts and unparliamentary behaviour which included, among other things, the use of 
pepper spray by one MP from Andhra Pradesh. 830  In the turmoil which gripped 
Parliament and Indian politics in the run up to the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the 
Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) 
Bill (2013) was its most high profile casualty. The bill was again taken up for 
introduction in the resumed Winter Session in February 2014 but deferred due to the 
Opposition’s stalling. In the words of a Supreme Court advocate, who was a former 
member of the drafting committee in the NAC:  
 
The government did not have the political will. The opposition did not 
want this law. We should have been able to calculate and factor all that 
in. But we couldn’t do that and it was a huge loss. There was the inability 
of the NAC to grasp the significance and to strategically accept these 
points. It led us to the failure and the new bill never made it to 
Parliament. We are going to be handicapped in the absence of such a 
law.831 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The inability to control and manage effectively acts of collective communal violence is 
one of the major weaknesses of Indian democracy.832 Following the election of the UPA 
in 2004, its commitment to enact model anti-communal violence legislation was a key 
component of its efforts to deliver a new framework of equality of opportunity for 
religious minorities. Such legislation, like the protective legislation for SCs and STs 
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against caste violence, had the potential to create a new normative order by increasing 
the penalties for committing acts of communal violence. 
 
 However, as our detailed analysis of the bill’s progress from 2005 onwards 
demonstrates, the UPA’s commitment to the legislation was limited and half-hearted: it 
was characterised by ambivalence, non-decisions at crucial points, and efforts at 
symbolic implementations, particularly before the 2009 and 2014 Lok Sabha elections. 
Thus, after the introduction of the bill in Parliament in 2005, the government referred it 
to the Standing Committee, and then made one feeble attempt by introducing 59 
amendments before the general election in 2009. After 2009, its response to the bill was 
mainly reactive, until a new version was drafted by the NAC and discussed at the NIC 
meeting, without adequate consultations with state governments or political parties. 
Displacing blame on to state governments and other political parties, the Congress itself 
was ambiguous in its support: the party’s approach was high on political symbolism in 
pursuing a policy that was difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Symbolic 
implementation in the face of strong institutionalised resistance against religious 
minorities, especially Muslims, reasserted the familiar pattern of historical path 
dependence. It also reconfirmed that after mid-2007, when the UPA had to rebalance its 
political coalition, the momentum for converting the contestational juncture for the 
settlement of minorities’ aspirations created by the election of the government into a 
critical juncture had been lost. 
 
 The UPA era ended with ‘competing equalities’ for SCs and STs, on the one 
hand, and religious minorities, on the other, largely in place. Despite the removal of SCs 
and STs as beneficiaries in the final draft of the bill, if the earlier versions had been 
enacted, they would have received additional protection as well as that afforded by the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989). 
Throughout the policy process Dalit groups acquiesced to the bill, and only voiced their 
concerns when they were excluded as a target group − in stark contrast to their active 
engagement when the government wanted to open SC and ST reservations in 
employment to religious minorities (See Chapter Five). Today, SCs and STs thus have 
special legal protection, but such protection eludes religious minorities.833 
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One notable feature of the development of the bill was the emergence of Muslim 
civil groups and networks around the proposed legislation. This activism led to a 
contestation of the ‘top-down’ policy approach and, ultimately, a significant input into 
the drafting of the UPA (I) and UPA (II) bills. The increased engagement of civil 
society and Muslim groups, and the growth of Muslim-centric political parties, could be 
seen as an outcome of the democratisation of the policy process, a healthy development 
for future policy in this area.834 Equally, it could be understood as the intensification of 
long-standing demands for more equal protection and security from the state against 
what Brass has called the ‘institutionalised riot system’.835 
 
Ultimately what symbolised UPA’s inability to pass the bill was not its 
performance in Parliament but the Muzaffarnagar riots. As Zoya Hasan, a noted 
academic commented: 
 
Congress wants to do things for minorities, but only up to a point. Up to a 
point and no further. When it faces opposition, [it is] one step forward 
and two steps backward. That is the policy.836  
 
In December 2013, while the debate on the bill was proceeding, Rahul Gandhi, heir 
apparent of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, visited the Muzaffarnagar relief camps. Asked 
by a refugee whether a Muslim could be an Indian ‘You are very much an Indian’, he 
snapped.837  But despite the subsequent request by Muslim leaders to pass the bill, 
neither Rahul nor Sonia Gandhi made any substantive comments on the proposal.838  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has attempted to answer one of the main puzzles of the last UPA 
administration from 2004-14: namely, why a government which came to power on a 
commitment of ‘delivering full equality of opportunity for religious minorities’ 839 
struggled to implement these policies. What were the political forces and institutional 
factors that frustrated the implementation of these policies? Why, in spite of the UPA’s 
manifesto commitment, is its record on core policy initiatives, especially with reference 
to India’s Muslims, unconvincing?  
 
 The thesis does not aim to evaluate the vast range of UPA policy initiatives 
targeted at religious minorities during the decade that the administration was in power. 
Such an undertaking, as explained in Chapter Two, would be beyond the scope of this 
work. Instead a limited assessment was undertaken of the initiatives aimed at improving 
Muslim employment opportunities and service delivery, areas where it was possible to 
investigate the complete policy process. In particular the objective of this research has 
been to arrive at a better understanding of the underlying modes of institutional and 
political resistance to such policies, especially when directed towards Muslims.  
 
 Conventional political science responses to UPA policies on religious minorities 
emphasise electoral incentives, the instrumental determinants of electoral power in India 
that limited the potential of policy change. These mainstream explanations by leading 
specialists such as Wilkinson 840  have been supplemented by accounts rooted in 
normative political theory that highlight the role of political ideology (Bajpai),841 social 
justice (Verma),842 and social exclusion (Hasan).843 These explanations, as we noted in 
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Chapters One and Two, provide some meaningful insights into the UPA policy process. 
However, their principal shortcoming is an inability to ‘pry open the black of policy 
change’844 and offer a more rounded account of policy formulation and implementation 
to explain why some policies were selected and other not, why different modes of 
implementation were adopted, and why some policies were pursued symbolically when 
there was no prospect of them being realised.  
 
 To address this lacuna this thesis develops an institutional policy analysis 
approach that combines two methodological orientations. First, it examines the policy 
process on the subject during the UPA administration: how the issue of religious 
minorities established itself on the policy agenda, policy formulation, decision-making, 
(non) implementation and evaluation. 845  Second, this approach is integrated with 
historical institutionalism and path dependence which privilege the role of institutions in 
explaining policy outcomes; that is, the contribution of actors and institutions in 
reproducing recurring patterns of behaviour over time that shape, determine and define 
particular paths of public policy from which it is difficult to exit.846 Thus, historical 
institutionalism and path dependence, which accord centrality to institutions in 
explaining outcomes, provide a necessary bridge to our research because the policy 
process during the UPA government was heavily circumscribed by historical legacies. 
Institutional structures in India, both at the national and state levels, appear to have 
played an independent role in determining the fortunes of UPA policies on religious 
minorities. Our institutional policy analysis approach, therefore, as outlined in Chapter 
Two, acknowledges historical institutionalism and path dependence as an independent 
variable and the policy process of the UPA government as the dependent variable. Or to 
put it differently, the policy process on religious minorities in India is strongly shaped 
by a form of historical institutionalisation and path dependence from which is difficult 
to change course. Change is not impossible: rather for change to take place it requires a 
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combination of circumstances and political commitment that so far have been found 
only at the sub-national level (e.g. West Bengal, Kerala, and Karnataka).  
 
 
UPA, equality of opportunity and Muslims: reassessing the experience  
 
In re-assessing the Congress-led UPA policies on religious minorities, especially 
Muslims, it is important to recognise the influence of the enduring legacy of India’s 
critical juncture during constitution-making. As Chapters One, Two and Three have 
demonstrated, and the seminal works of Bajpai,847 Verma,848 Hasan849 and Galanter850 
have confirmed, the distinction that was created by the constitution-makers between 
socio-economically disadvantaged Hindu castes and minority religions − a distinction 
that was central to the idea of modern, post-colonial India in which the political rights 
of religious minorities found few supporters − subsequently became firmly 
institutionalised around reservations and the different regimes of ‘competing equalities’. 
The different historical development of these ‘competing equalities’, we have argued, 
can be better comprehended if we recognise that they created lasting tensions by 
providing increasing political and social returns to lobbies of socio-economically 
disadvantaged castes. Simultaneously, the political claims of religious minorities − poor 
or otherwise − were progressively sidelined. Direct mobilisation by some religious 
minorities in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s was one response to this marginalisation; 
UPA efforts after 2004 to address the claims of poor minorities, particularly after 9/11, 
were another.  
 
 In the event, the UPA approach towards religious minorities was shot through by 
pragmatism, symbolism and gesture politics. The root cause of this ambivalence, a 
willingness as Hasan has noted, to do something for minorities but only ‘up to a 
point’,851 was not simply the result of electoral considerations, but is to be found in the 
institutional resistance to these policies from three core constituencies. First, this 
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included the institutionalised SCs, STs and OBCs lobbies that view themselves as the 
guardians of these caste groups’ interests. As we saw in Chapters Four and Five, some 
of these lobbies opposed the extension of reservations to poor Christians and Muslims. 
They also rejected the UPA’s new architecture for equal opportunities that threatened to 
undermine the existing institutional arrangements of ‘competing equalities’. Second, 
policies specifically targeted at religious minorities, particularly Muslims, also 
encountered stiff resistance from within the structures of the state, notably within the 
civil service and judiciary. These policies, as we have seen in Chapters Four, Five, Six, 
were either interpreted as at variance with the secular constitutional framework, or 
inconsistent with the criteria of social justice for reservations and service delivery for 
socio-economically disadvantaged castes and OBCs. Finally, these policies were firmly 
opposed by the Hindu Right (and sections of the Congress) on the grounds that they 
fundamentally compromised the constitutional settlement in challenging the hegemonic 
nationalist framework which prioritised social justice primarily directed at socio-
economically disadvantaged Hindu castes.  
 
 Although since the 1990s the OBC category has emerged as a social and 
political force and, as Fazal 852  points out, offers Dalit Christians and Muslims the 
possibilities of accommodation in the reservations net, such progress has been partial 
and limited to a few states with unique historical traditions. Overall, the distinction 
between caste and religion still endures; its dilution is firmly resisted by the powerful 
institutionalised socio-economically disadvantaged caste lobbies. As the substantive 
evidence presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven demonstrates, there is still a 
fundamental cleavage at the core of Indian nation-making between caste and religion. 
Today, this distinction is being used adroitly by the BJP in its construction of the 
nation.853 In other words, the divergent paths which Dalits, poor Christian and Muslim 
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communities of the same social background since the 1950s have followed point to a 
major, ineradicable divide at the heart of the idea of modern Indian nationhood.854 In the 
words of Perry Anderson, India has emerged as a ‘caste-iron democracy’.855 
 
 That the Indian state responds differently to policy demands from similar social 
classes if they are framed in terms of caste than religion was demonstrated in UPA’s 
approach to what has been termed Mandal II – the extension of a system of reservations 
in education for OBCs. The period witnessed the largest expansion of reservations since 
Mandal.856 Rhetorically and conceptually, this change was secured, as Bajpai857  has 
pointed out, by drawing on the discourse of social justice for socio-economically 
disadvantaged castes. Similarly, as we have demonstrated in Chapter Five, the state was 
also highly responsive to the BSP’s demand for the Promotion Quota Bill because it 
was framed in the language of social justice that provided further ‘increasing returns’ to 
institutionalised caste lobbies. But in contrast, the UPA struggled to articulate 
successfully in terms of the ‘common good’,858 the justification of special measures for 
religious minorities, especially Muslims. Whether such a discourse can be developed 
remains to be seen, though what is evident, as Hasan notes, is that there is unevenness in 
the Indian state’s approach to demands from socio-economically disadvantaged castes − 
reservations, security or discrimination − and demands from socio-economically 
disadvantaged religious groups.859  
 
 Sixty-four years after they were crafted by constitution-makers, ‘competing 
equalities’ are still largely intact. Despite the efforts of the UPA (I and II) to create a 
new, level framework of equality of opportunity for all in a modern, complex, socially 
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inclusive and, increasingly, globalised society with multiple forms of discrimination and 
disadvantage, the institutionalised caste interests that have gained from the 
constitutional settlement played a major role in undermining such initiatives. The most 
telling illustration of this (see Chapter Four) was a recommendation by OBC, SC and 
ST leaderships that the UPA’s flagship measure, the Equal Opportunity Commission 
Bill, should apply to ‘religious minorities only’. 
 
  Historical institutionalism and path dependence, as explained in Chapter Two, 
recognise that change is possible if groups or classes opposed to the original settlement 
are politically mobilised, thereby generating a contestational juncture which, under 
appropriate conditions, can be transformed into a critical juncture – an opportunity for 
replacing the original settlement with new institutions. Within the Indian political 
system with its different sub-national traditions, cultures and histories, the opportunities 
for change are immeasurably greater outside the Hindi-belt.860 As we saw in Chapter 
Five, Mamata Banerjee’s efforts to build a political base in West Bengal as the Minister 
of Railways produced a virtuous cycle for a change which may, or may not, be 
sustained. In the south, states with a long history of reservations for backward groups, 
including religious minorities, such as Kerala and Karnataka, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the delivery of substantive equality of opportunity are far more 
propitious.861 In many ways the irony of the UPA’s experience in seeking to apply the 
lessons of the south to national politics was the failure to understand the distinctiveness 
of social and political conditions that had made these state’s policies on religious 
minorities possible. 
 
 
Post-Sachar evaluation: towards historical path dependence? 
 
This thesis has been focused primarily on the forms of institutional and political 
opposition to UPA policies on religious minorities with special reference to Muslims. 
The review of literature in Chapter One emphasised that a systematic appraisal of these 
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policies, their actual impact on the ground for the intended recipients, was largely an 
unknown territory filled by the reports of advocacy organisations and NGOs with ‘grey 
literature’. The UPA government during its tenure sedulously avoided such an 
evaluation. It eventually conceded this demand towards the end of its second term when 
the Minister of Minority Affairs appointed the Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee 
headed by Prof. Amitabh Kundu to ‘review and assess the implementation of Justice 
Rajinder Sachar Committee’s recommendations and Prime Minister’s Fifteen-Point 
Programme’. 862  This committee, as we observed in Chapter Four, was finally 
constituted in August 2013, with the terms of references which included the evaluation 
of ‘the process of the implementation of decisions of the Government on the 
recommendations…[of the] Sachar Committee for institutional reforms and 
programmatic shifts…[and to] Evaluate the outcome indicators in the areas of focus as 
identified by this [Sachar] Committee’. 863  Although the Post-Sachar Evaluation 
Committee was scheduled to report within six months, before the Lok Sabah elections 
in May 2014, it submitted its final report at the end of September 2014. This report is 
yet to be placed in the public domain. Given the paucity of evaluative data, the difficult 
policy process on the subject, which included, as we saw in Chapter Four, efforts to 
suppress the release of the RMCR, and the need to provide further official evidence 
underpinning the argument in the thesis, below we provide a brief summary of the key 
empirical findings of the report and a short assessment of its contribution to the subject. 
 
 Eight years after Sachar, the Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee found ‘definite 
evidence that community-based discrimination and deprivation have not gone down in 
many of the social spheres in the country’.864 In terms of employment of Muslims in the 
public sector, for instance, the report’s data confirmed the analysis presented in Chapter 
Five (see also Appendix 1). ‘The relative employment situation of the Muslims as also 
other SRCs’, the Committee noted, ‘has not undergone much change since the adoption 
of the [Justice] SCR…The share of minorities in government employment remains low 
– less than half of the share of their total population in the country – despite all 
effort.’865 Similarly, in assessing poverty levels across SRCs, the committee found no 
discernible change in the position of the Muslim community between 2004-05 and 
                                                      
862
 ‘High-power Panel to Review Sachar Panel Report, Fifteen-Point Programme’, The Hindu, 18 
February 2013 (electronic edition).  
863
 Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee (New Delhi: GoI, 2014), 4. 
864
 Ibid., 11. 
865
 Ibid., 33. Emphasis added. 
239 
 
2011-12;866 and though educational attainment within the community improved slightly 
compared with 2004-05, standards at all levels among all communities had risen during 
the period.867 The Committee’s assessment of programmes and institutions designed to 
deliver the SCR’s recommendations was equally critical: the PM’s 15 PP schemes were 
found to ‘have too little funds and also tardy utilisation’; 868  the MSDP had been 
‘implemented in non-minority concentrated blocks’;869 within the states, ‘there was lack 
of institutional mechanism and implementation staff at the state, districts [and] block 
levels’;
870
 a large proportion of this staff lacked the ‘motivation’ to undertake these 
programmes;
871
 non-Muslims and non-Buddhists were able to ‘corner large share in 
P(riority) S(ector) L(ending)’;
872
 and the absence of monitoring of data at the local level 
in terms of SRC made it difficult to assess what share of resources had gone to any 
particular religious community.873 In short, the Committee concluded that ‘the political 
promises and rhetoric for the minority development stands quite in contrast to the 
effective benefits to minorities from the schemes’.874  
 
 However, in spite of the above assessment, and the begrudging recognition by 
the Committee that the most deprived sections of the Muslim community be brought 
within the SCs net of reservations,875 its main recommendations reaffirmed faith in the 
SCR: there was a need for a new approach to equality of opportunity that could ‘result 
in transformation of the society’;
876
 this approach required ‘a paradigm shift in dealing 
with the problem of unequal access to socio-political spaces in the country’;877 a cross-
party political consensus had to be built for such change;
878
 more information and data 
about religious minorities were necessary; and the state had to incentivise the promotion 
of diversity and empower citizens and civil society actors to effect such change.879  
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 In many ways the Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee and its recommendations 
are a product of two different masters: the UPA, which was reluctant to undertake an 
evaluation of its own policies, and the BJP-led NDA, which is implacably opposed to 
the politics of ‘minorityism’. The report is not only very poorly crafted but there is a 
clear dissonance between its analysis and recommendations. Indeed, apart from general 
observations drawn from secondary literature, there is no serious effort to engage with 
the causes of non-implementation of policies during the policy process. Remarkably, the 
issue of the security of the Muslim community is mentioned only in a single paragraph 
in the main body but identified as the key issue in ‘promoting a sense of security and 
positive perceptions’.880 Overall, the Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee report falls into 
a well-trodden lineage of standardised institutional responses by the Indian state to the 
Muslim community dating from Nehru’s time and the Gopal Committee: as a formal 
response for policy failure and ‘having done nothing for minorities’.881  
 
 
Issues for further research 
 
Our research has drawn attention to some key areas in Indian politics that remain under-
researched. Here we highlight three areas worthy of further investigation. 
 
The use of data on religious minorities 
 
Foremost among these is to review (see Chapters Five and Six) the collection and 
construction as well as the use and misuse of official data. In spite of official 
declarations, appropriate monitoring mechanisms for the regular assessment and 
progress of policies were poorly developed and operationalised. Frequently, data was 
misrepresented or inappropriately gathered and processed. In employment and service 
delivery there does not appear to have been a determined commitment to use data on 
religious minorities for effective affirmative action, either within the state structures or 
in making the data more transparent to political and civil society groups committed to 
improving the equality of opportunity for India’s Muslims. In fact, notwithstanding the 
Sachar Committee’s recommendation to establish a National Data Bank on the socio-
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economic condition of religious groups, the Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee found 
that there has been ‘no concerted effort by the Government agencies to collect relevant 
data…[and] only very limited amount of data are placed in the National Data Bank 
portal of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation which are mostly 
tabulated data from [the] Census and [the] National sample Survey.’882   
 
Further developing institutional policy analysis  
 
Analytically, the thesis combines policy analysis with historical institutionalism and 
path dependence theory. This hybrid institutional policy analysis better informs the 
policy process specific to a government and the ways it can be placed in historical 
context. This approach was developed because of the limited access to the policy 
process (the lack of transparency in policy formulation, decision-making, 
implementation, and evaluation) under the UPA − and most previous governments in 
India − and the need to historically understand the path dependent nature of caste-based 
institutionalised politics and structures for SCs, STs and OBCs. Such a broad field, as 
explained in the Introduction and Chapter Two, necessarily required a focus on the 
formal structure of the policy process and its actors. As a result, limited key case studies 
were undertaken which could illuminate the ‘black box’ of public policy formation in 
key areas that had always been highly sensitive for the Indian state. In this respect, the 
thesis complements the growing field of public policy studies in India which is 
increasingly drawing on sophisticated tools of public policy analysis to understand 
issues such as regulatory reform or administrative change.883  
 
Indeed, the thesis has highlighted the strengths and the limitations of this 
research strategy in a contested policy sector. In the absence of established protocols for 
detailed policy research in this field in India, it was decided to focus on the formal 
policy process identified with the policy cycle (Figure 2.1). In two of the case studies 
(employment and service delivery), the policy process broadly corresponded with the 
‘cycle’, though we have noted that sometimes the policy stages were merged. The third 
case study (communal violence bills) covered the period of both UPA governments but 
the policy cycle was aborted at the policy-making stage. The evidence and analysis 
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presented have thrown a new light on decision (and non-decision)-making, the 
considerations which influenced the actions (and non-actions), and the forms of 
implementation and evaluation (when indeed it was undertaken).  
 
Other areas for application of institutional policy analysis include social and 
economic policy, with agrarian policy in particular, potentially providing rich insights 
into the endurance of patterns of politics around the agricultural lobby.884 Our work has 
also drawn attention on the inter-departmental rivalries that stifled MoMA’s autonomy 
(see Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven). Institutional policy analysis, thus, has the 
potential to better illuminate the historical and institutional practices which produce − as 
well as reproduce − these outcomes, especially the rivalries between functional and 
specialist departments. Political institutions themselves, notably Parliament, also offer 
extremely invaluable insights into a re-examination of the role of the key actors in 
policy formation. And as we noted above, institutional policy analysis has significant 
scope for operationalisation at the sub-national level in the states where size and 
historical traditions offer a more variegated experience of social and political policies on 
minorities.  
 
Much more broadly, institutional path dependent analysis of the status of 
minorities in India shares several similarities with ideological approaches. Both eschew 
the more reductionist perspectives offered by methodologies such as rational choice 
theory. Both seek to offer explanations that uncover the underlying causes in the long-
term development of public policy on religious minorities. And both draw attention to 
the starting point of India’s constitution-making, the seminal event which established 
the foundational framework, or ideological normative order, within which public policy 
on minorities has been constructed. This thesis and other institutionalist accounts885 
have drawn attention to the interests that underpin the caste lobbies. Such works alert us 
to the need for a more nuanced deconstruction of the values, rhetoric and ideas which 
sustain these interests. This is particularly the case with Dalit caste lobbies and religious 
minorities which, as has been pointed out, have all too often been painted as the major 
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villains in eroding India’s democratic values.886  Equally, however, ideological path 
dependent explanations of minority policy in India also need, as we explained in 
Chapter One, a more informed understanding of the public policy process on minorities 
in which the legitimation of policy (see in particular Chapter Four) is much more a 
multi-layered process involving actors, institutions, non-decisions and symbolic and 
performative politics.  
 
Muslim civil society and political representation  
 
Comparatively, the political and civil support from representatives of the target 
communities has been one of the key variables in developing substantive equal 
opportunities policies in developed polities. Hence, in the evolution of equal 
opportunities policies in local government in England in the early 1980s, for instance, 
the increasing representation of black and ethnic minority municipal leaders was 
accompanied by the rise of civic groups and black and ethnic minority workers within 
municipal government who were able to establish political coalitions for change.887 In 
contrast, the relative weakness in the national political representation of Muslims and 
Muslim civil society in India has limited the opportunities for change. 
 
Political commentators have noted the progressive decline of Muslim 
representation in Parliament since the 1980s. Beginning with 21 MPs in 1952, Muslim 
representation gradually increased, reaching a high point in 1980 but declined 
thereafter. This decline was most notable in the 1990s and 2000s. Precisely at a time 
when the arguments for the ‘politics of presence’ and ‘representation’ have become 
mainstream for excluded groups, such as Dalits and women, the representation of 
Muslims has been moving in the opposite direction, both at the national and state levels. 
The causes of this decline are many and complex, including the non-selection of 
Muslim candidates in winnable seats by the major parties 888 Yet, whatever the causes, 
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the absence of a Muslim caucus in Parliament, as we noted in Chapter Five, militated 
against the more active promotion of the UPA’s policies for the community and the 
formation of institutions within Parliament, à la OBCs, SCs and STs, that can better act 
as guardians of the community’s interests. Without these institutions, and with the 
lowest representation of Muslims in Parliament since 1952, the ‘politics of 
representation’ without ‘presence’ is unlikely to advance the interests of religious 
minorities.  
 
Similarly, the traditional weakness of Muslim civil society has also impeded 
better policy development. This may well be the outcome of the socio-economic 
development of Muslim communities in India, but what our thesis has demonstrated is 
that under appropriate conditions Muslim civil society networks can emerge to make a 
difference. The role of ANHAD, for example, in the debates about the communal 
violence bills, is illustrative of how such advocacy groups can make an impact. The 
informal networks of Muslim policymakers and administrators, as interview data has 
demonstrated, were catalytic in fostering a collective community interest around the 
UPA’s policies. The emergence and activities, moreover, of advocacy organisations 
such as the Centre for Equity Studies, the Centre for Budget and Governance 
Accountability, and the US-India Policy Institute that engage with policymakers and 
key public institutions, such as the Planning Commission, represents new initiatives that 
are both likely to promote greater scrutiny and interest in policies directed at minorities. 
Some of these initiatives are reactive; that is, a response to the possible consequences of 
public policy. Others have been encouraged by the co-option and engagement of 
Muslim civil society networks in policy formation, for example, by the NAC. This 
interest in policy-making is likely to be further strengthened by the emergence of new 
Muslim political parties after the SCR, though they have yet to actively participate in 
the policy process.889 Surprisingly, what has been absent from the Indian debate – in 
contrast to comparative experience of Western states following 9/11 – is the active 
sponsorship of Muslim civil society networks by the state to counter-balance the 
historical under-development of such associations within the community.890 
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Summing up: ‘the verdict of history’ 
 
Reeling before the onslaught of the opposition parties, scandals, and the lowest poll 
rankings of any Prime Minister in office, three months before the 2014 Lok Sabha 
elections Manmohan Singh defended his record in government by invoking the 
judgment of history. ‘I honestly believe’, he declared: 
 
that history will be kinder to me than the contemporary media, or for that 
matter, the opposition parties in Parliament. I cannot divulge all things 
that take place in the Cabinet system of government. I think, taking into 
account the circumstances, and the compulsions of a coalition polity, I 
have done as best as I could under the circumstances.891 
 
Although most analysts recognise that whilst the UPA (II) ended in whirlwind of 
political vilification associated with a weak and ineffectual Prime Minister, nonetheless, 
its policy performances in some areas was creditable. Between 2003 and 2009, the 
economy grew at an average of 9 per cent per annum, enabling the government to fund 
extensive anti-poverty social programmes. In foreign policy there were also notable 
successes in the nuclear energy deal with the US, détente with China and a new 
dialogue with Pakistan.892 Uniquely, among developing countries, according to Manor, 
the UPA delivered ‘inclusive growth’ for a decade which witnessed rising incomes 
among rural Dalits, OBCs and Muslims. In so doing, the Congress-led UPA renewed its 
social democratic vision by skilfully balancing the management of a growing economy 
with the need for social welfare.893 
  
However, these positive evaluations rarely, if at all, include any reference to 
UPA (I and II)’s policies on religious minorities. As a government with the first 
minority community Prime Minister, and one to have won two successive general 
election victories, this silence was remarkable. In retrospect, the UPA (I)’s first three 
years of policy formation on religious minorities, and Muslims in particular, probably 
represented the high watermark of India’s ‘liberal spring’, that ephemeral moment when 
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a range of out-of-the-box thinking policy initiatives combined to create the potential for 
a new paradigm of equality of opportunity in twenty-first century India, and also deliver 
the long-delayed promise of substantive equality for disadvantaged religious 
communities such as Muslims. The SCR and RMCR were the finest hours of this 
‘liberal spring’. But these new policy initiatives, as we have seen, were short-lived as 
the ‘liberal spring’ gave way to the intense heat of the Indian summer generated by the 
opposition to these proposals. Wilkinson has perceptively concluded that so far ‘India 
has so far been fortunate to avoid alienating its 13 per cent Muslim minority from the 
polity, despite the fact that the Muslim community is worse off than the majority on 
almost every dimension.’ 894  Today, poverty and discrimination for self-conscious 
religious communities can be a fatal combination as militancy draws ‘on men and 
women who have some education but feel that their life chances are limited and that the 
state, the market and the majority community are stacked against them’.895 Viewed in 
this light, when history judges the UPA (I and II), it will judge it not on scandals, 
political mismanagement or foreign policy, which are the normal failings of most Indian 
governments, but the historic opportunity to provide substantive equality of opportunity 
with religious minorities. The reversion to the familiar pattern of historical path 
dependence suggests that it will be sometime before such a public policy programme is 
again back on the political agenda. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1.  
 
Recruitment of minorities in Central Government Departments and Public Sector 
Undertakings. 
 
Sr. 
no. 
Departments/ 
organisations 
2006-07 
Minorities 
recruited 
(%) 
2007-08 
Minorities 
recruited 
(%) 
2008-09 
Minorities 
recruited 
(%) 
2009-10 
Minorities 
recruited 
(%) 
2010-11 
Minorities 
recruited 
(%) 
2011-12 
Minorities 
recruited 
(%) 
1 Government 
Ministries/De
partment 
5485 
(8.37%) 
1620 
(8.71%) 
2593 
(12.75%) 
1339 
(8.22%) 
22349 
(11.99%) 
4665 
(4.10%) 
2 Public Sector 
Banks and 
Financial 
Institutions 
702 
(6.93%) 
1615 
(10.20%) 
4263 
(8.87%) 
2930 
(7.18%) 
4702 
(7.36%) 
4245 
(7.50%) 
3 Para Military 
Forces 
2700 
(9.49%) 
4914 
(9.90%) 
3068 
(10.22%) 
2682 
(8.16%) 
4539 
(9.21%) 
3404 
(5.60%) 
4 Posts 386 
(7.60%) 
517 
(9.65%) 
176 
(6.36%) 
617 
(8.01%) 
1293 
(8.29%) 
768 
(8.11%) 
5 Railways 1456 
(2.67%) 
2295 
(6.31%) 
2739 
(7.56%) 
1705 
(6.65%) 
1591 
(8.72%) 
3521 
(12.53%) 
6 Public Sector 
Undertakings 
1453 
(11.86%) 
(for 133 
PSUs) 
1234 
(5.52%) 
(for 126 
PSUs) 
2107 
(5.92%) 
(for 161 
PSUs) 
1322 
(5.92%) 
1218 
(7.02%) 
(for 121 
PSUs) 
1776 
(6.91%) 
(for 157 
PSUs) 
Total minorities 
recruited and 
percentage 
12182 
(6.93%) 
12195 
(8.23%) 
14946 
(9.90%) 
10595 
(7.28%) 
35692 
(10.18%) 
18379 
(6.24%) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the percentage to the total recruited employees in each 
organisation/departments in the respective years.  
 
Source: Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee (New Delhi: GoI, 2014), 122. 
 
Share (%) of persons from minority community recruited in 37 
Ministries/department of Government of India 
 
 
 
Source: Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee (New Delhi: GoI, 2014), 123.  
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